Prepare to Move South to Annihilate the Enemy When the Kuomintang Army Again Invades and Harasses Shijiazhuang[1]

(November 16, 1948)

Cheng and Huang, and inform Lin, Luo, and Liu[2]:

Your telegram of the 16th at 19:00 hours[3] received. (1) Your plan to prepare to move south to annihilate the enemy when they again invade and harass Shijiazhuang is very good. (2) If the enemy again invades and harasses Shijiazhuang, the timing will probably be in the first ten days of December, because our Yang-Luo-Geng force[4] will join the Taiyuan operation starting December 1. After Fu Zuoyi[5] discovers this situation, he may hold his troops back and not move, or he may divide his forces to invade and harass Shijiazhuang. (3) We hope you will study and make preparations regarding the route for advancing south, crossing rivers, and other such matters.

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--- Notes

[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, addressed to Cheng Zihua, commander of the Second Corps of the Northeast Field Army, and Huang Zhiyong, its chief of staff.


[2] Lin, Luo, and Liu refer to Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou, who were respectively commander, political commissar, and chief of staff of the Northeast Field Army at the time.


[3] Refers to the telegram sent by Cheng Zihua and Huang Zhiyong to the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China at 19:00 hours on November 11, 1948. The telegram stated: The Military Commission's directive of the 9th instructed us to prepare two plans, either to attack Beiping or to move south. We believe moving south seems more advantageous. At present, the enemy's strength in North China has increased. If they send three armies south to attack Shijiazhuang, they could still control three or four armies of mobile forces in the outskirts of Beiping to deal with us. Attacking Beiping might not easily tie down the enemy, whereas if we move south, we can tie down the enemy and also annihilate a part or one column of the enemy in field operations. If, after we move south, the enemy discovers that our main Northeast force has entered the pass, they may quickly concentrate and withdraw westward. At that time, we could then turn via western Beiping toward the Beiping-Zhangjiakou section to block the enemy's westward withdrawal, thereby facilitating the complete annihilation of Fu Zuoyi's forces.


[4] The Yang-Luo-Geng force refers to the Second Corps of the North China Military Region, with corps commander Yang Dezhi, political commissar Luo Ruiqing, and chief of staff Geng Biao.


[5] Fu Zuoyi was then commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang’s “Bandit Suppression” General Headquarters in North China.