OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA


March 5, 1949

[The Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held its Second
Plenary Session in Hsipaipo Village, Pingshan County, Hopei Province, from
March 5 to 13, 1949. Thirty-four members and nineteen alternate members of
the Central Committee were present. This session, which was convened on the
eve of the country-wide victory of the Chinese people's revolution, was extremely
important. In his report at the session, Comrade Mao Tse-tung set forth policies
to promote the speedy achievement of the country-wide victory of the revolution
and to organize this victory. He explained that with this victory the centre
of gravity of the Party's work should be shifted from the village to the
city, defined the basic political, economic and foreign policies the Party
should adopt after victory and set the general tasks and main course for
transforming China from an agricultural into an industrial country, from
a new-democratic into a socialist society. In particular, he analysed the
current conditions in the different sectors of China's economy and the correct
policies the Party had to adopt, pointed out the necessary ways to realize
the socialist transformation in China, criticized various "Left" and Right
deviations on this question and expressed the firm conviction that China's
economy would develop at a comparatively high speed. Comrade Mao Tse-tung
appraised the new situation in the class struggle both at home and abroad
following the victory of the Chinese people's democratic revolution and gave
timely warning that the "sugar-coated bullets" of the bourgeoisie would become
the main danger to the proletariat. All this gives the document great
significance for a long historical period. This report and his article On
the People's Democratic Dictatorship, written in June of the same year,
formed the basis for the policies embodied in the Common Programme adopted
by the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference, which served as a provisional constitution after the founding
of New China. The Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee
of the Party adopted a resolution based on Comrade Mao Tse-tung's report.
After the session, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
moved from Hsipaipo, Pingshan County, Hopei Province to Peiping.]


## I

With the conclusion of the Liaohsi-Shenyang, Huai-Hai and Peiping-Tientsin
campaigns, the main force of the Kuomintang army has been destroyed. Only
a million odd of its combat troops are left, dispersed over vast areas from
Sinkiang to Taiwan and over extremely long fronts. From now on there can
be only three patterns for disposing of these Kuomintang troops -- the Tientsin
pattern, the Peiping pattern or the Suiyuan
pattern.[1] To dispose of the enemy forces by fighting,
as we did in Tientsin, must still be the primary object of our attention
and preparations. The commanders and fighters of the entire Chinese People's
Liberation Army absolutely must not relax in the least their will to fight;
any thinking that relaxes the will to fight and belittles the enemy is wrong.
The possibility has increased for solutions on the Peiping pattern, that
is, to compel enemy troops to reorganize peacefully, quickly and thoroughly
into the People's Liberation Army in conformity with the latter's system.
For the purpose of rapidly eliminating the vestiges of counter-revolution
and liquidating its political influence, this solution is not quite as effective
as the solution by fighting. However, it is bound to occur and is unavoidable
after the main force of the enemy has been destroyed; furthermore, it is
advantageous to our army and the people because casualties and destruction
can be avoided. Therefore, the leading comrades of the various field armies
should all pay attention to this form of struggle and learn how to use it.
This is one form of struggle, a form of struggle without bloodshed; it does
not mean that problems can be solved without struggle. The Suiyuan pattern
is deliberately to keep part of the Kuomintang troops wholly or nearly intact,
that is, to make temporary concessions to these troops in order to help win
them over to our side or neutralize them politically. Thereby, we can concentrate
our forces to finish off the main part of the remnant Kuomintang forces first
and then, after a certain period (say, a few months, half a year or a year
later), proceed to reorganize these troops into the People's Liberation Army
in conformity with its system. That is another form of struggle. It will
preserve more of the vestiges and political influence of counter-revolution
than the Peiping form and for a longer period. But there is not the slightest
doubt that they will eventually be eliminated. It must never be assumed that,
once they yield to us, the counter-revolutionaries turn into revolutionaries,
that their counterrevolutionary ideas and designs cease to exist. Definitely
not. Many of the counter-revolutionaries will be remoulded, some will be
sifted out, and certain die-hard counter-revolutionaries will be suppressed.

