First Secretly Move Four Columns through
the Pass During the Night
(November 20, 1948, midnight)
To Lin [Biao], Luo [Ronghuan], and Liu [Yalou], and for the information of
Cheng Zihua and Huang Zhiyong, as well as to Yang [Dezhi], Luo [Ruiqing], and
Geng [Biao], and the Northeast Bureau:1
We received your telegram of 11:00 A.M. on the 19th.
	 1.	 The opportunity to surround the enemy in Tangshan is worth considering.
Cheng and Huang can prepare to surround Tangshan between the 25th and
27th, thus cutting off the enemy’s line of retreat. However, await our final
orders before implementing this plan.
	 2.	 This should be discussed: Fu Zuoyi’s ability to lead is greater than that of
Wei Lihuang et al.2 If Cheng and Huang surround Tangshan too early and
allow their main force to wait in the vicinity of Tangshan, Beiping, and
Tianjin for two or three weeks, Chiang Kaishek and Fu Zuoyi are sure to
make a move within this time frame. If the enemy moves every division of
its central army toward Beiping as well as moves part, most, or all of Fu’s
army to the [Tian]jin-Tang[gu]-Tang[shan] line and also uses the army at
Tanggu, they will be able to reach the enemy forces in Tangshan. They will
thereby complete their preparations for retreat by water, and our army will
have difficulty going through the [Shanhai] Pass to annihilate the enemy.
	 3.	 We believe we should secretly begin simultaneously moving our armies at
the Jinzhou-Xinmin line and the area around Yingkou as well as four columns and Cheng and Huang’s current forces to cut off communications between
Tianjin and Beiping and between Tangshan and Tanggu. This will prevent
the enemy in Beiping and Tangshan from reaching Tianjin and Tanggu. If
we want to attain this goal, we must delay Cheng and Huang’s move to surround Tangshan. We must also first secretly move four columns through
the [Shanhai] Pass during the night to cut off contact between Beiping and
Tianjin. Furthermore, the troops near Shenyang should delay their departure
because Shenyang has an enemy telegraph tower through which the enemy
hears of our every move.
	 4.	 Two columns of Yang, Luo, and Geng’s division are now at Quyang and can
emerge in the vicinity of Zhangjiakou to coordinate with Yang Chengwu and
Zhan Da’nan3 to implement the encirclement of Zhangjiakou, thus blocking
the western route of retreat for Fu’s army as well as severing contact between
[Bei]ping and [Tian]jin. But the 40,000 or so soldiers of the Sixth Brigade
of this division do not have enough experience to single-handedly take on
the task of severing contact between [Bei]ping and [Tian]jin. Therefore, it
would be more appropriate for them to coordinate with Yang Chengwu and
Zhan Da’nan. Ask Lin, Luo, and Liu for their opinion on how best to use this
division. Ask Yang, Luo, and Geng how much time will be needed to move
troops from Quyang to the [Bei]ping-[Tian]jin railway and to the [Bei]ping-Zhang[jiakou] railway.
	 5.	 In order keep from alerting Fu’s army too early, we have already ordered that
Nie [Rongzhen], Bo [Yibo], and Teng [Daiyuan]4 order the seven columns
attacking Baoding to halt their attack and to instead take the course of action
of “surrounding and observing.” This city is currently guarded by only one
local regiment, whose objective is to forcibly pin down part of our forces
and give Fu’s army time to implement the plan of retreating or entrenching.
(Fu is now funneling local forces, for example those of Wang Fenggang5 and
others, into Fu and Chiang [Kaishek]’s regular army. However, Wang and
the others are not willing and are now discussing surrendering the city to us.)
	 6.	 One army of Fu and Chiang’s in Shanhai Pass has not yet retreated, anticipating that your main force must go through this area in order to cross through
the pass. It will have that army block you to allow time for its main force to
escape or to hold ground. You should therefore take your main force through
the pass along the same route taken by the Fourth and Eleventh columns and
not go through Shanhai Pass.

	 7.	 You will need to be extremely secretive about your troops’ movements.
Chiang and Fu always underestimate our army’s initiative; they will never
expect your forces to go through the pass so soon. Therefore, in addition
to being extremely secretive about the movement of your troops, also ask
the Northeast Bureau and Lin [Biao], Luo [Ronghuan], and Tan [Zheng]6
to order Xinhua News Agency and radio stations in the Northeast to publish
and broadcast the news during the next two weeks to Shenyang, Xinmin,
Yingkou, and Jinzhou that our main force will hold a celebration for our
victories in order to confuse the enemy.
	 8.	 Please reply regarding the above items.
The Military Commission

---

Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 5, pp. 253–55, where it is
reproduced from Mao Zedong’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission.
Lin Biao was commander of the Northeast Field Army. Luo Ronghuan was political commissar of the Northeast Field Army, and Liu Yalou was chief-of-staff of the Northeast Field
Army. Cheng Zihua and Huang Zhiyong were commander and chief-of-staff, respectively,
of the Northeast Field Army’s Second Corps. Yang Dezhi, Luo Ruiqing, and Geng Biao
were commander, political commissar, and chief-of-staff, respectively, of the Second Corps
of the North China Military Region.

2.  Fu Zuoyi was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang army’s North China “Bandit
Suppression” Headquarters. Wei Lihuang formerly served as commander-in-chief of the
Northeast “Bandit Suppression” Headquarters.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-188

3.  Yang Chengwu was commander of the North China Military Region’s Third Corps.
Zhan Da’nan was commander of the Hebei-Rehe-Chahar Military Region.

4.  Nie Rongzhen, Bo Yibo, and Teng Daiyuan were commander, political commissar,
and second deputy commander, respectively, of the North China Military Region.

5.  Wang Fenggang (1914–1962, born in Xincheng, Hebei) was commissioner and public security commander of Hebei Province under the Nationalist government.

6.  Tan Zheng was director of the Political Department of the Northeast Field Army.