January 11–18, 1949. At that time, we still referred to the Kuomintang’s reactionary, traitorous government as a “government.” In this respect, our attitude was indeed not sufficiently solemn. But does this so-called “government” even exist anymore? Is it based in Nanjing? There are no administrative organs there. Is it based in Guangzhou? There is no chief executive. Is it based in Shanghai? Shanghai has neither administrative organs nor a chief executive. Or is it based in Fenghua? All that remains there is a self-styled president who has already “retired”; there is nothing else. To regard it as a government at all, it can at best be considered a hypothetical or purely symbolic “government,” and only on the assumption that there exists a spokesperson capable of speaking on its behalf. If so, that spokesperson should recognize that this hypothetical, symbolic Kuomintang reactionary, traitorous government has not only made no progress whatsoever in peace negotiations but is, in fact, continually creating new complications. For example, while you were so urgently pressing for talks, you suddenly acquitted General Okamura—wasn’t that precisely an unwarranted complication? And after the Chinese Communist Party demanded his re-arrest, you sent him back to Japan, along with another one hundred sixty war criminals—was that not also an unwarranted complication?

Who rules Japan today? Is it the Japanese people, or are imperialist elements still in control? Japan is such a beloved place to you that you seem to believe it would be safer, more comfortable, and more fitting to have these Japanese war criminals reside in Japan rather than in areas under your own jurisdiction. Is this a judicial matter? Why has such a judicial issue arisen? Have you forgotten that you waged war against the Japanese aggressors for eight whole years? Is it entirely unrelated to the peace talks? When the CCP put forward its Eight Points on January 14, the release of General Okamura had not yet occurred. By January 16, when that release took place, it had become directly relevant to the negotiations. Then, on January 31, you complied with MacArthur’s orders and dispatched those one hundred sixty Japanese war criminals, together with Okamura, to Japan—making the matter even more closely tied to the peace talks.

Why do you seek peace negotiations? Because you have been defeated. Why were you defeated? Because you launched a civil war against the people. When did you initiate this civil war? After Japan’s surrender. Against whom did you wage this war? Against the People’s Liberation Army and the liberated areas, which had borne the brunt of the War of Resistance Against Japan. With what forces did you fight? Apart from American aid, you mobilized troops conscripted and extorted from the populace within your own controlled territories. Hardly had the great showdown between the Chinese people and the Japanese aggressors come to an end—the conclusion of an external war—when you launched this internal conflict. Now that you have been vanquished and are demanding negotiations, you suddenly declare the principal Japanese war criminal, General Okamura, innocent. No sooner had we lodged a protest, calling for his detention under guard No. 4 and preparation for handover to the People’s Liberation Army, than you hastily shipped Okamura and one hundred sixty other Japanese war criminals off to Japan.

Gentlemen of the Kuomintang reactionary, traitorous government: your actions are utterly unreasonable and run counter to the will of the people. We have deliberately added the word “traitorous” to your official title, and you ought to acknowledge this fact. Your government has long been a traitorous regime; we have sometimes omitted these two characters merely to save space, but no longer. Beyond your previous “crime of treason,” you have now committed another act of treason—indeed, a very serious one—which must be discussed at the peace negotiation table. Whether you choose to call it an “unwarranted complication” or not, this issue cannot be avoided, for it arose after January 14 and was not included in our original eight conditions.

Accordingly, we propose adding a new item to the first condition: the punishment of Japanese war criminals. Thus, that clause would comprise two parts: (a) the punishment of Japanese war criminals; and (b) the punishment of domestic war criminals. Our proposal is justified and reflects a widespread sentiment throughout the country that Japanese war criminals should be brought to justice. Even within the Kuomintang itself, many hold the view that punishing them is just as natural and necessary as punishing your own domestic war criminals. Regardless of whether you claim to harbor peaceful intentions or not, both categories of war crimes must be negotiated and ultimately punished.

As for your contention that there should be no preconditions to the talks—that you should first arrest a group of domestic war criminals and prevent their escape—we maintain that this is not a precondition; rather, it is a logical demand arising once you have acknowledged the punishment of war criminals as the basis for negotiation. The purpose of the arrest is to prevent these criminals from fleeing. While we were still in the preparatory stages of the talks, you yourselves were frantic to begin, driven by sheer anxiety; hence, we urged you to undertake a sensible measure: these criminals must be apprehended, no matter where they may try to hide. You profess to be compassionate souls dedicated to “shortening the duration of the war,” “alleviating the suffering of the people,” and “saving the people above all else”—people of good heart. Yet, judging from your willingness to make the punishment of war criminals the foundation of the talks, you do not seem particularly concerned about holding accountable those responsible for slaughtering millions of your fellow countrymen. Nevertheless, since you insist that immediate arrest would present considerable difficulties, very well—then at least take steps to prevent their escape; under no circumstances should you allow them to slip away.

Gentlemen, consider this: if, while you are painstakingly dispatching a delegation to discuss the punishment of war criminals, those very criminals have already fled, what, pray tell, could possibly remain to be discussed? What dignity would be left on the faces of your delegates? Where, then, would your much-vaunted “peaceful intentions” find expression? How could one possibly demonstrate that you truly intend to “shorten the war,” “relieve the people’s suffering,” and “prioritize saving lives”—without a trace of hypocrisy?

Moreover, the spokesperson has uttered numerous evasions, which deceive no one; we see no need to respond to them. Gentlemen of the hypothetical, symbolic Kuomintang reactionary, traitorous “government” in Nanjing, Guangzhou, Fenghua, or Shanghai (note the quotation marks around the word “government”): if you believe that our tone in this statement still lacks sufficient solemnity, then please forgive us; we can only adopt this stance toward you.