## II

The People's Liberation Army is always a fighting force. Even after country-wide
victory, our army will remain a fighting force during the historical period
in which classes have not been abolished in our country and the imperialist
system still exists in the world. On this point there should be no
misunderstanding or wavering. The People's Liberation Army is also a working
force; this will be the case especially when the Peiping or the Suiyuan pattern
of solution is used in the south. With the gradual decrease in hostilities,
its function as a working force will increase. There is a possibility that
before very long the entire People's Liberation Army will be turned into
a working force, and we must take this possibility into account. The 53,000
cadres now ready to leave with the army for the south are very inadequate
for the vast new areas we shall soon hold, and we must prepare to turn all
the field armies, 2,100,000 strong, into a working force. In that event,
there will be enough cadres and the work can develop over large areas. We
must look upon the field armies with their 2,100,000 men as a gigantic school
for cadres.

## III

From 1927 to the present the centre of gravity of our work has been in the
villages -- gathering strength in the villages, using the villages in order
to surround the cities and then taking the cities. The period for this method
of work has now ended. The period of "from the city to the village" and of
the city leading the village has now begun. The centre of gravity of the
Party's work has shifted from the village to the city. In the south the People's
Liberation Army will occupy first the cities and then the villages. Attention
must be given to both city and village and it is necessary to link closely
urban and rural work, workers and peasants, industry and agriculture. Under
no circumstances should the village be ignored and only the city given attention;
such thinking is entirely wrong. Nevertheless, the centre of gravity of the
work of the Party and the army must be in the cities; we must do our utmost
to learn how to administer and build the cities. In the cities we must learn
how to wage political, economic and cultural struggles against the imperialists,
the Kuomintang and the bourgeoisie and also how to wage diplomatic struggles
against the imperialists. We must learn how to carry on overt struggles against
them, we must also learn how to carry on covert struggles against them. If
we do not pay attention to these problems, if we do not learn how to wage
these struggles against them and win victory in the struggles, we shall be
unable to maintain our political power, we shall be unable to stand on our
feet, we shall fail. After the enemies with guns have been wiped out, there
will still be enemies without guns; they are bound to struggle desperately
against us; we must never regard these enemies lightly. If we do not now
raise and understand the problem in this way, we shall commit very grave
mistakes.

## IV

On whom shall we rely in our struggles in the cities? Some muddle-headed
comrades think we should rely not on the working class but on the masses
of the poor. Some comrades who are even more muddle-headed think we should
rely on the bourgeoisie. As for the direction of industrial development,
some muddle-headed comrades maintain that we should chiefly help the development
of private enterprise and not state enterprise, whereas others hold the opposite
view that it suffices to pay attention to state enterprise and that private
enterprise is of little importance. We must criticize these muddled views.
We must whole-heartedly rely on the working class, unite with the rest of
the labouring masses, win over the intellectuals and win over to our side
as many as possible of the national bourgeois elements and their representatives
who can co-operate with us -- or neutralize them -- so that we can wage a
determined struggle against the imperialists, the Kuomintang and the
bureaucrat-capitalist class and defeat these enemies step by step. Meanwhile
we shall set about our task of construction and learn, step by step, how
to administer cities and restore and develop their production. Regarding
the problem of restoring and developing production we must be clear about
the following: first comes the production of state industry, second
the production of private industry and third handicraft production. From
the very first day we take over a city, we should direct our attention to
restoring and developing its production. We must not go about our work blindly
and haphazardly and forget our central task, lest several months after taking
over a city its production and construction should still not be on the right
track and many industries should be at a standstill, with the result that
the workers are unemployed, their livelihood deteriorates and they become
dissatisfied with the Communist Party. Such a state of affairs is entirely
impermissible. Therefore, our comrades must do their utmost to learn the
techniques of production and the methods of managing production as well as
other closely related work such as commerce and banking. Only when production
in the cities is restored and developed, when consumer-cities are transformed
into producer-cities, can the people's political power be consolidated. Other
work in the cities, for example, in Party organization, in organs of political
power, in trade unions and other people's organizations, in culture and
education, in the suppression of counter-revolutionaries, in news agencies,
newspapers and broadcasting stations -- all this work revolves around and
serves the central task, production and construction. If we know nothing
about production and do not master it quickly, if we cannot restore and develop
production as speedily as possible and achieve solid successes so that the
livelihood of the workers, first of all, and that of the people in general
is improved, we shall be unable to maintain our political power, we shall
be unable to stand on our feet, we shall fail.

