Problems Requiring Attention When
Occupying Areas Such as Wusong and
Jiaxing
(May 6, 1949)
To Su [Yu] and Zhang [Zhen] (forward to Tan [Zhenlin], Wang [Jian’an], and Ji
[Pengfei]); Chen [Yi] and Rao [Shushi]; Liu [Bocheng] and Deng [Xiaoping]:1
	 1.	 We received Chen [Yi] and Rao [Shushi]’s telegram sent on May 5.2
	 2.	 We request that from May 10 to 15 Su [Yu] and Zhang [Zhen] should first
deploy troops to occupy Wusong and Jiaxing, and block off the river port
of Wusong and the seaport of Zhapu so as to cut off the retreat of enemy
forces from Shanghai, thereby ensuring that Shanghai’s resources will not
be removed in large quantities by sea (according to several reports from Wu
Wenyi3 in Shanghai, Tang Enbo4 is shipping out goods and materials), and
enabling the use of peaceful methods to resolve the problem of Shanghai. Su
[Yu] and Zhang [Zhen] are to inform us of specific deployments by telegram.
	 3.	 We are afraid that occupying Wusong necessitates occupying the towns of
Kunshan, Taicang, and Baoshan. However, with regard to Jiading and places east of Kunshan, such as Lujiabang, Anting, and so on, we need not occupy
them for the time being if it is unnecessary.
	 4.	 After we occupy Jiaxing, we should go on to occupy locations such as
Jiashan, Jinshan, Pinghu, Zhapu, and Jinshanwei,5 but for now we should not
occupy places such as Qingpu, Songjiang, and Fengxian.
	 5.	 Furthermore, after Tan [Qilong], Wang [Jian’an], and Ji [Pengfei]’s group
rests for several days in the area of Hangzhou, it should dispatch one or two
armies eastward to occupy the line from Hangzhou to Ningbo and counties
such as Fenghua, Sheng county, Xinchang, Zhuji, and Yiwu that lie south
of that line, and after that it should commence operations. When it occupies Fenghua, it should warn its soldiers not to destroy Chiang Kaishek’s
residence, ancestral temples, and other buildings. When it occupies places
such as Shaoxing and Ningbo, it should take care to preserve the homes and
properties of large, medium-sized, and minor capitalists of the Ningbo faction in order to win over these capitalists and get them to cooperate with us
in Shanghai or to minimize their trouble-making behavior.
	 6.	 You should not delay the plan of occupying Shanghai just because you will
also be occupying Wusong and Jiaxing. When exactly we occupy Shanghai
should be decided in accordance with the degree to which our preparations
have been completed. It would be best to have one more month to complete
our preparatory work, but you should be prepared to occupy Shanghai earlier if the situation requires it. Therefore, your preparatory work should be
finished as soon as possible.
	 7.	 Su [Yu] and Zhang [Zhen] are to warn your armies in advance that when
occupying Wusong to pay extreme attention to avoid conflict with foreign
warships.
	 8.	 Liu [Bocheng], Zhang [Jichun], and Li [Da]6 should focus on protecting the
tomb of Sun Yatsen in Nanjing and on looking after the men protecting this
tomb.
The Military Commission

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Notes

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 5, pp. 575–77, where it is
reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission to
Su Yu, deputy commander and second deputy political commissar of the Third Field Army,
and Zhang Zhen (张震) who was chief-of-staff of the Third Field Army. Tan Zhenlin was
first deputy political commissar of the Third Field Army. Wang Jian’an was commander of
the Seventh Corps of the Third Field Army, and Ji Luo (Ji Pengfei) was political commissar
and head of the Political Department of the Seventh Corps of the Third Field Army. Chen Yi
was commander and political commissar of the Third Field Army. Rao Shushi was political
commissar of the East China Military Region, and Deng Xiaoping was political commissar
of the Second Field Army. Liu Bocheng was commander of the Second Field Army.

2.  The telegram from Chen Yi and Rao Shushi discussed the benefits of first occupying
Wusong and Jiaxing.

3.  Wu Wenyi, also known as Wu Kejian, was a member of the Chinese Communist
Party’s underground Shanghai Municipal Party Committee.

4.  Tang Enbo was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang army’s Beiping-ShanghaiHangzhou Garrison Command.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-267

5.  Jinshanwei is located in the southern part of Shanghai’s Jinshan county.

6.  Zhang Jichun was deputy political commissar and head of the Political Department
of the Second Field Army, and Li Da was chief-of-staff of the Second Field Army.