Postpone the Attack on Lianggu and Strictly Prevent the Enemy in Beiping and Tianjin from Breaking Out[1]

(December 26, 1948)

Lin:

Your telegram of the 26th[2] received. (1) Since there are many signs that the enemy in Beiping and Tianjin may break out and there are also difficulties at present in attacking Lianggu[3], it is naturally advisable to postpone the attack on Lianggu. Please also consider withdrawing our troops that are approaching Lianggu. If the enemy sees that we are not going to attack, they may not necessarily flee. After the seaside freezes over in a number of days, we can then reconsider whether to attack. The enemy there has only five divisions, and even if they escape by sea, it will not matter much. (2) As for the enemy in Beiping and Tianjin, we must strictly guard against their breaking out and fleeing. After the 4th Column arrives, please consider whether our forces are sufficient. If not, we should transfer Yang Chengwu’s[4] units or even Yang Dezhi’s[5] units to take part in the Beiping-Tianjin operations. You should consider the overall disposition for the eventuality that the enemy in both Beiping and Tianjin break out simultaneously and our forces wipe out both enemy forces in the course of their breakout. (3) If there are definite signs that the enemy in Beiping and Tianjin are about to break out, we should decisively abandon the plan to attack Lianggu and move the main force from Lianggu to the area between Beiping and Tianjin, using only part of our forces to cut the connections between Tianjin and Tanggu and between Tianjin and Dagu, so as to change the present situation of dividing our forces equally (a disposition made on the assumption that the enemy in Beiping and Tianjin would not break out).

[1] This telegram was drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee and addressed to Lin Biao, commander of the Northeast Field Army.

[2] This refers to Lin Biao’s telegram of December 26, 1948 to the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee. The telegram stated that there were many signs that the enemy in Beiping and Tianjin might break out, that the water obstacles at Tanggu and Dagu were at present too great, and that our forces could not be used effectively there, so the attack on Lianggu was to be postponed.

[3] Lianggu refers to Tanggu and Dagu in Tianjin.

[4] Yang Chengwu was then commander of the 3rd Corps of the North China Military Area.

[5] Yang Dezhi was then commander of the 2nd Corps of the North China Military Area.

(4) Please order Yang Chengwu’s units to rest and regroup in Zhangjiakou and await orders. Units under Yao Zhe, Wang Ping,[1] the Mongolian cavalry, and the Chahar cavalry can be prepared to thrust into the area between Guisui[2] and Baotou, but for the time being they are not to move out. (5) The Yang-Luo force[3] may either continue to encircle Datong without change or stop its siege of Datong and prepare to move east. Please decide as you see fit. (6) Do not let Fu Zuoyi’s[4] representative get away, and stop him from communicating with Fu Zuoyi by radio. (7) The enemy in Beiping and Tianjin may take advantage of the dispersal of our forces and break out within the next few days. Please promptly draw up an overall plan for dealing with the enemy’s breakout and report it by telegram.

Military Commission

22:00 hours, December 26

[1] Yao Zhe was then commander of the Suiyuan-Mongolia Military Sub-area and concurrently commander of the 8th Column. Wang Ping was then commander of the Beiyue Military Sub-area.

[2] Guisui is the old name for the city now known as Hohhot, Inner Mongolia.

[3] The Yang-Luo force refers to the 2nd Corps of the North China Military Area, with Yang Dezhi as commander and Luo Ruiqing as political commissar.

[4] Fu Zuoyi was then commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang’s General Headquarters for the Suppression of Bandits in North China.