Would It or Would It Not Be Preferable
for the Northeast Main Force to Cross the
Shanhai Pass Earlier?
 (November 16, 1948, 4:00 A.M.)
To Lin [Biao], Luo [Ronghuan], and Liu [Yalou]:1
We received your telegram sent on the 15th at 1:00 P.M.2 After giving careful thought to the questions raised in your telegram, we believe that if the Yang
[Dezhi], Luo [Ruiqing], and Geng [Biao]’s corps3 joins that of Yang Chengwu4
in eastern Suiyuan, our army may be able to prevent Fu Zuoyi’s5 corps from
withdrawing toward Suiyuan.6 But our army will not be able to stop Fu’s corps
and the Guomindang’s central forces from withdrawing via the ocean, even if we
encircle Zhangjiakou. This is because the enemy has a total of thirty-five infantry
divisions and four cavalry divisions. If the enemy resolves to withdraw via the
ocean, it can amass more than ten divisions to accompany the enemy troops at
Zhangjiakou, gathering them in Tianjin and Tanggu to be shipped out one by one.
The defense of Baoding consists of two divisions put together from the peacekeeping corps, which also seem inclined to withdraw. Whether or not we encircle
them will not affect the overall situation. The enemy army at Chengde has already withdrawn. Xu [Xiangqian] and Zhou [Shidi]’s7 corps of 100,000 men, which has
been fighting bitterly during the last few months and has suffered total casualties
of 20,000, may stop attacking Taiyuan. But if we order them to give up the positions they have already occupied and move on to Zhangjiakou to take on the task
of encircling the enemy, the consequences will be as follows: First Bandit Yan
[Xishan]8 will come out of the city and recklessly attack us; second, the sentiments
among the troops will not be known to the leaders; and third, the enemy forces at
Zhangjiakou will escape annihilation before our army arrives. Furthermore, the
enemy garrison in Zhangjiakou is very small; originally, there was only one division put together from the peace-keeping corps, and now we hear that one more
division has been added, although this has yet to be confirmed. The main forces of
Fu’s army are all in the area near Beiping. We have been thinking about sending
your main force to cross the [Shanhai] Pass earlier, encircle Jingu and Tangshan,
and rest and reorganize while in an encircling position, thus preventing the enemy
from escaping via the ocean. Please consider whether it would be best for you to
cross the [Shanhai] Pass earlier or to carry out the plan of resting and reorganizing
in the Northeast before crossing the [Shanhai] Pass; report your conclusions by
telegram.
The Military Commission
---

Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 5, pp. 226–27, where it is
reproduced from Mao Zedong’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission.
Lin Biao was commander of the Northeast Field Army. Luo Ronghuan was political commissar of the Northeast Field Army, and Liu Yalou was chief-of-staff of the Northeast Field
Army.

2.  The telegram from Lin Biao et al. advised that in addition to one unit being left
behind to guard Taiyuan, the forces under Xu Xiangqian, Zhou Shidi, Yang Dezhi, and Luo
Ruiqing should amass to quickly surround Baoding or Zhangjiakou in order to cut off their
communications with Beiping and to prevent Fu Zuoyi and the Guomindang central forces
from moving south or from withdrawing to Suiyuan.

3.  Yang Dezhi was commander, Luo Ruiqing was political commissar, and Geng Biao
was chief-of-staff of the North China Military Region’s Second Corps.

4.  Yang Chengwu was commander of the North China Military Region’s Third Corps.

5.  Fu Zuoyi was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang army’s North China “Bandit
Suppression” Headquarters.

6.  Suiyuan province covered the central region of today’s Inner Mongolia before it was
abolished in 1954.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-185

7.  Xu Xiangqian was first deputy commander of the North China Military Region and
commander and political commissar of its First Corps. Zhou Shidi was deputy commander
and deputy political commissar of the First Corps.

8.  Yan Xishan was director of the Guomindang army’s Taiyuan Pacification Office.