Deployment for the Fourth Field Army’s Rest and Reorganization and Combat Operations[1]

(June 2, 1949)

Lin, Xiao, Zhao, and Nie:

Your telegram of the 30th at 16:00 hours has been received. (1) We agree that after all your armies have assembled, they should rest and reorganize for a short period, and then advance simultaneously in three or two columns (except that the Thirteenth Army Corps should attack and annihilate the enemy north of the Yangtze River a few days earlier). This plan can proceed in parallel, pushing forward in one continuous drive to the line of Ganzhou, Chenzhou, and Yongzhou (Lingling), followed by a month of rest and reorganization, with only certain necessary short rests along the way. In order to subject Bai Chongxi’s[2] various units to our fierce assault and relentless pursuit, catching them off guard and annihilating them one by one, just as Liu and Deng[3] drove from the riverbank to northern Fujian in one continuous push, after your armies reach their designated attack preparation positions, as long as the food supply situation permits, they should rest and reorganize for at least half a month to recover from fatigue and unify their resolve, and then advance according to plan. (2) Cheng Qian, Li Mo’an, and Chen Mingren[4] have the possibility of cooperating with us to oppose Chiang Kai-shek and the Guangxi clique. Li Mo’an has already made contact with our side in Hong Kong, and the Hong Kong side is now earnestly carrying out this
work. Please also use Zhang Zhen to encourage Cheng Qian to stand on our side, but the initiative must not be launched too early. Bai Chongxi should be allowed to engage in combat without concern, and only after Bai’s forces have been dealt with should the initiative be launched to bring them over to our side. (3) It is very good that the 42nd Army has decided to remain in Henan. The heavy artillery units can stay in Wuhan to garrison the area. Hubei has forces in Tongbai, Jianghan, and Dabie Mountains, which are sufficient for local defense. The one army originally designated to remain in Hubei can advance southward. The Military Commission has already issued orders on the 2nd. [1] Zhang Zhen, formerly Deputy Commander of the Central China Military and Political Affairs Office of the Kuomintang Army and Commander of the 19th Army Corps, led an uprising on May 15, 1949, in the area of Heshengqiao and Jinkou south of Wuchang, Hubei.

Manuscript of "Deployment for the Fourth Field Army’s Rest and Reorganization and Combat Operations" drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee.

Issues Concerning the Timing of Actions for Entering Sichuan and Fujian[1]

(June 2, 1949)

East China Bureau, General Front Committee, and to be communicated to Liu, Zhang, and Li[2]:

Your telegram of the 29th of May[3] has been received. (1) We agree that the Second Field Army should enter Sichuan and actively prepare, striving to set out in early August if circumstances permit. (2) Deng Xiaoping must prepare to go to Sichuan. (3) The issue of cadres should be arranged according to the Central Committee’s telegram of yesterday. (4) We agree that Ye Fei’s three armies should enter Fujian. It would be even better if the timing of the action could be advanced to the last ten days of this month. (5) One army and a portion of the artillery attacking Qingdao can set out around the 10th of June.

Military Commission

June 2

[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee to the East China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and the General Front Committee.

[2] Liu, Zhang, and Li refer to Liu Bocheng, Zhang Jichun, and Li Da, who were then serving as Commander, Deputy Political Commissar and Director of the Political Department, and Chief of Staff of the Second Field Army, respectively.

[3] This refers to the telegram sent by the East China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and the General Front Committee to the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee on May 29, 1949. The telegram stated: "In the future, probing offensive actions by the United States and Britain may occur one after another. It is entirely necessary for the Central Committee to handle this with caution and be prepared for any eventuality. We plan to send one army from the Eighth Army Corps, with an attached artillery regiment, to Qingdao, setting out around early June. The three armies of Ye Fei’s Tenth Army Corps plan to rest and reorganize for one month and set out in early July to swiftly capture all of Fujian Province. The Second Field Army’s entry into Sichuan is imperative and should be carried out as early as possible. Active preparations must be made to set out in early August. The greatest difficulty is the issue of cadres. The Second Field Army has no local cadres at hand. Has the Central Committee made any preparations for this? Please advise. Whether Comrade Deng Xiaoping needs to go to Sichuan must be indicated early so that we can consider the organizational issues of the East China Bureau."

--- Notes

[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee to Lin Biao, Commander of the Fourth Field Army and concurrently Commander of the Central China Military Region; Xiao Ke, First Chief of Staff; Zhao Erlu, Second Chief of Staff; and Nie Heting, Deputy Chief of Staff.

[2] Bai Chongxi was then serving as Commander of the Central China Military and Political Affairs Office of the Kuomintang Army.

[3] Liu and Deng refer to Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, who were then serving as Commander and Political Commissar of the Second Field Army, respectively.

[4] Cheng Qian was then serving as Chairman of the Hunan Provincial Government of the Kuomintang and Director of the Kuomintang Changsha Pacification Office. Li Mo’an was then serving as Deputy Director of the Kuomintang Changsha Pacification Office and Commander of the 17th Pacification Zone. Chen Mingren was then serving as Commander of the First Army Corps of the Kuomintang.