Agree to the Temporary Halt of the First Field Army’s Advance[1]

(May 26, 1949)

Peng, Zhang, Zhao:

Your decision to temporarily halt the advance after capturing Fengxiang and other areas and annihilating a portion of the enemy is correct. At present, the Hu and Ma forces are coordinating along the line from Changwu to Baoji in an attempt to block our offensive. However, our 18th and 19th Corps will still need three to four weeks before they can reach the Xifu[2] region. With your current strength, you can engage Hu but cannot simultaneously take on Ma. To engage both at the same time, you must wait for the arrival of the 18th and 19th Corps, or at least one of them, to have confidence in success; otherwise, there is no certainty. Therefore, you should patiently wait for three to four weeks without impatience. Once the 18th and 19th Corps arrive and a few good battles are fought, you can directly take Lanzhou and fundamentally resolve the Northwest issue. As long as Hu and Ma do not withdraw, there will always be battles to fight. Only under one circumstance—namely, if Hu’s forces retreat toward Hanzhong and it is confirmed that Hu and Ma cannot coordinate (i.e., Ma’s forces do not truly threaten our flank)—may you pursue Hu’s forces toward Hanzhong without waiting for the 18th and 19th Corps to arrive. Have you also calculated this? Has Peng arrived at the field headquarters? Awaiting your report.

Military Commission

Chenyou

[1] This telegram was drafted by Mao Zedong for the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee and addressed to Peng Dehuai, commander and political commissar of the First Field Army, and deputy commanders Zhang Zongxun and Zhao Shoushan.

[2] Xifu refers to the area between the Jing and Wei rivers in Shaanxi, historically known as Fengxiang Prefecture.

Agree to the Temporary Halt of the First Field Army’s Advance

Peng Dehuai, your revised plan to halt the advance after establishing a base at Fengxiang is correct. Currently, Hu and Xi forces are blocking our offensive along the Changwu-Baoji line, while our 18th and 19th Corps will only reach the Xiyuan region after a period of time. With your current forces, you can engage Hu but cannot simultaneously handle both. To engage both, you must wait for the 18th and 19th Corps to arrive, or at least one corps, to have confidence; otherwise, the situation remains uncertain.

You must patiently wait three to four weeks without impatience. Once the corps arrive and a few good battles are fought, you can directly take Qingzhou and fundamentally resolve the Northwest issue. As long as Hu’s forces do not withdraw, battles will continue. Only under one circumstance—if Hu’s forces retreat toward Mozhong and it is confirmed that Hu and Ma cannot coordinate (i.e., Ma’s forces do not threaten our flank)—may you pursue Hu’s forces toward Mozhong without waiting for the 18th and 19th Corps to arrive.

Have you also calculated this? Has Peng arrived at the field headquarters? Awaiting your report.

Manuscript of "Agree to the Temporary Halt of the First Field Army’s Advance," drafted by Mao Zedong for the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee.

Circular on the Experience of Taking Over Enterprises in Beiping and Tianjin

(May 26, 1949)

East China Bureau, Central China Bureau, Northwest Bureau, Nanjing Municipal Committee:

Based on the experience in Beiping and Tianjin, during the initial period of occupying cities, if personnel assigned to take over enterprises only prepare for takeover without planning for operations, and only send operators after the takeover, the takeover personnel will adopt a "five-day mayor" mentality, showing no interest in operations, wasting materials, and causing significant losses to enterprise production. Therefore, the responsible persons sent to take over enterprises in the initial phase should, as far as possible, be selected from those who can be entrusted with operations. Instruct them not only to take over well but also to manage well, ensuring that production suffers no losses. This point must be noted. Furthermore, enterprise materials (whether stored in factories or already delivered to the Nationalist government but not yet paid for) must not be treated as war booty to be confiscated, distributed, or consumed. If enterprise materials (such as cotton cloth, bedding, and other manufactured goods) are consumed as war booty, the government will inevitably have to pay the enterprises for them before they can resume operations; otherwise, the enterprises will shut down and be unable to continue production. This is also based on the experience in Beiping and Tianjin, which was previously communicated to the East China Bureau. It is reiterated here for your attention and dissemination to subordinate units.

Central Committee

Chenyou