Countermeasures and Deployments Prepared
in Advance against the Military Intervention
by Imperialism
 (May 28, 1949)
To Peng [Dehuai] and He [Long], Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping], Chen
[Yi], Rao [Shushi], and Su [Yu], Lin [Biao] and Luo [Ronghuan]:1
	 1.	 Recently, there have been signs that the imperialist countries might join
together to interfere with the revolution. Such signs are apparent from the
following examples: the United States and twelve other countries, including
England and France, are holding discussions to unify their policies regarding China; the number of American warships in Qingdao has increased; all
of the ambassadors of various countries who have remained in Nanjing are
preparing to withdraw; England is increasing the number of its soldiers in
Hong Kong; the Guomindang in Guangzhou has also expressed its glee; and
so forth. We cannot yet determine whether or not these signs will develop
into actual interference, but we should prepare countermeasures in advance
just in case.
	 2.	 The most important aspect of our countermeasures is that all of our field
armies will advance following a predetermined plan and will annihilate the
remaining forces of the Guomindang, thereby causing the imperialists of
every country to lose their running dogs on the Chinese mainland. The second aspect is to do our utmost to attain economic self-sufficiency, so when
a naval blockade occurs, we will be prepared to deal with it. It is extremely important with regard to this aspect that we unite with the capitalists and
intellectuals of our country so that they stand on our side. The third aspect
is to deploy ample forces in North and East China in order to prevent the
U.S. Navy from cooperating with the Guomindang army and navy to launch
surprise attacks and foment chaos in the region behind our lines.
	 3.	 As for preventing the U.S. Navy from cooperating with the Guomindang
army and navy to assault the region behind our lines, in addition to having ordered Yang Chengwu’s corps2 and Zhong Chibing’s artillery column3
to organize a defense in front of Qinhuangdao and Tanggu, we will also
make the following special deployments: (a) Yang Dezhi’s corps4 and the
Eighteenth Corps will continue to advance along the same route in the direction of Fengxiang. After their various units have joined together, they will
prepare to annihilate the main forces of Hu [Zongnan], Ma [Bufang], and Ma
[Hongkui]5 in the Shaanxi-Gansu Border Region. If we attain our goals during this battle and if the situation in North China requires it, then we will prepare to have Yang Dezhi’s corps remain in the area of Baoji and Fengxiang
to await opportunities and at the same time to do their utmost quickly to
repair the Luoyang-Baoji railway in order to facilitate transport. (b) Lin
[Biao] and Luo [Ronghuan] will leave one army in Henan to be responsible
for destroying the bandits when it is not fighting and will go to North China
as reinforcements when the need arises. (c) Chen [Yi], Rao [Shushi], and Su
[Yu] will take one army plus the necessary number of artillery soldiers to
Qingdao to await orders to occupy Qingdao, which they will then be responsible for holding. It is extremely good that there are already two armies in
the region of Nanjing, Zhenjiang, and Suzhou, and three armies in the region
of Zhejiang. There should be seven armies in the region of Wusong and
Shanghai. Pay particular attention to strengthening the battery equipment in
Wusong and Jiangyin. Except for those armies responsible for holding cities
and destroying bandits in the countryside, all of the armies mentioned above
should be swiftly deployed for training and consolidation. The force attacking Fujian should not exceed two armies. (d) The entire Second Field Army,
apart from one unit, will await orders to cross the Gan River to coordinate
with the Fourth Field Army to annihilate the Guangxi Clique outside of the

Yuan River valley. The remaining unit will primarily engage in consolidation and training as well as helping to destroy the bandits in its present location during the two months of June and July. After the two months are over,
we will decide on a plan of action based on the situation at that time.
	 4.	 We expect you to report your opinions on the above points to us.
The Military Commission

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Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 5, pp. 600–602, where it is
reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission.
Peng Dehuai was commander and political commissar of the First Field Army, and He
Long was commander of the Northwest Military Region. Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping
were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Second Field Army. Chen Yi
was commander and political commissar of the Third Field Army. Rao Shushi was commander of the East China Military Region. Su Yu was deputy commander and second
deputy political commissar of the Third Field Army. Lin Biao and Luo Ronghuan were
commander and first political commissar, respectively, of the Fourth Field Army and the
Central China Military Region.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-279

2.  Yang Chengwu was commander of the Twentieth Army Group, which at the time was
directly subordinate to the Central Military Commission.

3.  The artillery column of Zhong Chibing (1914–1975, born in Pingjiang county,
Hunan) was formerly the Northeast Field Army Artillery Column, but at the time it was
part of the Fourth Field Army Special Forces, with Wan Yi as commander and Zhong Chibing as political commissar.

4.  Yang Dezhi was commander of the Nineteenth Corps of the First Field Army.

5.  Hu Zongnan was director of the Guomindang army’s Xi’an Pacification Office. Ma
Bufang and Ma Hongkui were acting commanding officer and deputy commanding officer,
respectively, of the Guomindang army’s Northwest Military and Political Affairs Office.