Strengthen the Political Offensive Against the Encircled Enemy[1]

(December 28, 1948)

Su and Tan, and inform Deng and Zhang[2]:

Your telegram of the evening of the 26th[3] has been noted. Whether you launch the attack on the midnight of the 5th–6th will depend on how the enemy’s situation develops within the next ten days. The conditions facing Du Yuming’s[4] forces are now far worse than those faced by Zheng Dongguo’s[5] forces in Changchun; suffering from cold and hunger, large numbers are surrendering, and they are disintegrating day by day. If the process of disintegration within the enemy ranks shows a trend of accelerating and expanding, a result similar to that in Changchun may emerge in ten or twenty days. You should now exert maximum effort to strengthen the political offensive. Write letters in various names (yourselves, the various columns and divisions, and enemy officers who have come over to surrender) to enemy officers at all levels, and openly disseminate these letters, treating this as a mass movement and carrying out this work openly. Three possibilities lie before you: (1) resolving the enemy by storming; (2) resolving the enemy through a combination of partial disintegration and partial storming; (3) the enemy developing from disintegration to collective surrender. Please closely monitor the enemy’s movements and keep us informed at all times. Comrades Liu and Chen[6] have arrived here.

Central Military Commission

28th, 13:00 hours

---

[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, addressed to Su Yu, Acting Commander and Acting Political Commissar of the East China Field Army, and Tan Zhenlin, Deputy Political Commissar, and others.
[2] Deng and Zhang refer to Deng Xiaoping and Zhang Jichun, who were then respectively Political Commissar and Deputy Political Commissar and Director of the Political Department of the Central Plains Field Army.
[3] Refers to the telegram of December 26, 1948, from the Political Department of the East China Field Army to all corps, columns, and divisions, with a copy to the Central Military Commission of the CPC, the Political Department of the East China Military Region, and the General Front Committee. The telegram stated: At present, the enemy within the encirclement is in a desperate situation, and all conditions are more favorable for us to launch a political offensive and strive to disintegrate large numbers of the enemy. Therefore, during the short period of rest and reorganization, all units should further intensify the political offensive against the enemy (especially the frontline units), making it one of the main central tasks. This will not only cause more of the enemy to flee or surrender, weakening their effective strength, but will also more deeply and universally demoralize the enemy troops, facilitating their smooth annihilation later.
[4] Du Yuming was then Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Kuomintang Army’s Xuzhou “Bandit Suppression” General Headquarters and Director of the Forward Command Post.
[5] Zheng Dongguo was formerly Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Kuomintang Army’s Northeast “Bandit Suppression” General Headquarters and Commander of the 1st Corps. On October 19, 1948, under the circumstances where the Northeast Field Army had encircled Changchun and captured Jinzhou, causing the entire Northeast Kuomintang forces to waver, Zheng Dongguo led the directly subordinate units of the 1st Corps Headquarters and all officers and soldiers of the New 7th Army to lay down their arms.
[6] Liu and Chen refer to Liu Bocheng and Chen Yi, who were then respectively Commander of the Central Plains Field Army and Commander and Political Commissar of the East China Field Army.