## V

Conditions in the south are different from those in the north, and the Party's
tasks must also be different. The south is still under Kuomintang rule. There,
the tasks of the Party and the People's Liberation Army are to wipe out the
Kuomintang's reactionary armed forces in city and countryside, set up Party
organizations, set up organs of political power, arouse the masses, establish
trade unions, peasant associations and other people's organizations, build
the people's armed forces, mop up the remnant Kuomintang forces and restore
and develop production. In the countryside, our first tasks are to wage struggles
step by step, to clean out the bandits and to oppose the local tyrants (the
section of the landlord class in power) in order to complete preparations
for the reduction of rent and interest; this reduction can then be accomplished
within a year or two after the arrival of the People's Liberation Army, and
the precondition for the distribution of land will thus be created. At the
same time care must be taken to maintain the present level of agricultural
production as far as possible and to prevent it from declining. In the north,
except for the few new Liberated Areas, conditions are completely different.
Here the Kuomintang rule has been overthrown, the people's rule has been
established and the land problem has been fundamentally solved. Here the
central task of the Party is to mobilize all forces to restore and develop
production; this should be the centre of gravity in all work. It is also
necessary to restore and develop cultural and educational work, wipe out
the remnants of the reactionary forces, consolidate the entire north and
support the People's Liberation Army.

## VI

We have already carried out extensive economic construction, and the Party's
economic policy has been implemented in practice and has achieved marked
success. However, there are still many muddled views within the Party on
the question of why we should adopt this kind of economic policy and not
another, i.e., on a question of theory and principle. How should this question
be answered? In our opinion, the answer should be as follows. Before the
War of Resistance Against Japan, the proportions of industry and agriculture
in the entire national economy of China were, modern industry about 10 per
cent, and agriculture and handicrafts about 90 per cent. This was the result
of imperialist and feudal oppression; this was the economic expression of
the semi-colonial and semi-feudal character of the society of old China;
and this is our basic point of departure for all questions during the period
of the Chinese revolution and for a fairly long period after victory. This
gives rise to a series of problems regarding our Party's strategy, tactics
and policy. An important task for our Party at present is to reach a clearer
understanding of these problems and their solution. That is to say:

1. China already has a modern industry constituting about 10 per cent of
her economy; this is progressive, this is different from ancient times. As
a result, China has new classes and new political parties -- the proletariat
and the bourgeoisie, proletarian and bourgeois parties. The proletariat and
its party, because they have been oppressed by manifold enemies, have become
steeled and are qualified to lead the Chinese people's revolution. Whoever
overlooks or belittles this point will commit Right opportunist mistakes.

2. China still has scattered and individual agriculture and handicrafts,
constituting about 90 per cent of her entire economy; this is backward, this
is not very different from ancient times -- about 90 per cent of our economic
life remains the same as in ancient times. We have abolished, or will soon
abolish, the age-old feudal ownership of land. In this respect, we have become,
or will soon become, different from what we were in ancient times, and have
or will soon have the possibility of modernizing our agriculture and handicrafts
step by step. In their basic form, however, our agriculture and handicrafts
today are still scattered and individual, somewhat as they were in ancient
times, and they will remain so for a fairly long time to come. Whoever overlooks
or belittles this point will commit "Left" opportunist mistakes.

3. China's modern industry, though the value of its output amounts to only
about 10 per cent of the total value of output of the national economy, is
extremely concentrated; the largest and most important part of the capital
is concentrated in the hands of the imperialists and their lackeys, the Chinese
bureaucrat-capitalists. The confiscation of this capital and its transfer
to the people's republic led by the proletariat will enable the people's
republic to control the economic lifelines of the country and will enable
the state-owned economy to become the leading sector of the entire national
economy. This sector of the economy is socialist, not capitalist, in character.
Whoever overlooks or belittles this point will commit Right opportunist mistakes.

