Lure the Enemy in Deep and Wait Until Our Forces Are Concentrated Before Striking

(June 9, 1949)

Comrade Dehuai:

Your telegram of the 8th[2] has been received. (1) With the forces now available, it seems we are not fully assured of victory in an all-out engagement with Ma and Hu.[3] It would be more appropriate to lure the enemy in deep and wait until our forces are concentrated before striking. (2) If you believe there is a good opportunity to destroy the enemy piecemeal, we also agree to fighting one engagement first. (3) Please analyze and telegraph us the difficulties and disadvantages of luring the enemy in deep and waiting until the end of this month or the beginning of next month when our forces are concentrated before striking.

Mao Zedong

Jiaxu, 7-9 p.m.

[1] Dehuai, i.e., Peng Dehuai, then commander and political commissar of the First Field Army.

[2] Reference to Peng Dehuai’s telegram to Mao Zedong at 10 a.m., June 8, 1949. The telegram states: “In light of the enemy situation, we plan to appropriately lure the enemy in deep, position the 2nd Army in the Qishan-Fufeng-Meixian area to block Hu’s bandit forces step by step. The 3rd and 4th Armies will assemble near Qianxian and construct in-depth defensive fortifications to draw attacks from Ma Bufang’s and Ma Hongkui’s forces. The 1st Army will assemble in the Fufeng area. The 6th Army can assemble in Liquan and areas to its north by the 10th. We plan to use four armies to attack and destroy Ma’s forces. Once Ma’s forces are exhausted, their attacks are checked, and they face difficulties with grain and fodder, we will launch an all-out counteroffensive to encircle and annihilate them.”

[3] Ma refers to Ma Jiyuan and Ma Dunjing, then respectively commander of the Kuomintang army’s Longdong (Eastern Gansu) Corps and commander of the 82nd Army, and commander of the Ningxia Corps. Hu refers to Hu Zongnan, then director of the Kuomintang army’s Xi’an Pacification Bureau.