Carry out Outflanking Tactics by
Surrounding from a Distance to Pursue and
Annihilate Bai Chongxi’s Forces
(July 16, 1949)
To Lin [Biao], Deng [Zihui], and Xiao [Ke], and to Liu [Bocheng], Zhang
[Jichun], and Li [Da]:1
We received your telegram sent at 8:00 P.M. on the 14th.2
	 1.	 There are only about 40,000 enemy soldiers in Guangdong whom we have
not yet entirely defeated, and we have more than 40,000 guerrilla soldiers
there. We only need two armies plus Zeng Sheng’s two small divisions3 to
resolve the Guangdong problem. At most, we will dispatch three armies plus
Zeng Sheng’s units. This will be enough; there is no need for us to send more
troops.
	 2.	 We estimate that Bai Chongxi4 will be prepared to fight in one of the following three places: southern Hunan, Guangxi, or Yunnan. Of these places,
Guangxi is the most likely. However, you should be prepared to fight the first
stage of the battle with him in Hunan, that is, south of Hengzhou.5 In the second stage, you should be prepared to fight him in Guangxi. In the third stage,
you should be prepared to fight him in Yunnan. After Bai Chongxi’s forces retreated to southern Hunan, there were only about 100,000 soldiers left.
Song Xilian’s6 army and Cheng Qian’s army will retreat to western Hunan
and western Hubei. They will not retreat to southern Hunan.
	 3.	 Wherever the fighting place is, whether in Chaling, somewhere south
of Hengzhou, Quanzhou, Guilin, or elsewhere, you should not fight Bai
[Chongxi]’s troops by outflanking the enemy through closely surrounding
him. Rather, only by outflanking the enemy by surrounding him from a distance will you be able to gain the initiative. That means that you totally ignore
the temporary deployment of Bai’s troops while you outflank him from a distance and seize the rear of his forces, thereby ultimately giving him no choice
but to fight us. Because Bai’s bandits have little capital and are very clever,
they will not fight us. Therefore, you should prepare to drive Bai’s 100,000
bandits to Guilin, Nanning, Liuzhou, and other places in Guangxi, and then
annihilate them. You should even be prepared to pursue them to Kunming to
destroy them.
	 4.	 In order to annihilate Bai’s bandits, we should establish what the concrete
military force of our armies is. We recommend that it should consist of eight
armies composed of three units of Chen Geng’s forces,7 and five units from
the Fourth Field Army. These eight units should aim to advance deeply into
Guangxi and Yunnan in order to completely annihilate Bai’s bandits. This
force should not be mixed in with our other forces. Chen Geng’s other units
can take part in the fighting in southern Hunan, but they will not advance to
Guangxi. They will prepare to advance directly to Guiyang from Chenzhou,
and they will aim to occupy Guizhou. Chen Geng’s three units will retreat
from Kunming after they finish fighting in Guangxi. Their aim will be to
occupy and manage Yunnan. This point has already been decided in face-toface discussions with Comrade Deng Xiaoping.8 (Liu [Bocheng] and Deng
[Xiaoping]’s armies have altogether 500,000 soldiers. It has been decided
that this force, except for the four armies led by Chen Geng, will begin to
advance to Sichuan through western Hunan and Hubei and northern Guizhou
in September, arriving in November. They will be able to occupy the region
around Chongqing in December. In addition, He Long9 will lead about
100,000 soldiers into Chengdu. Comrades Liu [Bocheng], Deng [Xiaoping],
He [Long], and others will establish the Southwest China Bureau to oversee
the provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Xikang.10 The areas you will oversee have been established as the six provinces of Henan, Hubei,
Hunan, Jiangxi, Guangdong, and Guangxi. However, your Fiftieth Army
must be prepared to go to Yunnan. If the main force of Bai’s bandits retreats
to Yunnan, you must also consider dispatching one more army to Yunnan to
help with the fighting.)
	 5.	 You should consider the route by which Chen Geng’s four units will arrive
in Chenzhou. Can you divide the troops among several roads to advance
through Sichuan, Shangrao, and Chongyi? We do not know how many highways there are in that region. If there are in fact suitable roads, it would seem
that this plan to advance would be good.
	 6.	 The two units responsible for overseeing Jiangxi should not take on any
other responsibilities. The two units responsible for overseeing Guangdong
should advance through Jiangxi and Dayuling, not through southern Hunan,
because Hunan already has too many soldiers, both ours and the enemy’s,
and food will inevitably be difficult to obtain there.
	 7.	 You (five units of the Fourth Field Army and three units of Chen Geng’s
forces) should prepare to penetrate more deeply into Guangxi to seek
opportunities to annihilate the eight armies of the Guangxi system. After
you arrive at Chenzhou, if you use the Hunan-Guangxi railway to transport food and aid, it would be fastest for all troops to take the route through
Quanzhou to advance directly to Guilin and Nanning. Otherwise, the five
units of the Fourth Field Army should take the road through Guangzhou and
western Zhaoqing, winding through southern Guangxi. Chen Geng’s three
units should advance southward through Quanzhou. Alternatively, Chen
Geng’s three units should join with the two units from the Fourth Field Army
responsible for overseeing Guangdong (altogether five units) and advance
to Guangzhou via Dayuling. However, Chen Geng’s troops should not be
responsible for operations in Guangzhou; they should only pass through
on their way to southern Guangxi. The five units of the Fourth Field Army
(including the Fiftieth Army) should advance to Guilin through Quanzhou.
	 8.	 Zeng Sheng’s forces should advance swiftly to Guangdong from Jiangxi.
	 9.	 Please consider whether the aforesaid points are advisable and tell us what
you think.
The Military Commission



1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission.
Lin Biao was the commander of the Fourth Field Army and the Central China Military
Region, Deng Zihui was second political commissar of the Fourth Field Army and the
Central China Military Region, and Xiao Ke was first chief-of-staff of the Fourth Field
Army and the Central China Military Region. Liu Bocheng was commander of the Second
Field Army, and Zhang Jichun was deputy political commissar and director of the Political
Department, and Li Da was chief-of-staff of the Second Field Army.

2.  The telegram from Lin Biao et al. suggested deployments in the likelihood that the
enemy forces would withdraw south to the Xiang River or into a narrow belt in Guangxi.

3.  Zeng Sheng (1910–1995, native of Guangdong) was commander of the Guangdong
and Guangxi columns of the Fourth Field Army.

4.  Bai Chongxi was commander of the Guomindang army’s Central China Military and
Political Affairs Office.

5.  Hengzhou refers to Hengyang in Hunan.


6.  Song Xilian was director of the Guomindang army’s Sichuan-Hunan-Hubei Border
Region Pacification Office. Cheng Qian was chairman of the Guomindang Provincial Government in Hunan and director of the Changsha Pacification Office.

7.  Chen Geng was commander and political commissar of the Fourth Corps of the
Second Field Army.

8.  Deng Xiaoping was political commissar of the Second Field Army.

9.  He Long was commander of the Northwest Military Region.

10.  Xikang Province covered the western part of Sichuan and Tibet until it was abolished in 1955.