4. China's private capitalist industry, which occupies second place in her
modern industry, is a force which must not be ignored. Because they have
been oppressed or hemmed in by imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism,
the national bourgeoisie of China and its representatives have often taken
part in the people's democratic revolutionary struggles or maintained a neutral
stand. For this reason and because China's economy is still backward, there
will be need, for a fairly long period after the victory of the revolution,
to make use of the positive qualities of urban and rural private capitalism
as far as possible, in the interest of developing the national economy. In
this period, all capitalist elements in the cities and countryside which
are not harmful but beneficial to the national economy should be allowed
to exist and expand. This is not only unavoidable but also economically
necessary. But the existence and expansion of capitalism in China will not
be unrestricted and uncurbed as in the capitalist countries. It will be
restricted from several directions -- in the scope of its operation and by
tax policy, market prices and labour conditions. We shall adopt well-measured
and flexible policies for restricting capitalism from several directions
according to the specific conditions in each place, each industry and each
period. It is necessary and useful for us to apply Sun Yat-sen's slogan of
"regulation of capital".[2] However, in the interest
of the whole national economy and in the present and future interest of the
working class and all the labouring people, we must not restrict the private
capitalist economy too much or too rigidly, but must leave room for it to
exist and develop within the framework of the economic policy and planning
of the people's republic. The policy of restricting private capitalism is
bound to meet with resistance in varying degrees and forms from the bourgeoisie,
especially from the big owners of private enterprises, that is, from the
big capitalists. Restriction versus opposition to restriction will be the
main form of class struggle in the new-democratic state. It is entirely wrong
to think that at present we need not restrict capitalism and can discard
the slogan of "regulation of capital"; that is a Right opportunist view.
But the opposite view, which advocates too much or too rigid restriction
of private capital or holds that we can simply eliminate private capital
very quickly, is also entirely wrong; this is a "Left" opportunist or adventurist
view.

5. Scattered, individual agriculture and handicrafts, which make up 90 per
cent of the total value of output of the national economy, can and must be
led prudently, step by step and yet actively to develop towards modernization
and collectivization; the view that they may be left to take their own course
is wrong. It is necessary to organize producers', consumers' and credit
co-operatives and leading organs of the co-operatives at national, provincial,
municipal, county and district levels. Such co-operatives are collective
economic organizations of the labouring masses, based on private ownership
and under the direction of the state power led by the proletariat. The fact
that the Chinese people are culturally backward and have no tradition of
organizing co-operatives may confront us with difficulties, but cooperatives
can and must be organized and must be promoted and developed. If there were
only a state-owned economy and no cooperative economy, it would be impossible
for us to lead the individual economy of the labouring people step by step
towards collectivization, impossible to develop from the new-democratic society
to the future socialist society and impossible to consolidate the leadership
of the proletariat in the state power. Whoever overlooks or belittles this
point will also commit extremely serious mistakes. The state-owned economy
is socialist in character and the co-operative economy is semi-socialist;
these plus private capitalism, plus the individual economy, plus the
state-capitalist economy in which the state and private capitalists work
jointly, will be the chief sectors of the economy of the people's republic
and will constitute the new-democratic economic structure.

6. The restoration and development of the national economy of the people's
republic would be impossible without a policy of controlling foreign trade.
When imperialism, feudalism, bureaucrat-capitalism and the concentrated
expression of all three, the Kuomintang regime, have been eliminated in China,
the problem of establishing an independent and integrated industrial system
will remain unsolved and it will be finally solved only when our country
has greatly developed economically and changed from a backward agricultural
into an advanced industrial country. It will be impossible to achieve this
aim without controlling foreign trade. After the country-wide victory of
the Chinese revolution and the solution of the land problem, two basic
contradictions will still exist in China. The first is internal, that is,
the contradiction between the working class and the bourgeoisie. The second
is external, that is, the contradiction between China and the imperialist
countries. Consequently, after the victory of the people's democratic revolution,
the state power of the people's republic under the leadership of the working
class must not be weakened but must be strengthened. The two basic policies
of the state in the economic struggle will be regulation of capital at home
and control of foreign trade. Whoever overlooks or belittles this point will
commit extremely serious mistakes.

