Quickly Control Lugouqiao, Jinghai, and Other Places to Prevent the Enemy from Fleeing Southward[1]

(December 26, 1948)

Lin, Liu:

How is the situation with bridging the Yongding River? Have you dispatched troops to control Lugouqiao? If the enemy in Beiping and Tianjin breaks out southward, how will you deal with it? We believe that under the present circumstances, the possibility of the enemy in Beiping and Tianjin breaking out westward is not great. There is a possibility that the enemy in Beiping will break out and concentrate in Tianjin, and then join forces with the enemy in the two Gu areas to flee by sea. However, because we have sufficient forces positioned between Beiping, Tianjin, and the two Gu areas, the enemy certainly cannot succeed. We believe it is more likely that the enemy in the two Gu areas will flee by sea, while the enemy in the two cities of Beiping and Tianjin will break out southward to join forces at Shijiazhuang or Dezhou, and then move south along the Beiping-Hankou Railway or the Tianjin-Pukou Railway. If your plan to rapidly construct many bridges over the Yongding River cannot be realized, and the Yongding River becomes an obstacle to your deployment for pursuit, then the southern sector will be our most vulnerable direction, and the danger of the enemy breaking out in this direction will be greatest. At the same time, because Du Yuming has not yet been annihilated, our Liu-Deng and Chen-Su forces cannot deploy to block and strike, making this danger even greater. Therefore: (1) Please quickly use the necessary forces to control Lugouqiao, Jinghai, and other places; (2) Please quickly construct many bridges over the Yongding River.

Military Commission

24:00, 26th

[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee, addressed to Lin Biao, Commander of the Northeast Field Army, and Liu Yalou, Chief of Staff.