We Must Use the Method of Storming to
Fight the Formidable Foe
(December 4, 1948, 4:00 P.M.)
To Liu [Bocheng], Chen [Yi], and Deng [Xiaoping]; and for the information of
Su [Yu], Chen [Shiju], and Zhang [Zhen]; Tan [Zhenlin], Wang [Jian’an], and Li
[Yingxi]; Wei [Guoqing], and Ji [Luo]:1
We received the telegram sent between 9:00 P.M. and 11:00 P.M. on
December 3.2
	 1.	 About one-half of Huang Wei’s3 effective strength has been wiped out.
According to Huang Wei’s own words, sixteen out of thirty-three regiments
have already been eliminated, while seventeen regiments remain. These few
days present an opportune moment for us to turn the corner. If you can wipe
out just three or four more regiments, the enemy forces will be at a complete
numerical disadvantage and annihilating them will be relatively easy.
	 2.	 The experiences of fighting Huang Baitao4 and Huang Wei have proven that
we cannot rely on raids to wipe out enemy forces with formidable combat capacity. Rather, we must adopt tactics such as separation, scouting, sapping, concentrating the fighting force and firepower, and coordinating the
infantry and artillery, in order to wipe them out.
	 3.	 As for fighting to annihilate Qiu [Qingquan], Li [Mi], and Sun [Yuanliang]’s
forces,5 the most important thing at present is to take advantage of the enemy’s movements to boldly insert each of our columns between the enemy’s
various armies (nine armies in all); we must not allow the enemy forces to
come together as one. After that, we can wipe them out one by one. Among
these forces, we may be able to finish off the Twelfth Army, Forty-first
Army, Forty-seventh Army, Seventy-second Army, and so forth, by using
the raid method. The other armies can only be finished off using a method of
storming (that is, separating the enemy into big parts, separating the enemy
into small parts, scouting, sapping, concentrating the fighting force and firepower, coordinating the infantry and the artillery, and so on). Our armies in
the Northeast were able to finish off Liao [Yaoxiang’s] corps6 in Liaoning
so swiftly because our columns boldly inserted themselves between the enemy’s armies, and also because the enemy command was in disarray (suffering setbacks first in the west, then in the southeast, and then again in the
northeast). The East China Field Army may encounter this kind of situation
when facing Qiu, Li, and Sun this time around, and if so, it may be possible
to finish them off quickly. But once the weaker enemy forces are finished off
quickly, you must be prepared subjectively to spend considerable time using
the method of storming to finish off [Qiu, Li, and Sun].
	 4.	 Li Yannian’s unit7 has passed the Fei River and advanced to Baojiaji.8 We
hope that Liu, Chen, and Deng can inform us by telegram of how you will
deal with this enemy.
 The Military Commission
---

Notes

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 5, pp. 317–19, where it is
reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Military Commission. Liu
Bocheng was commander of the Central Plains Field Army Chen Yi was first deputy commander, and Deng Xiaoping was political commissar of the Central Plains Field Army. Su
Yu was acting commander and acting political commissar of the East China Field Army,
Chen Shiju was chief-of-staff of the East China Field Army, and Zhang Zhen (张震) was
deputy chief-of-staff of the East China Field Army. Tan Zhenlin, Wang Jian’an, and Li
Yingxi (1902–1981, born in Shangcheng, Henan) were political commissar, deputy commander, and chief-of-staff, respectively, of the Shandong Corps of the East China Field
Army. Wei Guoqing and Ji Luo (Ji Pengfei) were commander and deputy political commissar, respectively, of the Northern Jiangsu Corps of the East China Field Army.

2.  The telegram from Liu Bocheng et al. stated that all their units had been engaged in
attacks for three days but had wiped out only one enemy division (minus one battalion).
Given the stubborn resistance of the enemy troops, Liu, Chen, and Deng had decided to
pull in more units and to launch a focused attack on the enemy from all directions. They
anticipated requiring more time to annihilate the enemy.

3.  Huang Wei was commander of the Guomindang army’s Twelfth Corps.

4.  Huang Baitao, commander of the Guomindang army’s Seventh Army, died in the
battle of Daxiaoyuanshang, east of Nianzhuang, on November 22, 1948.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-197

5.  Qiu Qingquan, Li Mi, and Sun Yuanliang were commanders of the Guomindang
army’s Second, Thirteenth, and Sixteenth army groups, respectively.

6.  Liao Yaoxiang was commander of the Guomindang army’s Ninth Army Group. Liao
and other commanders, along with more than 100,000 troops, were captured during the
second phase of the Liao-Shen Campaign in late October 1948.

7.  Li Yannian was commander of the Guomindang army’s Sixth Corps.

8.  Presumably referring to Baoji, located in northeast Huaiyuan, Anhui.