The Current Situation and the Tasks of Our
Party in 19491
 (January 8, 1949)
A. The current situation
	 1.	 As regards the military aspects, we have exceeded in half a year what we
had planned to achieve in a full year.2 From July to December of 1948, we
destroyed 148 divisions of the regular enemy forces, including 111 full divisions. By the time all the campaigns—Beiping-Tianjin, Huai-Hai, Taiyuan,
and Datong—have been completed, we will again have destroyed more than
sixty full divisions. The above two categories, those already destroyed and
those to be destroyed, total more than 210 divisions, 173 of which are full
divisions. By the spring of 1949, the Guomindang will have left only about
160 divisions. Of these, the majority are newly formed, and have either been
reinforced after being destroyed or are weak in combat effectiveness; only
a small part have relatively strong combat effectiveness, for example, the
Guangxi Clique and the Ma armies.3 In 1949, the Guomindang will probably mobilize about 500,000 men, who, apart from reinforcing the existing
divisions, will be formed into several new divisions. They will, however,
have no combat effectiveness. After the Beiping-Tianjin, Huai-Hai, Taiyuan,
and Datong campaigns, can we say that we have basically overthrown the
Guomindang government? Because its main military forces have been
destroyed, we may say so. But we still have several battles to fight in Nanjing,
Wuhan, Xi’an, and other places. After these battles have been fought, we may consider the Guomindang government basically overthrown not only
militarily but also politically and economically. Basically overthrowing the
Guomindang is nevertheless not the same as overthrowing it completely. In
our country, there are still many enemy armies to defeat and many areas we
must occupy and where we must carry out work. We should never underestimate our enemy, and we should absolutely never allow victory to go to our
heads.
	 2.	 The balance of class forces in China has fundamentally changed. The great
majority of the popular masses have broken away, in large numbers at a time,
from the influence and control of the Guomindang, and they stand on our
side. The liberal bourgeoisie4 has found a way out with us, and very few of
them are still following the Guomindang. The representatives of all the democratic parties and people’s organizations are already in our Liberated Areas
or are coming here. The Guomindang’s strategic front in all the areas north
of the Yangzi River has collapsed, and wherever it rules the Guomindang
finds itself in a situation of great confusion and collapse. We already have
complete certainty of overcoming the Guomindang throughout the country. The next two years, 1949 and 1950, will be the years during which the
Chinese Revolution will achieve victory throughout the entire country. We
must carry the revolution forward to the end and never allow it to be abandoned halfway. We must convincingly carry out education in our Party, in
the People’s Liberation Army, and among the popular masses. We must also
make efforts to explain ourselves to the representatives of all the democratic
parties and the people’s organizations so that everyone understands why we
must carry the revolution through to the end and never allow it to be abandoned halfway. We must continue to unmask and attack the Guomindang’s
plot for so-called “Peace Negotiations.”5
	 3.	 The advantages of waging war in the south are: The Guomindang’s army
is already without its main forces, and we have a powerful army; the
Guomindang has lost its prestige, and especially after we take Nanjing and
Wuhan, its prestige will be totally ruined, while our Party, in contrast, has
extremely high prestige. The south is the region where the revolution of
1924 to 1927 and the land revolution of several years after 1927 took place,
and at present there are already many guerrilla forces and guerrilla areas.
These are the advantages. The disadvantages of going to fight in the south
are: Most areas there are under the control of the Guomindang, our Party
organizations there are still not very powerful, and the masses have not been
mobilized. Under these circumstances, our army will encounter various difficulties with supplies during the early stage; it will be easy to occupy the
major cities, but they will be much more difficult to control than the cities in the north. These are the disadvantages. We must perceive all these advantages and disadvantages, and we must explain them clearly to all cadres
and soldiers going south so they will be psychologically prepared to use the
advantages to overcome the disadvantages and to achieve victory throughout
the country.
	 4.	 Our battle plans have always considered the possibility that the United States
may send troops directly to occupy several cities in the coastal regions of
China and to fight against us. We will still not abandon this consideration
to avoid falling into a predicament in the very unlikely event that this actually happens. But the stronger and more resolute the force of the Chinese
people’s revolution, the smaller the likelihood that the United States will
directly intervene militarily, and the probability of America supporting the
Guomindang financially or with armaments may also diminish. This has
been demonstrated in the fluctuation and uncertainty of the attitude of the
U.S. government since last year, and especially in the last three months. We
must continue to point out and overcome the incorrect viewpoint among the
Chinese people, as well as in our Party, that overestimates the power of U.S.
imperialism.
	 5.	 The China policy of U.S. imperialism has already shifted from simply supporting the Guomindang in armed warfare against the Communist Party to
a double-dealing attitude. That is, on the one hand, U.S. imperialism supports the remaining military forces of the Guomindang as well as the local
warlords, and it continues to resist our People’s Liberation Army; but, on the
other hand, it sends its running dogs to infiltrate the revolutionary camp and
to organize the so-called opposition faction to destroy our revolution from
within. At a time when the People’s Liberation Army is approaching victory
in the entire country, it even does not hesitate to seek legal status, playing
the game of recognizing the People’s Republic to carry out this policy of
“destruction from within.” In dealing with this plot of U.S. imperialism, we
must heighten our vigilance and resolutely beat off its attacks.
	 6.	 During the past several years, especially in 1948, the great majority of our
Party’s cadres have systematically learned various concrete policies and tactics in our work in the countryside, in the cities, and in military affairs, and
have systematically corrected both rightist and “leftist” deviations. A great
many cadres learned within one year what they had been unable to grasp
for a long time in the past. In this way, the general line of our Party6 can be carried out thoroughly and consistently throughout our entire Party. This is
a very great and fundamental victory. It represents immense progress in the
political maturity of our Party. This event shows that our Party can certainly
seize political power over the whole country within a relatively short period
of time. To ensure victory, we must continue to carry out widespread and
thorough education regarding our policies in 1949. When we say, “We have
learned it,” this in no way means that we need not study anymore; we must
continue to study many new things. When we say, “The deviations have been
corrected,” it does not mean there are no deviations left in our Party, nor
does it mean that there will not be deviations again in the future. Deviations
still exist in our Party even now, and new deviations will occur in the future
as well. We must continue to always focus on correcting deviations in our
Party.
B. Our Party’s tasks in 1949
	 1.	 In summer, autumn, and winter 1949, we should strive to take the greater
part of these nine provinces: Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, Jiangsu, Anhui,
Zhejiang, Fujian, Shanxi, and Gansu. Some should be taken completely.
	 2.	 In summer, autumn, and winter 1949, we must promptly call up and train
35,000 cadres who will serve with our troops.
	 3.	 In 1949, we must regularize all our field army forces. This means above
all strengthening our artillery and engineering forces, employing modern means of transportation such as railways, highways, and waterways,
strengthening the organization and discipline of the army, resolutely
overcoming some of the phenomena of disorganization that still exist in
relatively serious form in the army, and strengthening the work of our
headquarters as well.
	 4.	 In 1949 and 1950, we must strive to organize a usable air force and a navy
for defending our coastal areas and river valleys. Such a possibility exists.
	 5.	 In 1949, we must truly take agricultural and industrial production in the
entire area to a higher level than in 1948. The main railroads and highways
in our areas should all be repaired and used. Economic and financial work in
our areas should be more planned and centralized based on what is possible
and necessary to avoid wasting human and material resources and obstructing increased production and support to the front.
	 6.	 In 1949, we must enhance the organization and effectiveness of the rear services of the People’s Liberation Army based on what is possible and necessary to effectively support the great march of the People’s Liberation Army
toward the various southern provinces. These tasks include items such as
suitable plans for the munitions industry, regularization or establishment of
all military supply industries besides munitions, establishment of an armament system, unified regulations regarding the standards for supplies of
all kinds, unified distribution of medical and communications equipment, division of labor in transportation and warehousing as well as determining
the organization and system of the rear services.
	 7.	 In 1949, we must guide the political work of the People’s Liberation Army,
under the leadership of the Political Department of the Central Military
Commission, to prepare summaries regarding items such as the “New Style
of Military Rectification,” the “Party Committee System,” the “Committee
of Revolutionary Servicemen,” and the “Tasks of the Company Branch,” and
so forth, and we must turn them into regulations or rules for dissemination to
the entire army as an established practice.
	 8.	 In 1949, our tasks of land reform and Party rectification in all major Liberated
Areas must focus on the production movement and make use of the spare
time of the masses to gradually resolve or adjust the rare instances of incomplete land distribution and of incomplete Party rectification. Establish people’s assemblies at all levels in the main Liberated Areas and select people’s
government committees at all levels as well. Strengthen the Party committee
system in the main Liberated Areas and hold Party congresses and representative assemblies at all levels. Carry out reduction of land rent and interest on
loans and mobilize the masses in the Liberated Areas of the Central Plains.
In provinces south of the Yangzi River, our tasks for the next three to five
years will not be the distribution of land but rather the reduction of land rent
and interest on loans and the mobilization of the masses. Land distribution
will be taken into consideration only after the land rent and interest on loans
are reduced and the masses are mobilized.
	 9.	 In 1949, the cadre training project, that is, a plan for educating our cadres
in cadre training schools as well as at work through study of the theories of
Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, and of the various concrete policies of the
Chinese Revolution, must be adapted to the demands of the current revolutionary situation and our revolutionary tasks.
	10.	 The 1949 plan for national education (including college and university
education, professional education of all sorts, high school and elementary
school education, and supplementary education for adults) must fit in with
the demands of the current revolutionary situation and revolutionary tasks.
This applies also to news agencies and newspaper offices as well as to literary and artistic work.
	11.	 In 1949, the work of the labor unions and the Youth League, as well as work
with women, must all produce better results than in 1948. In the first half of
1949, we must complete the work for all-China congresses of young people
and of women.
	12.	 In 1949, we must call together a political consultative conference of all
the democratic parties and groups and all people’s organizations, except
for representatives of the reactionaries, for the purpose of completing the
revolutionary tasks of the Chinese people, proclaiming the establishment
of the Chinese People’s Republic, forming the Central Government of the
Republic, and passing a Common Program.

