It Is Necessary to Prepare to Fight Successive
Battles to Strive for a Complete Victory in the
Campaign
 (November 23, 1948)
To Liu [Bocheng], Chen [Yi], and Deng [Xiaoping], Su [Yu], Chen [Shiju], and
Zhang [Zhen], Tan [Zhenlin] and Wang [Jian’an], Wei [Guoqing] and Ji [Luo,
i.e., Ji Pengfei], and for the information of every column committee, the East
China Bureau, the Central Plains Bureau, the Henan-Anhui-Jiangsu Sub-Bureau,
and the Central China Work Committee:1
	 1.	 We celebrate your great victory in annihilating ten divisions of Huang
Baitao’s corps.2
	 2.	 During the sixteen days from November 7 to November 22, you annihilated
eighteen reorganized divisions of the regular forces of Liu Zhi’s system3
(including the three rebel divisions of He [Jifeng] and Zhang [Kexia] that
you won over). You have also launched significant attacks on the four corps
of Qiu Qingquan, Li Mi, Sun Yuanliang, and Liu Ruming; occupied broad
tracts to the south, east, north, and west of Xuzhou; cut off communications between Xu[zhou] and Beng[bu]; and isolated the enemy in Xu[zhou].
This is a great victory. Before launching the campaign, we estimated that during the first stage we could possibly destroy eighteen enemy divisions but
isolating the enemy in Xu[zhou] and cutting off communications between
Xu[zhou] and Beng[bu] were things we did not dare anticipate that we would
be able to do. What brought about this situation was, subjectively, that our
two big East China and Central Plains field armies joined forces to attack and
occupy Su county. Objectively, it was that the enemy only has a certain level
of defensive capabilities (we absolutely must not underestimate this point),
and hardly has any offensive capabilities (we need to recognize this point
fully).
	 3.	 Of the eight enemy corps, one rebelled (that of Zhang and He),4 one was
annihilated (that of Huang Baitao), and four suffered considerable blows.
We have divided the Qiu-Li-Sun forces in the north from the Huang-Liu-Li
forces in the south, and the enemy’s morale will weaken further. You and
cadres at every level need to recognize the significance of this great victory,
and you should educate the soldiers; this is one aspect. At the same time, we
need to recognize that within the enemy’s main forces, the armies of Qiu
Qingquan, Li Mi, and Huang Wei as well as the Li Yannian army, there is one
army (the Fifty-fourth Army, transferred from Huludao) that still possesses
considerable stubborn fighting strength in the area of defense. Of the sixty-six enemy divisions fighting you directly (four of Feng Zhi’an,5 ten of Huang
Baitao, ten of Qiu Qingquan, seven of Li Mi, four of Sun Yuanliang, eleven
of Huang Wei, six of Liu Ruming, nine of Li Yannian6 and five directly subordinate to Liu Zhi), apart from those that have been annihilated, about fifty
divisions remain. This enemy can be eliminated. However, you must prepare
to devote three to five months to the entire campaign, and also to employ several stages of battle (you have already finished the first stage) to win overall
victory in the campaign. It is necessary to procure food, fodder, and ammunition for three to five months for a total of approximately 1,300,000 troops
and conscripted laborers, and provisions for medical treatment for around
100,000 to 200,000 wounded. At least half of the time that each unit spends
on this campaign should be used for rest, reorganization, and replenishment
to ensure high morale and full energy. Regarding troops, you must carry out
the overall principle of supplementing wherever you fight and fighting while
supplementing; regarding the people, follow the overall principle of mutual
assistance among tillers and fighters. In the area of tactics, you must not rely upon hasty raids but rather upon full reconnaissance and technical preparations (sapping, coordination among foot soldiers and artillery, and so forth)
to achieve success. We need to carry out ample political work among the
army and the local civilians as well as political attacks on the enemy forces
that are fierce and have a genuine effect, and we must incite internal rebellion
among the forces of Liu Ruming and the others. If you take note of and fulfill
the above conditions, you will have the possibility of achieving this great
victory of nationwide significance.
	 4.	 Only under one type of circumstance will you leave your present location
and search for other opportunities for battle, specifically, if Huang Wei, Liu
Ruming, and Li Yannian in the south stop and do not advance for the present,
and also if they have not suffered serious attacks of annihilation by you, and
thus, for the purpose of rescuing the corps of Qiu, Li, and Sun, and to redeploy the river defenses and protect the area around Shanghai and Nanjing,
Chiang Kaishek then transfers all the armies of the Guangxi system and of
his own system to Bengbu to open up the Xu[zhou]-Beng[bu] railway and
rescue the enemy in Xuzhou. If Chiang Kaishek does this, he will lose [Bei]
ping and [Tian]jin and he will also expose the enemy forces in Wuhan and
the middle reaches of the Yangzi River in front of our armies. This would
be very dangerous for the Guomindang. Whether or not the enemy will do
this, and whether it would be in time, will shortly become clear. As for us,
the most advantageous thing to do is to annihilate the enemy forces that are
before us one by one according to the present situation; we should strive
mightily to do this. If, during the second phase of battle, we can annihilate
large numbers of the enemy to the south, then even if the enemy does do this,
it will still be possible for us to realize our original plans.
	 5.	 We hope that the [East] China and Central Plains field armies under the unified leadership of the front committee of Liu, Chen, Deng, Su, and Tan (with
Deng as secretary) will achieve a new, great victory.
 The Military Commission

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Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 5, pp. 263–66, where it is
reproduced from the original preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission.
Liu Bocheng was commander of the Central Plains Field Army, Chen Yi was first deputy
commander of the Central Plains Field Army, and Deng Xiaoping was political commissar
of the Central Plains Field Army. Su Yu was acting commander and acting political commissar of the East China Field Army, Chen Shiju was chief-of-staff of the East China Field
Army, and Zhang Zhen (张震) was deputy chief-of-staff of the East China Field Army. Tan
Zhenlin and Wang Jian’an were political commissar and deputy commander, respectively,
of the East China Field Army’s Shandong Corps. Wei Guoqing and Ji Luo (Ji Pengfei) were
commander and deputy political commissar, respectively, of the East China Field Army’s
Northern Jiangsu Corps.

2.  Huang Baitao was commander of the Guomindang army’s Seventh Army Group. He
was killed in action at Daxiaoyuan, east of Nianzhuang, on November 22, 1948.

3.  Liu Zhi was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang army’s Xuzhou “Bandit Suppression” Headquarters.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-190

4.  The deputy commanders of the Guomindang’s Third Pacification Zone, He Jifeng
and Zhang Kexia (who were both underground members of the Chinese Communist Party)
went over to the Communist side during the first stage of the Huai-Hai Campaign, bringing
with them more than 20,000 troops.

5.  Feng Zhi’an was commander of the Guomindang army’s Third Pacification Zone.

6.  Qiu Qingquan, Li Mi, Sun Yuanliang, Huang Wei, Liu Ruming, and Li Yannian were
the commanders of the Guomindang army’s Second, Thirteenth, Sixteenth, Twelfth, Eighth,
and Sixth army groups, respectively.