Opinions on Overall Operational
Principles from Now On
 (December 12, 1948)
To Liu [Bocheng], Chen [Yi], and Deng [Xiaoping]; Su [Yu] and Tan [Zhenlin]:1
	 1.	 After Huang Wei’s2 army has been annihilated, we ask Comrade Bocheng
to please come to the Central Committee to discuss our strategic orientation. We estimate that Huang Wei’s entire army may be annihilated within
several days, while it will take somewhat more time to annihilate all of Qiu
[Qingquan] and Li [Mi]’s forces.3 After [the army of] Huang Wei has been
annihilated, will the five comrades Liu, Chen, Deng, Su, and Tan please hold
a meeting of the General Front Committee. You should discuss the plan of
rest and reorganization to follow the annihilation of Qiu and Li’s forces, the
next steps of the fighting plan, and the future plans for the battle to cross the
Yangzi River; and these should be brought to the Central Committee as the
opinions of the General Front Committee. If Su and Tan are too occupied
to attend the General Front Committee’s meeting, will Bocheng please go
to Su and Tan’s headquarters, meet with Su and Tan, gain an understanding
of the situation of the East China Field Army, consult regarding Su’s and
Tan’s opinions, and then come to the Central Committee immediately. We
hope Bocheng can arrive at the Central Committee for meetings between
December 20th and 25th.
	 2.	 Our opinions about the overall policy for warfare in the future are generally as follows: First, after annihilating all the enemy forces under Huang,
Qiu, and Li, the two forces of the East China Field Army and the Central

Plains Field Army should rest and reorganize for two months (divided into
four stages of half a month each). They also should prepare all items needed
for the battle to cross the Yangzi River (raincoats, currency, artillery shells,
medicine, steamships, and so on) and provisionally complete political mobilization. Second, on the condition that the enemy forces currently in the
region between the Yangzi River and the Huai River do not retreat south
of the Yangzi River, the two armies should coordinate their efforts to carry
out the Jiang-Huai Campaign in one to two months. They should annihilate all the enemy forces in the region between the Yangzi River and the
Huai River and occupy all cities and towns north of the Yangzi River, south
of the Huai River, east of the [Bei]ping-[Hai]kou railway, and west of the
ocean, generally all cities and towns in the region from Anqing to Nantong,
and control the north bank of the Yangzi River. Third, they should finally
complete preparatory work for the battle to cross the Yangzi River within
a substantial period of time, and then carry out the battle to cross the river.
The timing should be around May or June of next year. Fourth, the East
China Field Army and the Central Plains Field Army should cooperate in
managing southeast China, including southern Anhui, southern Jiangsu, all
of Zhejiang and Fujian, and part of Jiangxi, and in capturing and controlling the cities of Wuhu, Hangzhou, Zhenjiang, Suzhou, Nanjing, Shanghai,
and Fuzhou. Fifth, the main force of the North China Army, in coordination
with our Northeast China Army, should finish the task of capturing Beiping,
Tianjin, Zhangjiakou, and Tangshan in January or February of next year.
They should rest and reorganize in March and April, advance southward
along the [Bei]ping-Han[kou] railway in May, carry out the Jiang-Han
Campaign, finish preparatory work for crossing the Yangzi River in June and
July,4 and cross the river in August. The first step will be to manage southern
Hubei, the entire province of Hunan, and part of Jiangxi, including capturing
Wuhan, Yuezhou,5 Changsha, Changde, Baoqing, Hengzhou,6 Chenzhou,
Jiujiang, Nanchang, Ji’an, and Ganzhou. The second step will be to capture
Guangdong and Guangxi. Sixth, after our Northeast China Army in coordination with the main force of the North China Army captures [Bei]ping, [Tian]
jin, Zhang[jiakou], and Tang[shan], they should join in capturing Taiyuan if
Taiyuan has still not fallen by that time. They should then have Yang [Dezhi] and Luo [Ruiqing]’s forces7 and Yang Chengwu’s forces8 occupy Suiyuan9
and Ningxia and join up with Peng [Dehuai] and He [Long].10 The corps of
Xu [Xiangqian] and Zhou [Shidi]11 should join up with Peng and He soon.
They should first eliminate all enemy forces in the regions along the line from
Lanzhou to Tongguan and the areas south and north of the line. They should
also capture the cities of Tongguan, Xi’an, Tianshui, and Hanzhong, and then
enter Sichuan. Seventh, you should strive to complete repairs on the [Tian]
jin-Pu[kou], [Bei]ping-Han[kou], and Longhai [Lanzhou-Lianyungang] railways in autumn or at the latest winter of next year. We will use the [Tian]jinPu[kou] railway to supply you, the [Bei]ping-Han[kou] railway to supply the
army of Lin [Biao] and Luo [Ronghuan], and the Longhai railway to supply
the army of Peng and He. Eighth, the above plans are made based on our own
and the enemy’s current situation and the enemy’s possible deployments in
the future. After the enemy forces you are facing now and the enemy forces
in [Bei]ping and [Tian]jin are annihilated, we estimate that the enemy will
deploy a relatively large amount of troop strength south of the Yangzi River;
the second part of its forces will be deployed to Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi;
and the third part will be deployed to Sichuan and Shaanxi. Ninth, the above
plans have been made based on many military, political, and economic considerations, and they adopt the basic principle of going about things surely
and steadily. There are some differences from what we discussed in the past
with comrades Chen [Yi], Deng [Xiaoping], and Su [Yu]; please consider
this prior to [Liu] Bocheng’s departure.
	 3.	 We are sending this telegram only to Liu, Chen, and Deng. Will Xiaoping
please be responsible for reading it to Su [Yu] and Tan [Zhenlin] when the
two of them arrive at your location for a meeting. After they have read it,
burn it to maintain secrecy.
The Central Military Commission

---

Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 5, pp. 382–84, where it is
reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission.
Liu Bocheng was commander of the Central Plains Army, Chen Yi was first deputy commander of the Central Plains Army, and Deng Xiaoping was political commissar of the
Central Plains Field Army. Su Yu was acting commander and acting political commissar
of the East China Field Army, and Tan Zhenlin was deputy political commissar of the East
China Field Army.

2.  Huang Wei was commander of the Guomindang army’s Twelfth Army Group.

3.  Qiu Qingquan and Li Mi were the commanders of the Guomindang army’s Second
and Thirteenth army groups, respectively.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-204

4.  The Guomindang forces had withdrawn south of the Yangzi River after their defeat
in the Liaoning-Shenyang, Huai-Hai, and Beiping-Tianjin campaigns. The scheduled
Jiang-Han campaign therefore had not yet to begun.

5.  Yuezhou refers to Yueyang, Hunan.

6.  Baoqing and Hengzhou refer to Shaoyang and Hengyang in Hunan.

7.  Yang Dezhi and Luo Ruiqing were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the North China Military Region’s Second Corps.

8.  Yang Chengwu was commander of the North China Military Region’s Third Corps.

9.  Suiyuan province covered the central region of what is today Inner Mongolia before
it was abolished in 1954.

10.  Peng Dehuai was commander and political commissar of the Northwest Field
Army. He Long was commander of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia-Shanxi-Suiyuan Joint
Defense Force.

11.  Xu Xiangqian was commander and political commissar of the First Corps of the
North China Military Region, and Zhou Shidi was deputy commander and deputy political
commissar of the First Corps of the North China Military Region.