	13.	 After the Beiping-Tianjin, Huai-Hai, Taiyuan, and Datong campaigns, our
main field armies must rest and reorganize for at least two months to complete various items in preparation for crossing the Yangzi River and advancing southward. We will then march south steadily and resolutely.
	14.	 As regards launching a struggle against certain serious phenomena of indiscipline and anarchism that exist in the leadership organs of our whole Party
and army at all levels, we must, in accordance with the stipulations of the
Central Committee, carry this [struggle] to a conclusion before the end of
March 1949. Resolutions on this matter must be submitted to the Central
Committee by military organs at the regimental level and above, and by
local government organs at the county level and above, by April. Those who
request a deferment for particular reasons are also required to complete the
resolutions in April and submit them to the Central Committee by May.
	15.	 We must carefully develop our Party’s organization in all newly occupied
areas. In dealing with intellectuals in the upper strata who want to join
our Party, we must adopt an orientation of strict vetting. This point should
receive particular emphasis in the big cities. It is better that there are fewer in
quantity than they are poor in quality.
	16.	 We must strengthen our security work in all the Liberated Areas, and resolutely fight all reactionaries, covert or overt.
	17.	 Following the liberation of Beiping, we must hold the Second Plenum of
the Seventh Central Committee. The tasks of this plenum are as follows:
1) Analyze the current situation and determine the tasks of our Party; 2)
Pass a draft of the Common Program for submission to the Chinese People’s
Political Consultative Conference; 3) Pass a draft on constituting the main
components of the Central Government;7 4) Approve military plans; 5)
Determine the orientation of economic development; 6) Determine foreign
policy; 7) Other matters.

