Telegram of November 16, 1948: Your main force should enter the Pass as soon as possible, encircle Tianjin, Tanggu, and Tangshan, and carry out reorganization while maintaining the encirclement; in this way, the enemy will have no avenue of escape by sea.

Telegram of November 18, 1948: Immediately order all columns to complete preparatory arrangements for departure within one to one-and-a-half days. On the 21st or the 22nd, the entire army—or at least eight columns—should take a shortcut and advance with maximum speed to suddenly encircle the enemy forces in Tangshan, Tanggu, and Tianjin, preventing any escape, and strive to secure the unconditional surrender of the Central Army units (which is quite likely).

Telegram of November 20, 1948: Fu and Chiang still have one corps stationed at Shanhaiguan, whose purpose is to assume that your main force will inevitably pass through that area upon entering the Pass. By having this unit hold up your advance, they hope to gain time for the bulk of their forces to either withdraw or fortify themselves. Therefore, when your main force enters the Pass, it should follow the route taken by the Fourth and Eleventh Columns and avoid Shanhaiguan.

Telegram of November 21, 1948: The five columns currently positioned around Jinzhou, Dahuishan, and Yingkou may set out on the 23rd, taking a shortcut to travel at night and rest during the day, keeping well concealed and moving swiftly. All units should pass through Rehe Province into eastern Hebei, rather than going via Shanhaiguan. Units in the Shenyang area, together with the headquarters and its heavy baggage, should delay their departure by several days and exit near Shanhaiguan, heading toward Tangshan. Should Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou decide to move out first, they should take only a light command post with them and proceed ahead. About a week after their departure, a notice stating that Lin was still in Shenyang should be published in the Shenyang newspapers and broadcast over Xinhua News Agency. All units must pay close attention to concealment.

Telegram of November 8, 1948: “Your plan to dispatch the Third and Fifth Columns to engage the Sixteenth Army is unsound from the standpoint of the overall strategic scheme. At present, Fu Zuoyi has fourteen divisions and one cavalry division concentrated in the Beijing–Zhuozhou–Tongxian–Shunyi–Nankou region, not counting the five divisions stationed in Xiaohuayuan and Huailai. Your primary task is to prevent these enemy forces from fleeing to Tianjin. The proper course is to occupy the Langfang–Xianghe line with four columns, thereby severing the communications between Beijing and Tianjin.”

“Under conditions where the link between Beijing and Tianjin has not yet been cut, if you were to employ two additional columns—beyond Cheng Zihua and Huang Kecheng—to attack the Sixteenth Army at Nankou and annihilate it, you would run the serious risk of forcing the enemy in Beijing to flee prematurely to Tianjin or Tanggu.”

“Therefore, you should await the arrival of reinforcing troops and prepare to implement the plan to sever the Beijing–Tianjin connection, encircle Tangshan, and destroy the enemy forces in Lutang.”