︹︺１The General Front Committee, Su Zhang, Liu Zhang Li: ︹︺２(1) The General Front Committee has received and acknowledged the telegram sent at the Chen hour.


(2) With regard to enemy strongholds on the north bank and in the middle of the river, those that can be captured within one night and which will facilitate a southward crossing on the following night should be seized on the eve of the crossing. As for those that cannot be taken in a single night and require substantial preparatory work after capture before a successful southward crossing can be made, they should be secured well in advance. Please handle these matters according to actual conditions.


(3) The final draft of the peace agreement was submitted last night (the 15th) to Representative Zhang Zhizhong’s delegation. This morning (the 16th), Huang Shaohong flew to Nanjing to seek instructions. Whether Nanjing will agree to sign depends on the attitudes of the U.S. government and Chiang Kai-shek. If they are willing, signing may take place on Maogai; otherwise, the negotiations will collapse.


(4) Your strategic position should be based on the assumption that negotiations will fail and that a combat-style crossing will be necessary. Ensure that the crossing is successfully completed in one decisive operation on the 22nd (Maoyang).


(5) What we now ask you to consider is this: Suppose Nanjing is willing to sign on Maogai but requests a few days after signing to redeploy its forces. In such a case, could our army postpone the crossing by another three days—moving it from Maoyang to Maoyou (the 25th)? Would such a delay hinder troop morale or the successful completion of the crossing mission? When making this assessment, you should still assume that even if Nanjing signs, reactionary commanders like Tang Enbo may refuse to comply, necessitating a combat crossing. Based on this assumption, if you conclude that no further postponement is advisable, we will reject Nanjing’s request. Only if you determine that delaying until Maoyou (the 25th) to launch a combat crossing would not pose an obstacle will we be prepared to accede to Nanjing’s request. Please deliberate and reply by telegram. Additionally, we request that you report on the current state of crossing preparations, your confidence in the success of the operation, and the time required to complete the full crossing of all forces.


Issued by the Military Commission at 8:00 a.m. on the 16th, printed from Mao Zedong’s handwritten draft.


Notes ︹︺１Su Zhang refers to Su Yu and Zhang Zhen, who at the time served respectively as Deputy Commander and Second Political Commissar, and Chief of Staff of the Third Field Army. Liu refers to Liu Bocheng, then Commander of the Second Field Army. Zhang refers to Zhang Jichun (1900–1968), from Yizhang, Hunan Province, who at the time held the posts of Deputy Political Commissar and Director of the Political Department of the Second Field Army. Li refers to Li Da, who served as Chief of Staff of the Second Field Army at the time. ︹︺２This refers to a telegram dated April 15, 1949, sent at the Chen hour by the General Front Committee to the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee, with copies to Liu Bocheng, Zhang Jichun, Li Da, Su Yu, Zhang Zhen, and Tan Zhenlin. The telegram stated that it was deemed worthwhile to seek political gains through negotiation, even if it entailed some military inconvenience. Therefore, it advocated launching operations on April 20: enemy positions on the north bank and in the river that could be captured overnight should be seized that night, while those that could not be taken immediately should be left undisturbed and captured over the course of two to three days. It was further emphasized that future military actions would be more advantageous if they could be sustained once initiated. ︹︺３This refers to the Kuomintang government’s peace negotiation delegation, with Zhang Zhizhong as its chief representative. ︹︺４Huang Shaohong was at the time a peace negotiation representative of the Kuomintang government. ︹︺５Maogai corresponds to April 20. ︹︺６Tang Enbo (1900–1954), from Wuyi, Zhejiang Province, served at the time as Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army’s General Garrison Command for the Beijing–Shanghai–Hangzhou Area.