Additional Suggestions for Negotiations with
Fu Zuoyi’s Armies, and Problems in Actively
Preparing for Attacking the City
 (January 16, 1949, 6:00 P.M.)
To Lin [Biao], Luo [Ronghuan], and Nie [Rongzhen]:1
	 1.	 We believe you received the telegrams sent at 2 a.m. on January 15th and on
January 16th.2 Regarding negotiations with Fu [Zuoyi],3 we add two suggestions. First, Fu’s request that his armies leave the city, that they not advance
too far, and that they not scatter too much indicates that he is afraid his troops
will be disarmed. Our opinions are: Regarding the first step, you can agree to
it so they will feel relaxed about leaving the city. They can be directed to go
to the regions of Tong county, Xianghe, and Sanhe. Then, regarding the second step, you can act on your plan to separate the enemy forces, insert them
between our columns, and reorganize them. For now, you should not take the
second step prematurely. Second, regarding supplies, Fu should be responsible for the first period. We will cooperate with him. We will be responsible
for the second period and Fu should cooperate with us. We will be entirely
responsible for the third period. If you think there is anything inappropriate
about the two suggestions mentioned above and those mentioned in the telegrams sent on January 15th and 16th, you should relay it to us by telegram.
Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 5, pp. 485–86, where it is
	 2.	 You should be actively preparing to attack Beiping. You must make a
meticulous plan of attack this time. Do your utmost to avoid destroying the
Imperial Palace, universities, and other famous and valuable cultural and historic sites. You must make every column commander understand and resolutely observe this. Let the enemies occupy these cultural institutions, but we
should not attack them. When we have occupied the bulk of the rest of the
city, we will weaken the enemy forces that are occupying these cultural institutions through negotiations or by disarming them. Even though it will delay
our occupation of Beiping, you should do this patiently. You must therefore
accurately investigate every part of the city. You must make clear to every
commander where attacks are allowed and where they are not allowed, using
a map and giving a copy to every commander, treating it as a disciplinary
measure to be carried out. To this end, you must hold a meeting for all commanders of the units that will be attacking the city and give them detailed
directives. To this end, your command post must have accurate telephone
communications with every unit attacking the city. Every development in the
battle must be under your command and supervision.
	 3.	 We hope you will investigate the losses suffered by industries and cultural
institutions in Tianjin and report on them by telegram.
The Military Commission

reproduced from the original preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission.
Lin Biao was commander of the Northeast Field Army, and Luo Ronghuan was political
commissar of the Northeast Field Army. Nie Rongzhen was commander of the North China
Military Region.

2.  The telegram on the 15th stated that Deng Baoshan and Zhou Beifeng (1903–1989,
native of Shanxi) should be told of suspicions about Fu Zuoyi before he expressed his
resolve to go over to the Communists. Of the telegrams of the 16th, one stated the intention
not to directly refuse Fu Zuoyi’s proposal that the Communists send reinforcements within
several days and join Fu in forming an allied council that would be eventually transferred
to Communist control. The other telegram noted that Fu Zuoyi had been told that he had to
commit to standing on the Communists’ side.

3.  Fu Zuoyi was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang’s North China “Bandit Suppression” Headquarters.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-227