Instructions Regarding the Deployment for Fu Zuoyi’s Troops to Leave the City and Reorganize
(January 21, 1949)
Lin and Luo:
(A) We have received your telegrams dated the 20th at 11:30 a.m. and 7:00 p.m., as well as Su Jing’s telegram of the 19th at 10:00 p.m. forwarded by you, and the telegram from the Beijing Party Committee dated the 20th at 1:00 p.m. (B) You should immediately inform Su Jing to convey to Fu and Deng: (1) Since Fu and Deng have resolved to stand on the side that benefits the people’s cause, we must warn them to remain vigilant against Chiang Kai-shek’s die-hard followers. If Chiang’s main force—the 101st Army and the 4th Cavalry Division—are the first to move out of the city, it remains doubtful whether he can ensure that other units such as the 13th and 94th Armies will also be able to leave. Should Chiang’s faction not only disobey Fu’s orders but even encircle and attack Fu’s headquarters, would Fu still have sufficient troops to resist until our reinforcements arrive? We must also anticipate potential assassinations by Chiang’s agents and air raids. (2) The 101st Army could depart first, with our forces taking over defensive positions around Guang’an Gate and You’an Gate. Subsequently, the central army units could exit the city one after another, with our troops assuming their respective defensive posts in sequence. It would be more prudent for the 4th Cavalry Division and other units under Fu’s command to leave last. (3) If Fu has indeed made all necessary arrangements, the date for the first unit to leave the city could remain as originally planned on the 22nd; however, if Fu has not yet completed his preparations—particularly concerning the central army units—our side may postpone this date by a few days.

[1] This is a reply drafted by Mao Zedong on behalf of the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee to Lin Biao and Luo Ronghuan regarding the deployment for Fu Zuoyi’s forces to leave the city and reorganize.
[2] Su Jing was then the Chief of the Operations Department of the Northeast Field Army Headquarters and served as a representative of the People’s Liberation Army during the peace negotiations for the liberation of Beiping.
[3] Fu and Deng refer to Fu Zuoyi and Deng Baoshan.
[4] The 13th and 94th Armies were both Nationalist Central Army units stationed in Beiping.

Instructions Regarding the Deployment for Fu Zuoyi’s Troops to Leave the City and Reorganize
time. (C) With respect to the points raised by Su Jing in your responses: (1) A joint administrative body could be established under the proposed name, with personnel appointments and proportional representation as you have outlined. (2) We concur with your view. (3) Agreed. (4) We can accept the opposing side’s suggestion. (5) We can accept Fu’s proposal; in fact, once the troops have left the city, the reorganization can proceed earlier, at which point they are unlikely to object. (6) Agreed. (7), (8), and (9) all align with your opinions. (10) Agreed. (11) We can accept Fu’s suggestion. (12) Postal and telecommunications matters should follow your recommendations, while newspaper policies should adhere to central directives. (13) The issue of dissolving the Kuomintang Youth League should be set aside; discussions about disbanding and registering such reactionary organizations can only take place after we have fully secured control over Beiping and established stable order. This point can be handled according to Fu’s proposal to reassure wavering elements. (14) Agreed. (D) Your orders issued to the various commanders are appropriate, but you must also ensure that a complete encirclement is maintained around the departing troops to prevent them from unexpectedly breaking out. Relying solely on the North China Seventh Column in the Gu’an area would be insufficient. All encircling units must exercise extreme vigilance and construct defensive fortifications approximately twenty li away from the enemy. This aspect must not be overlooked. Our army has never before implemented a cohabitation arrangement between friendly and hostile forces, so thorough preparation is essential; otherwise, chaos is likely to ensue. Central Military Commission
4:00 a.m. on the 21st