7. China has inherited a backward economy. But the Chinese people are brave
and industrious. With the victory of the Chinese people's revolution and
the founding of the people's republic, and with the leadership of the Communist
Party of China, plus the support of the working class of the countries of
the world and chiefly the support of the Soviet Union, the speed of China's
economic construction will not be very slow, but may be fairly fast. The
day is not far off when China will attain prosperity. There is absolutely
no ground for pessimism about China's economic resurgence.

## VII

Old China was a semi-colonial country under imperialist domination. Thoroughly
anti-imperialist in character, the Chinese people's democratic revolution
has incurred the bitter hatred of the imperialists who have done their utmost
to help the Kuomintang. This has aroused the Chinese people to even deeper
indignation against the imperialists and deprived them of their last shred
of prestige among the Chinese people. At the same time the whole imperialist
system is very much weakened after World War II, while the strength of the
world anti-imperialist front headed by the Soviet Union is greater than ever
before. In these circumstances, we can and should adopt a policy of
systematically and completely destroying imperialist domination in China.
This imperialist domination manifests itself in the political, economic and
cultural fields. In each city or place where the Kuomintang troops are wiped
out and the Kuomintang government is overthrown, imperialist political domination
is overthrown with it, and so is imperialist economic and cultural domination.
But the economic and cultural establishments run directly by the imperialists
are still there, and so are the diplomatic personnel and the journalists
recognized by the Kuomintang. We must deal with all these properly in their
order of urgency. Refuse to recognize the legal status of any foreign diplomatic
establishments and personnel of the Kuomintang period, refuse to recognize
all the treasonable treaties of the Kuomintang period, abolish all imperialist
propaganda agencies in China, take immediate control of foreign trade and
reform the customs system -- these are the first steps we must take upon
entering the big cities. When they have acted thus, the Chinese people will
have stood up in the face of imperialism. As for the remaining imperialist
economic and cultural establishments, they can be allowed to exist for the
time being, subject to our supervision and control, to be dealt with by us
after country-wide victory. As for ordinary foreign nationals, their legitimate
interests will be protected and not encroached upon. As for the question
of the recognition of our country by the imperialist countries, we should
not be in a hurry to solve it now and need not be in a hurry to solve it
even for a fairly long period after countrywide victory. We are willing to
establish diplomatic relations with all countries on the principle of equality,
but the imperialists, who have always been hostile to the Chinese people,
will definitely not be in a hurry to treat us as equals. As long as the
imperialist countries do not change their hostile attitude, we shall not
grant them legal status in China. As for doing business with foreigners,
there is no question; wherever there is business to do, we shall do it and
we have already started; the businessmen of several capitalist countries
are competing for such business. So far as possible, we must first of all
trade with the socialist and people's democratic countries; at the same time
we will also trade with capitalist countries.

