We Must Strive to Make the River Crossing a Single, Unqualified Success
(17 April 1949)
[1]
General Front Committee, and for information to Su and Zhang, Liu, Zhang and Li:
Your telegram of the 15th (xu hour) received. Negotiations reached a temporary conclusion on the 15th (April 15). The period from the 16th to the 20th (April 20) is allowed for Nanjing to consider and make its decision. During this time, our troops must capture all enemy strongholds on the north bank and in mid-river that need to be taken. After the 20th, which day we cross the river is entirely for our side to choose and is not subject to any restrictions. In our telegram of the 16th (chen hour) we asked whether you could change the river crossing from the 22nd to the 25th; this was said on the assumption that Nanjing would agree to sign, and that they would indeed sign on the 20th but then request a few days for deployment from our side—it did not mean it absolutely must be changed to the 25th. Whether Nanjing agrees to sign on the 20th is determined by the attitude of the United States and Chiang Kai-shek, and therefore we are not very confident about it. The Nanjing side believes our army will encounter great difficulty crossing the river;

[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China to the General Front Committee.
[2] Su and Zhang refer to Su Yu and Zhang Zhen, who at the time were respectively Deputy Commander and concurrently Second Deputy Political Commissar, and Chief of Staff of the Third Field Army. Liu, Zhang, and Li refer to Liu Bocheng, Zhang Jichun, and Li Da, who at the time were respectively Commander, Deputy Political Commissar and concurrently Director of the Political Department, and Chief of Staff of the Second Field Army.
[3] Refers to the telegram from the General Front Committee to the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China sent at the xu hour on 15 April 1949. The telegram stated that, along the Nanjing to Anqing sector, except for points like Jinhekou, Xiaohuangzhou, and Jiangxinzhou, where the defending enemy forces are concentrated and would require more than three days to capture, the remainder can all be taken either in one night on 20 April or within two days. The western section of the enemy's river defense is relatively weak, so a breakthrough there is easier. In the eastern section, enemy forces are more concentrated, so we must prepare for sustained, fierce fighting over several days before we can break through and gain a foothold. As for the 20 April operation, whether it is to mark the beginning of the formal river-crossing assault or whether, after only seizing the bridgeheads on the north bank, a pause will still be necessary—they request further instructions preferably by the 18th.
[4] That is, “The Standpoint Should Be Placed on Crossing the River by Force in Case Negotiations Break Down.”

We Must Strive to Make the River Crossing a Single, Unqualified Success
they do not believe our army can cross the river on a large scale. We estimate that before the 20th they may continue to ignore us, wanting to see whether our army can really cross the river after the 20th. If our army really succeeds in crossing the river on the 22nd (April 22), the agreement could still be signed on the 23rd, 24th, 25th, or thereabouts. Therefore you should adhere to the original plan, confirm the river crossing for the 22nd and do not change it, and you must strive to make it a single, unqualified success. That is of the utmost importance.
Central Military Commission
17th, 3:00 hours