[1]. To the East China Bureau and the General Front Committee; also to Su and Zhang, Liu, Zhang, and Li; and to all Bureaus and Committees: Telegram No. 2 has been received and understood.
(1) The handling of the Yanyou incident was very satisfactory.
(2) Without Central approval, the Nanjing Telegraph Bureau arbitrarily stopped foreign journalists from sending news telegrams. Please immediately ascertain who was responsible for this action and report back promptly.
(3) In our view, neither Nanjing nor Shanghai should, for the time being, suspend the transmission of news telegrams by foreign journalists. The Nanjing authorities should reopen the service, allowing foreign correspondents to transmit their reports without any censorship. After a certain period, once we have assessed the situation, the Central leadership will decide whether to completely prohibit such transmissions or to permit only reputable journalists to send their dispatches while barring those deemed unreliable.
(4) With regard to directives on policy and working methods, at the level of your senior leadership bodies, the primary means should be through telegrams and general orders, rather than through meetings of cadres or oral instructions. A single official can draft a telegram in half an hour and a general order in an hour. Within one, two, three, or four days, these documents can be transmitted via radio to all armies, divisions, and regiments, as well as to provinces, cities, and counties, providing a written record with clearly defined scope. This approach is both swift and ensures that lower-level units have clear guidance to follow. Comrade Mao Zedong has already suggested this method to Comrade Rao Shushi on numerous occasions.
However, in your case, you continue to issue instructions on certain policies and their implementation orally, rather than in writing. Oral instructions are indeed necessary and useful; they are indispensable. Nevertheless, they lack a written record, their scope is often unclear, and only a small number of those present at the meeting hear them, while the majority who were not in attendance remain uninformed—resulting in significant omissions (as in cadre meetings where only verbal reports are made, without any formal written resolutions).
The recent turmoil surrounding diplomatic policy over just a few days arose precisely because, in the past, you had never issued any written communications or telegrams to lower levels on this matter. Even when instructions were given on specific issues, if they were not simultaneously brought to the attention of leaders at all army, division, and regimental levels, as well as in every province, city, and county, or if the directives failed to emphasize, highlight, and clearly define the relevant points and boundaries, local authorities would still remain confused or only partially informed.
Now, in light of the recent disturbances in Nanjing, if you fail to adopt the practice of sending telegrams and issuing general orders to inform all armies, divisions, and regiments, as well as every province, city, and county, similar problems will inevitably recur in Shanghai, Hangzhou, Suzhou, Zhenjiang, Wuxi, Wuhu, and other localities. The principal responsibility for such incidents lies not with the lower ranks, but with the leadership, which either failed to provide adequate prior warnings or neglected to warn and take corrective action.
Your previous failure to issue telegrams or general orders concerning urban and industrial policies in Shandong and northern Jiangsu for an extended period left lower-level officials at a loss, each acting independently and causing considerable damage. This too serves as an important lesson.
Printed by the Central Military Commission on Mao Zedong’s manuscript, dated You Thirty.
Notes:  [1] “Su and Zhang” refers to Su Yu and Zhang Zhen, who at the time held the posts of Deputy Commander and Second Political Commissar, and Chief of Staff, respectively, of the Third Field Army. “Liu, Zhang, and Li” refers to Liu Bocheng, Zhang Jichun, and Li Da, who at the time served as Commander, Deputy Political Commissar cum Director of the Political Department, and Chief of Staff, respectively, of the Second Field Army.  [2] “Yanyou” denotes the You hour of the twenty-ninth day.  [3] Rao Shushi was then Secretary of the East China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Political Commissar of the East China Military Region.