## VIII

All the conditions are ripe for convening the Political Consultative Conference
and forming a democratic coalition government. All the democratic parties,
people's organizations and democrats without party affiliation are on our
side. The bourgeoisie in Shanghai and in the Yangtse valley are trying to
establish contacts with us. Navigation and postal communications between
north and south have been resumed. The disintegrating Kuomintang has alienated
itself from all the masses. We are preparing to have negotiations with the
reactionary Nanking government.[3] Its moving forces
for negotiating with us are the warlords of the Kwangsi clique, those factions
of the Kuomintang favouring peace and the Shanghai bourgeoisie. Their aims
are to obtain a share in the coalition government, retain as many troops
as possible, preserve the interests of the bourgeoisie in Shanghai and the
south and do their best to moderate the revolution. These groups recognize
our eight terms as the basis for negotiations, but they want to bargain so
that their losses will not be too great. Those trying to wreck the negotiations
are Chiang Kai-shek and his sworn followers. Chiang Kai-shek still has sixty
divisions south of the Yangtse and they are preparing to fight. Our policy
is not to refuse negotiations, but to demand that the other side accept the
eight terms in their entirety and to allow no bargaining. In return, we would
refrain from fighting the Kwangsi clique and the other Kuomintang factions
which favour peace, postpone the reorganization of their troops for about
a year, allow some individuals in the Nanking government to take part in
the Political Consultative Conference and the coalition government and agree
to protect certain interests of the bourgeoisie in Shanghai and in the south.
The negotiations are to be on an over-all basis and, if successful, they
will reduce many obstacles to our advance into the south and to the take-over
of the big cities there, which will have great advantages. If they are not
successful, then separate negotiations on a local basis will be held after
our army advances. The negotiations on an over-all basis are tentatively
fixed for late March. We hope to occupy Nanking by April or May, then convene
the Political Consultative Conference in Peiping, form a coalition government
and make Peiping the capital. Since we have agreed to hold negotiations,
we should be prepared for the many troubles which will arise after the success
of the negotiations, and we should be ready with clear heads to deal with
the tactics the other side will adopt, the tactics of the Monkey who gets
into the stomach of the Princess of the Iron Fan to play the
devil.[4] As long as we are fully prepared mentally,
we can beat any devilish Monkey. Whether the peace negotiations are overall
or local, we should be prepared for such an eventuality. We should not refuse
to enter into negotiations because we are afraid of trouble and want to avoid
complications, nor should we enter into negotiations with our minds in a
haze. We should be firm in principle; we should also have all the flexibility
permissible and necessary for carrying out our principles.

## IX

The people's democratic dictatorship, led by the proletariat and based on
the worker-peasant alliance, requires that our Party conscientiously unite
the entire working class, the entire peasantry and the broad masses of
revolutionary intellectuals; these are the leading and basic forces of the
dictatorship. Without this unity, the dictatorship cannot be consolidated.
It is also required that our Party unite with as many as possible of the
representatives of the urban petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie who
can co-operate with us and with their intellectuals and political groups,
so that, during the revolutionary period, we can isolate the
counter-revolutionary forces and completely overthrow both the
counter-revolutionary and imperialist forces in China and so that, after
the victory of the revolution, we can speedily restore and develop production,
cope with foreign imperialism, steadily transform China from an agricultural
into an industrial country and build China into a great socialist state.
Therefore, our Party's policy of long-term co-operation with non-Party democrats
should be clearly established in the thinking and work of the whole Party.
We must regard the majority of non-Party democrats as we do our own cadres,
consult with them sincerely and frankly to solve those problems that call
for consultation and solution, give them work, entrust them with the
responsibility and authority that should go with their posts and help them
do their work well. Proceeding from the desire to unite with them, we should
carry out serious and appropriate criticism or struggle against their errors
and shortcomings in order to attain the objective of unity. It would be wrong
to adopt an accommodating attitude towards their errors or shortcomings.
It would also be wrong to adopt a closed-door or perfunctory attitude towards
them. In each big or medium city, each strategic region and each province,
we should develop a group of non-Party democrats who have prestige and can
co-operate with us. The incorrect attitude towards non-Party democrats, fostered
by the closed-door style in our Party during the War of Agrarian Revolution,
was not entirely overcome during the War of Resistance Against Japan, and
it reappeared in 1947 during the high tide of the land reform in the base
areas. This attitude would serve only to isolate our Party, prevent the
consolidation of the people's democratic dictatorship and enable the enemy
to obtain allies. Now that China's first Political Consultative Conference
under the leadership of our Party will soon be convened, that a democratic
coalition government will soon be formed and that the revolution will soon
be victorious throughout the country, the whole Party must make a serious
and self-critical examination of this problem and understand it correctly;
it must oppose the two deviations, the Right deviation of accommodation and
the closed-door and perfunctory "Left" deviation, and adopt an entirely correct
attitude.