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The military department plans to attack its own transmission line, but there is still enough strength to resist and wait for our assistance. Darkroom operations and aircraft hangar construction also need to be considered in advance. Currently, the central city...
Replace the defense of the Guang’an Gate and You’an Gate areas with our own forces, leaving the division behind.
Lin and Luo, based on your suggestions from eleven o’clock today, propose that the first unit leave the city on the 22nd. However, since Fu has already decided to act in a manner beneficial to the people’s cause, we can suggest an earlier date for the departure of the first unit (mainly due to the central army issue). In that case, our side might delay the timing by a few days.
②(1) If Fu has properly arranged everything, the date for the first unit to leave the city can be set as originally planned, starting from the 22nd. However, if Fu has not yet made adequate preparations—especially regarding the central army units—our side may postpone the date by a few days.
Name can be formed into a tripartite official institution, and the selection of personnel and their proportions can be determined accordingly.
Units such as the Ninth Division should also leave the city. On this point, I agree with your opinion. (2) Students' opinions (three)
Agreed. (4) We can also consider the other side's opinion. (3) However, it is impossible for me to agree that each province should have great sensitivity. At that moment, there would be no stronger [force]. (6) Agreed. It is necessary to build defensive fortifications twenty li away from the enemy; this must not be taken lightly.
All agree with your views. (+) Agree with +).
· Commission, 21st day, time
We can also accept the other side’s opinion. (12) Regarding postal and telecommunications matters, follow your suggestions; as for newspapers, adhere to central directives. After this, our army has never practiced such a mixed living arrangement before.
Central opinion (13) Do not raise the issue of dissolving the Kuomintang Youth League. Only when we have completely controlled Beiping and established firm order can we discuss dissolving and registering these reactionary groups. This point can be addressed according to Fu’s proposal to pacify dissenting elements. (14) Agreed. (D) The orders you issued to the various commanders are correct, but you must also pay attention to maintaining a complete encirclement around the departing troops to prevent them from suddenly breaking out unexpectedly. The North China Seventh Column alone is insufficient for securing the Gu’an area.
Mao Zedong’s handwritten draft of a reply telegram to Lin Biao and Luo Ronghuan on behalf of the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee.

Spokesperson of the CPC Comments on the Nanjing Executive Yuan’s Resolution
(January 21, 1949)
[Shaanbei Telegram, January 21] According to a report by the Central News Agency, the official news agency of the reactionary Nationalist government in Nanjing, dated the 19th: “At a meeting of the Executive Yuan held at 9:00 a.m. on the 19th, the current situation was extensively discussed, resulting in the following resolution: ‘In order to comply with the aspirations of the entire nation and to seek the early realization of peace, the government hereby solemnly declares its willingness to immediately and unconditionally cease hostilities with the Chinese Communist Party and to appoint representatives from both sides to engage in peace negotiations.’” A spokesperson for the Chinese Communist Party stated: “This resolution of the Nanjing Executive Yuan makes no mention of either the declaration issued by the puppet President Chiang Kai-shek of Nanjing on January 1st, proposing peace talks, nor of the statement made by Chairman Mao Zedong of the Chinese Communist Party on January 14th, likewise suggesting peace negotiations. Furthermore, it does not indicate whether the Executive Yuan supports or opposes either of these proposals, as if no such proposals had ever been put forward by either the Communists or the Nationalists on January 1st or January 14th. Instead, the Executive Yuan has formulated its own separate proposal, which is entirely incomprehensible. In reality, the Nanjing Executive Yuan not only completely disregards the Communist Party’s January 14th proposal but also directly overturns the January 1st declaration made by the puppet President Chiang Kai-shek. In his January 1st proposal, Chiang stated: ‘As long as the Communist Party demonstrates genuine sincerity toward peace and provides clear assurances, the government will respond in kind, willing to negotiate specific measures to end the war and restore peace.’ Nineteen days later, a part of the same government—the Executive Yuan of the Nanjing regime—has reversed the president’s own declaration, replacing ‘a willingness to negotiate specific measures to end the war and restore peace’ with ‘an immediate unconditional ceasefire and the appointment of representatives to begin peace negotiations.’ We would like to ask the gentlemen of the Nanjing Executive Yuan: Which of your proposals is actually valid—the one you just made, or the one made by the presid…