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Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 5, pp. 471–78, where it is
reproduced from the original document preserved in the Central Archives.
1.  This is a Central Committee directive drafted by Mao Zedong and passed at the
meeting of the Central Committee Politburo on January 8, 1949.
2.  A telegram to Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou that Mao Zedong drafted
on behalf of the Central Military Commission on September 7, 1948, stated the intention to overthrow the Guomindang within about five years from July 1946. This would
require annihilating about 100 brigades of Guomindang regular troops every year. See
“Operational Principles for the Liaoning-Shenyang Campaign,” September 7, 1948, in this
volume.
6.  The Party’s “general line” was put forward in Mao Zedong’s “Speech at a Cadre
Conference in the Shanxi-Suiyuan Liberated Area,” on April 1, 1948: “The revolution
against imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism waged by the broad masses of
the people under the leadership of the proletariat—this is China’s new democratic revolution, and this is the general line and general policy of the Communist Party of China at the
current stage of history.”

--- Notes

3.  This refers to the Guomindang troops under Ma Bufang in Qinghai and Ma Hongkui
in Ningxia.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-224

4.  The liberal bourgeoisie mentioned here refers to the national bourgeoisie.

5.  This refers to the peace talks proposed by Chiang Kaishek on January 1, 1949.

7.  I.e., a draft of the Organic Law adopted in September 1949.