It Is Extremely Important Not to Underestimate the Enemy[1]

(February 13, 1949)

Comrades Xiaoping and Chen Yi, with copies to Rao, Kang, Zeng, Su, and Tan[2]:

(1) Your report of February 6[3] has been received and is excellent. It will be forwarded to various units for study and to guide the correction of similar deviations. We welcome such reports analyzing ideological trends within the Party. (2) The Central Plains Field Army and the Central Plains Party have just concluded a conference of over 100 senior cadres, so there is no need for another meeting. It seems appropriate for the East China Field Army to hold another senior cadres’ conference around February 18 to review the implementation of the previous meeting’s decisions, intensify preparations for crossing the Yangtze, and convey the directive to shift focus to the cities. After the meeting, you should come to attend the Second Plenary Session, arriving at the Central Committee by February 27 or 28. (3) The point about not underestimating the enemy is extremely important. We say that the Kuomintang has basically been overthrown and that there may be no more large-scale battles like those in western Liaoning[4] and the Huaihai Campaign in the future. This must absolutely not lead to a mindset of underestimating the enemy. The enemy will still struggle, and we will still have to fight. However, future operations may not reach the scale of those in western Liaoning and the Huaihai Campaign, where 500,000 to 600,000 enemy troops were annihilated each time, and the possibility of partial peaceful resolutions has increased.

[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, addressed to Deng Xiaoping, Political Commissar of the Second Field Army, and Chen Yi, Commander and Political Commissar of the Third Field Army.

[2] Rao and Kang refer to Rao Shushi and Kang Sheng, then Secretary and Deputy Secretary of the East China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, respectively. Zeng refers to Zeng Shan, then Head of the Organization Department of the East China Bureau. Su and Tan refer to Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin, then Deputy Commander and Second Deputy Political Commissar, and First Deputy Political Commissar of the Third Field Army, respectively.

[3] This refers to the report submitted by Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yi on February 6, 1949, to the CPC Central Committee on the transmission and discussion of the resolutions of the January 8 Political Bureau meeting.

[4] This refers to the Liaoxi-Shenyang Campaign.