[1] [2] Liu, Chen, and Deng, with copies to Su, Chen, Zhang, Tan, Wang, Li, Wei, and Ji: [3] We have received Jiang’s telegraph of the hour of the Pig.
[4] (1) Nearly half of Huang Wei’s forces have already been annihilated. According to Huang Wei himself, out of thirty-three regiments, sixteen have been destroyed, leaving seventeen intact.
The next few days present a critical opportunity. If you can destroy another three or four regiments, the enemy will be at a complete numerical disadvantage, making it much easier to wipe them out entirely.
[5] Both previous engagements against Huang Wei have demonstrated that (2) when confronting an enemy with strong fighting spirit, annihilation cannot be achieved through surprise attacks alone. Instead, one must employ a combination of tactics—separating the enemy, conducting thorough reconnaissance, executing close-in infiltration operations, concentrating troops and firepower, and ensuring effective infantry-artillery coordination—in order to achieve victory.
[6] (3) In the upcoming operation to destroy Qiu, Li, and Sun, the most important task at present is to take advantage of their movement. All your columns should boldly insert themselves between the enemy’s nine corps, making every effort to prevent them from coalescing into a single mass, after which they can be defeated piecemeal.
For units such as the 12th, 41st, 47th, and 72nd Corps, a swift, surprise attack may suffice; however, the remaining corps will require sustained, methodical assaults—employing large-scale and small-scale encirclement, intensive reconnaissance, close-in operations, concentrated troop and fire power, and coordinated infantry-artillery support—in order to secure victory.
In western Liaoning, our Northeast Field Army was able to swiftly resolve the battle against Liao’s corps precisely because our various columns boldly penetrated the spaces between the enemy’s different formations, while the enemy command was in utter disarray—first attempting a westward advance only to be repulsed, then turning southeast only to meet failure again, and finally shifting northeast—thus enabling a rapid conclusion.
A similar situation may arise in this campaign against Qiu, Li, and Sun. Should that occur, the operation could likewise be brought to a swift close. Nevertheless, you must be mentally prepared to follow up any quick victories over weaker enemy units with more protracted, all-out assaults aimed at eliminating the stronger adversaries.
[8] (4) Li Yannian’s force has crossed the Fei River and is advancing toward Baojiaji. Please advise on how best to deal with this enemy. Liu, Chen, and Deng are requested to telegraph their recommendations.
Issued by the Central Military Commission at 4:00 p.m. on the fourth day, based on Mao Zedong’s handwritten draft.
Notes [1]“Liu, Chen, and Deng” refers to Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, and Deng Xiaoping, who at the time served as commander, first deputy commander, and political commissar of the Central Plains Field Army, respectively.
[2] “Su, Chen, and Zhang” denotes Su Yu, Chen Shiju, and Zhang Zhen, who held the posts of acting commander and acting political commissar, chief of staff, and deputy chief of staff of the East China Field Army, respectively.
“Tan and Wang” stand for Tan Zhenlin and Wang Jian’an, who were political commissar and deputy commander of the Shandong Corps of the East China Field Army, respectively.
“Li” refers to Li Yingxi (1902–1981), a native of Shangcheng County, Henan Province, who at the time served as chief of staff of the Shandong Corps of the East China Field Army.
“Wei and Ji” represent Wei Guoqing and Ji Luo (also known as Ji Pengfei), who functioned as commander and deputy political commissar of the Northern Jiangsu Corps of the East China Field Army, respectively.
[3] This refers to the telegram sent on December 3, 1948, at the hour of the Pig, by Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, and Deng Xiaoping to the Central Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee, as well as to Deng Zihui and Li Da. The telegram reported on recent combat operations between our forces and the Nationalist army’s Huang Wei Corps, stating: “We have decided to immediately commit the Seventh and Thirteenth Columns of the East China Field Army (as reserves) to the offensive. Our operational approach will continue to draw upon the experience gained at Nianzhuang—namely, multi-pronged, focused attacks. Given the enemy’s tight defensive posture and stubborn resistance, it will still take some time to completely annihilate them.”
[4] This denotes the Nationalist army’s 12th Corps, under the command of Huang Wei.
[5] This refers to the Nationalist army’s 7th Corps, commanded by Huang Baitao.
[6] These are the Nationalist army’s 2nd, 13th, and 16th Corps, led respectively by Qiu Qingquan, Li Mi, and Sun Yuanliang.
[7] Liao’s Corps refers to the former Nationalist army’s 9th Corps, under the command of Liao Yaoxiang. On October 26, 1948, this corps was encircled by the Northeast Field Army in the areas of Heishan, Dahu Shan, and Xinmin in Liaoning Province, and was subsequently completely destroyed.
[8] Li Yannian’s force designates the Nationalist army’s 6th Corps, under the leadership of Li Yannian.