Postponing the Occupation of
Hangzhou and Shanghai
(May 3, 1949)
To the General Front Committee, the East China Bureau, and to Su [Yu] and
Zhang [Zhen]:1
	 1.	 We received the telegram sent by the General Front Committee on April 30.2
	 2.	 Tan [Zhenlin], Wang [Jian’an], and Ji [Pengfei]’s3 troops are approaching
Hangzhou. We do not know whether or not they will be stopped. In the city
of Hangzhou, aside from a small number of people acting as the rear guard
and led by Zhou Yan4 who have yet to retreat, the troops, the policemen, and
the provincial government offices have since pulled back to Ningbo, and
public security within the city is being maintained by temporarily organized civilian policemen. Under these circumstances, Tan [Zhenlin], Wang
[Jian’an], and Ji [Pengfei]’s troops need not rush to occupy Hangzhou. For
the moment, Hangzhou can be controlled by the Public Order Committee
that was established earlier (having appeared under the name of a relief committee), and by local gentry such as Lu Gongwang [1879–1954, native of
Zhejiang], and they can wait for the arrival of our cadres. Su [Yu] and Zhang
[Zhen], please decide whether or not this is possible.
Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 5, pp. 573–74, where it is
	 3.	 It has been decided that we will not move to occupy Shanghai before May
10 so as to have a period of ten days for preparatory work. After May 10, we
should execute plans along one of two lines: First, immediately move in to
occupy Shanghai. This is assuming that Tang Enbo5 will pull out of Shanghai
within ten days and that Shanghai will fall into anarchy, a situation that will
force us to occupy it. Your preparations should primarily be focused on this
point. If not, you will be caught at a disadvantage. Previously, in the three
months you took to prepare to cross the Yangzi River, you did not set aside
a month for your troops to study policies and issues pertaining to the seizure
of cities, nor did you prepare yourselves psychologically or organizationally
for the possibility of taking those cities very quickly, for which you have lost
out. Now you will have to make up for these various deficiencies within ten
days. Second, you will postpone the move to occupy [Shanghai] by half a
month or twenty days or one month. As long as Tang Enbo does not retreat
from Shanghai, you should do this. The occupation of Liuhe6 can also be
postponed. We had mentioned in previous telegrams that you should await
our orders before occupying Shanghai. Su [Yu] and Zhang [Zhen], please
take note of this point.
The Military Commission
reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission. Su
Yu was deputy commander and second deputy political commissar of the Third Field Army,
and Zhang Zhen (张震) was chief-of-staff of the Third Field Army.

2.  The telegram from the General Front Committee stated that based on experience in
Nanjing, occupying a major city without appropriate preparations was extremely disadvantageous. The committee advised at least ten days of training and consolidation before
occupying Hangzhou and Shanghai.

3.  Tan Zhenlin was first deputy political commissar of the Third Field Army. Wang
Jian’an was commander of the Seventh Corps of the Third Field Army, and Ji Luo (Ji Pengfei) was deputy political commissar and head of its Political Department.

4.  Zhou Yan (1895?–1953, native of Zhejiang) was deputy commander-in-chief of the
Guomindang army’s Beiping-Shanghai-Hangzhou Garrison Command and commander of
the Zhejiang Garrison Command.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-266

5.  Tang Enbo was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang army’s Beiping-ShanghaiHangzhou Garrison Command.

6.  Liuhe is a town in northeastern Taicang county, Jiangsu Province.