Do Not Rush to Encircle Hu Zongnan’s Forces at Present[1]

(December 24, 1948)

Lin, Luo, Gao:

Your telegram of 11:00 on the 24th[2] received. (1) Hu Zongnan[3] still has 28 divisions, totaling 158,000 men, and also has the Qinghai Hui forces (with relatively strong combat effectiveness) coordinating in Longdong. Whether Hu’s forces will retreat to Sichuan or Hubei is still undecided. Our Northwest Army is weaker than Hu’s forces and even weaker than the Hu-Ma[4] allied forces. Therefore, it is currently impossible to cut off their retreat route. Even adding Xu Xiangqian’s[5] forces would not make this possible; only by sending all three forces of Yang Dezhi, Yang Chengwu, and Xu Xiangqian together could this be possible. Chiang Kai-shek’s overall deployment is also still undecided.

If Hu’s forces are transferred to Nanjing-Shanghai,[1] the gateway to Sichuan will be thrown wide open. If Hu’s forces defend Sichuan, he will use Xi’an as the first line and will not easily abandon Xi’an. Therefore, at present, do not rush to encircle Hu’s forces.

(2) After the forces of Fu Zuoyi, Yan Xishan, and Du Yuming[2] are resolved, our entire army should rest and consolidate for two to three months. Then, the Liu-Deng and Chen-Su armies[3] will advance south of the Yangtze; you will advance into Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi; and the Northwest and North China armies (the three forces of Xu, Yang, and Yang) will advance into Shaanxi, Gansu, and Sichuan. The specific deployment is still to be discussed at the Central Committee meeting from January 1 to 5. We are hereby forwarding to you our telegram of the 24th to Liu, Chen, Deng, and Su, Tan[4]. Please hold a discussion meeting, and have Luo and Gao bring your collective opinions to the Central Committee. Among these, whether all three North China forces should advance into Shaanxi, Gansu, and Sichuan, or whether two forces should advance into Shaanxi, Gansu, and Sichuan while one force follows you in the first step into Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi and in the second step into the two Guang provinces, is still worth considering. (3) After the enemy at Zhangjiakou is annihilated, the 4th Column will return to your order of battle. The two Yangs will rest and consolidate on the spot for ten days, after which it is planned to order them to advance westward. The first step is to capture Datong and Guisui,[5] the second step to capture Houtao, and the third step to capture Ningxia. The above three steps must all be completed within the period when the Yellow River is frozen over in winter. If delayed until spring, there will be many difficulties. Xu’s forces will continue to besiege Taiyuan. After you capture Tianjin, dispatch two columns with a portion of artillery to coordinate with Xu and Zhou[6] in capturing Taiyuan. (4) Your opinions are requested; please inform us.

Central Military Commission
22:00, December 24

--- Notes

[1] This telegram was drafted by Mao Zedong for the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee and addressed to Lin Biao, commander of the Northeast Field Army, Luo Ronghuan, its political commissar, and Gao Gang, first deputy commander of the Northeast Military Region.


[1] Nanjing-Shanghai refers to Nanjing in Jiangsu Province and Shanghai.


[2] Refers to the telegram sent by Lin Biao and Luo Ronghuan to the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee at 11:00 on December 24, 1948. The telegram stated: The complete annihilation of the enemy in Pingjin and Taiyuan is now a certainty. The most important issue at present is to prevent the enemy in Xi’an from escaping. Therefore, we suggest that the Northwest Field Army immediately and swiftly thrust with full force south of Xi’an to cut off the enemy’s retreat route. Xu Xiangqian’s forces should advance with full force toward Xi’an to link up with Peng Dehuai. Yang Dezhi’s forces should immediately set out toward Taiyuan to take over Xu’s siege mission. Yang Chengwu’s forces, after concluding pursuit operations, should also turn toward Taiyuan. After resolving the enemy in Pingjin, our Northeast forces should dispatch a portion of troops and firepower to assist the two Yangs in attacking Taiyuan. To prevent the enemy in Xi’an from fleeing prematurely, it is suggested that the attack on Du Yuming’s corps group should wait until our main northern forces have moved south of Xi’an before commencing.


[2] Fu Zuoyi, then commander-in-chief of the Nationalist Army’s North China “Bandit Suppression” General Headquarters. Yan Xishan, then director of the Nationalist Army’s Taiyuan Pacification Office. Du Yuming, then deputy commander-in-chief of the Nationalist Army’s Xuzhou “Bandit Suppression” General Headquarters and director of its Forward Command Post.


[3] Hu Zongnan, then director of the Xi’an Pacification Office of the Nationalist Army.


[3] The Liu-Deng and Chen-Su armies refer to the Central Plains Field Army and the East China Field Army. Liu Bocheng was commander and Deng Xiaoping was political commissar of the Central Plains Field Army; Chen Yi was commander and political commissar and Su Yu was acting commander and acting political commissar of the East China Field Army.


[4] Hu refers to Hu Zongnan. Ma refers to Ma Bufang and Ma Hongkui, both then deputy directors of the Northwest Military and Political Affairs Office.


[4] Refers to “Opinions on the Future Operational Policy.”


[5] Xu Xiangqian, then first deputy commander of the North China Military Region and commander and political commissar of the First Corps.


[5] Guisui, old city name, now Hohhot, Inner Mongolia.


[6] Xu refers to Xu Xiangqian. Zhou refers to Zhou Shidi, then deputy commander and deputy political commissar of the First Corps of the North China Military Region.