Two Plans for the Thirteenth Army to Attack Song Xilian’s Forces[1]
(May 29, 1949)

Lin, Xiao, Zhao:

Regarding the timing of the Thirteenth Army’s attack on Song Xilian’s forces and the crossing of the river, this matter merits consideration. There are two plans for this issue. One is, without waiting for the eastern route to concentrate on the Nanchang–Jiujiang line or the central route to concentrate in southern Hubei, for the Thirteenth Army to immediately attack Song’s forces, cross the river, and occupy Changde. The advantage is that it would catch Bai Chongxi off guard by suddenly striking one of his routes (Bai Chongxi seems to expect that our army will wait until all three routes are assembled before attacking, and our army is not yet fully assembled at present), making it possible to annihilate the greater part of Song Xilian’s forces. The disadvantage is that after our army occupies Changde, the rear flanks of the enemy’s eastern and central routes will be threatened, and they may rapidly withdraw to Hengzhou. The other plan is for the Thirteenth Army not to attack Song’s forces for the time being, but to wait until our eastern and central routes are fully assembled, or until the central route (southern Hubei) is assembled, and then launch a simultaneous attack with three routes or two routes. The advantage is that it may be possible to annihilate the enemy forces on three routes or two routes simultaneously, and then advance southward in a coordinated pursuit. The disadvantage is that if Bai Chongxi sees that all three of our routes are assembled, he may order a simultaneous withdrawal on all three routes, causing us to lose the opportunity to annihilate the enemy. As to which of the above two plans is preferable, please consider and reply.

Military Commission
22:00, the 29th

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Notes
[1] This was a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee addressed to Lin Biao, Commander of the Fourth Field Army and concurrently Commander of the Central China Military Region, First Chief of Staff Xiao Ke, and Second Chief of Staff Zhao Erlu. In a telegram drafted for the Military Commission and addressed to Lin Biao and Xiao Ke on May 28 of the same year, Mao had pointed out that the “combat effectiveness of Song Xilian’s forces is relatively weak, and your use of three armies for the attack is sufficient.” And that they should “strive to annihilate the main force of this enemy, and as far as possible prevent this main force from retreating into the mountainous areas of western Hubei and western Hunan.”
[2] Song Xilian was then Commander of the Xiang-Hubei Border Pacification Area of the Kuomintang forces.
[3] Bai Chongxi was then Director of the Central China Military and Political Affairs Command of the Kuomintang forces.
[4] Hengzhou refers to Hengyang in Hunan Province.