You should, in accordance with our telegram of 11 January, personally refute the position taken by Fu Zuoyi in his telegram of the 9th during your meeting with Deng Baoshan. The city has been under siege for nearly a month, and negotiations have dragged on for so long without ever getting to the point. He himself proposed that his troops leave the city for reorganization, yet now he makes excuses and prevaricates, attempting to stall for time. In reality, he harbors ulterior motives and is aggravating the suffering of the people of Beiping and Tianjin. If Fu is sincere, he should order the defending forces in Tianjin to march out of the city in their entirety on the 13th and await disposition. The defending forces shall be responsible for handing over all public property, files, weapons, ammunition, and bedding and clothing, without causing any damage or loss. When the defending forces leave the city, they may carry only their personal firearms, ammunition, and belongings. All details concerning reorganization shall be discussed after they have left the city. Otherwise, our army will attack Tianjin on the 14th. As for the defending forces in Beiping, they may delay their departure from the city for a few days, but this must not be prolonged excessively. It is not a matter of our army assisting Fu’s forces in resolving the issue of those who resist and refuse to obey orders, but rather Fu’s forces assisting our army in entering the city to deal with all troops that dare to resist. When you convey these points, you should be resolute and unequivocal.

It is estimated that the defending forces in Tianjin will certainly not leave the city on the 13th according to the time and conditions we have set. You should be prepared to attack Tianjin on the 14th.

[1] This is the main content of a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China to Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen, after receiving their telegram reporting that Fu Zuoyi had decided to send Deng Baoshan out of the city for negotiations. Deng Baoshan was then Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Kuomintang’s “Bandit Suppression General Headquarters” in North China.
[2] In a telegram relayed to Lin Biao and Nie Rongzhen on 9 January via Li Bingquan (an underground CPC member), director of the interview department of the Beiping Pingming Daily, Fu Zuoyi stated: Regarding troop-related issues, “meticulous planning and careful, prudent implementation are urgently needed to avoid chaos and not deviate from the original intention.” “The timing of the troops’ departure from the city must be determined through specific discussions and agreements based on the progress of preparations and detailed issues on both sides. In the unlikely event that a small number refuse to obey orders, prior technical consultations between the two sides will still be necessary.”