## X

Very soon we shall be victorious throughout the country. This victory will
breach the eastern front of imperialism and will have great international
significance. To win this victory will not require much more time and effort,
but to consolidate it will. The bourgeoisie doubts our ability to construct.
The imperialists reckon that eventually we will beg alms from them in order
to live. With victory, certain moods may grow within the Party -- arrogance,
the airs of a self-styled hero, inertia and unwillingness to make progress,
love of pleasure and distaste for continued hard living. With victory, the
people will be grateful to us and the bourgeoisie will come forward to flatter
us. It has been proved that the enemy cannot conquer us by force of arms.
However, the flattery of the bourgeoisie may conquer the weak-willed in our
ranks. There may be some Communists, who were not conquered by enemies with
guns and were worthy of the name of heroes for standing up to these enemies,
but who cannot withstand sugar-coated bullets; they will be defeated by
sugar-coated bullets. We must guard against such a situation. To win countrywide
victory is only the first step in a long march of ten thousand li.
Even if this step is worthy of pride, it is comparatively tiny; what will
be more worthy of pride is yet to come. After several decades, the victory
of the Chinese people's democratic revolution, viewed in retrospect, will
seem like only a brief prologue to a long drama. A drama begins with a prologue,
but the prologue is not the climax. The Chinese revolution is great, but
the road after the revolution will be longer, the work greater and more arduous.
This must be made clear now in the Party. The comrades must be taught to
remain modest, prudent and free from arrogance and rashness in their style
of work. The comrades must be taught to preserve the style of plain living
and hard struggle. We have the Marxist-Leninist weapon of criticism and
self-criticism. We can get rid of a bad style and keep the good. We can learn
what we did not know. We are not only good at destroying the old world, we
are also good at building the new. Not only can the Chinese people live without
begging alms from the imperialists, they will live a better life than that
in the imperialist countries.

## Notes


[1] On September 19, 1949, Tung Chi-wu, Kuomintang governor
of Suiyuan Province, and Sun Lan-feng, Kuomintang army commander, revolted
and came over with more than forty thousand men. The regrouping of these
units began on February 21, 1950, under the leadership of the Suiyuan Military
Command of the People's Liberation Army. They were reorganized into the People's
Liberation Army on April 10.

[2] "Regulation of capital" was one of Sun Yat-sen's well-known
slogans. The Manifesto of the Kuomintang's First National Congress, in which
the Kuomintang and the Communist Party co-operated, was published on January
23, 1924 and gave the following interpretation to this slogan: "Private
industries, whether of Chinese or of foreign nationals, which are either
of a monopolistic nature or are beyond the capacity of private individuals
to develop, such as banking, railways, and navigation, shall be undertaken
by the state, so that privately owned capital shall not control the economic
life of the people."

[3] Concerning peace negotiations with the reactionary Nanking
Kuomintang government, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China
made the following decisions on March 26, 1949:

  (1) Time for the negotiations to begin, April 1;


  (2) Place for the negotiations, Peiping;


  (3) Chou En-lai, Lin Po-chu, Lin Piao, Yeh Chien-ying and Li Wei-han are
  appointed as delegates (on April 1, the Central Committee decided to add
  Nieh Jung-chen to the list of delegates), with Chou En-lai as chief delegate,
  to negotiate with the Nanking delegation on the basis of Chairman Mao Tse-tung's
  Statement on the Present Situation made on January 14 and the eight terms
  set forth therein;


  (4) The reactionary Nanking Kuomintang government is to be immediately notified
  of the aforesaid by radio broadcast and told to send its delegation to the
  specified place, at the specified time and, in order to facilitate the
  negotiations, to bring all necessary material relating to the eight terms.


[4] For the story of how Sun Wu-kung, the Monkey, changed
himself into a tiny insect, found his way into the stomach of the Princess
of the Iron Fan and thus defeated her, see the Chinese novel, Pilgrimage
to the West, Chapter 59.

Transcription by the Maoist Documentation Project.