Postpone the Attack on Taiyuan[1]

(November 16, 1948)

Xu and Zhou:

It is estimated that if Taiyuan is captured too early, there is a possibility that Fu Zuoyi[2] will feel isolated and voluntarily abandon Beiping, Tianjin, Zhangjiakou, and Tangshan[3] to withdraw southward, or retreat separately westward and southward, thereby increasing the difficulty of subsequent annihilation. Please consider whether the following policy is feasible: (1) Continue fighting for another one or two weeks, capture a number of key peripheral points and firmly control the airfields, then halt the offensive and launch a political offensive. The troops shall firmly hold the positions already gained and rest and regroup on the spot. When our Northeast Field Army enters the pass to attack Beiping and Tianjin in early January next year, you will then resume the attack on Taiyuan. (2) If this policy is adopted, the Yang-Luo-Geng Corps[4] shall rest and regroup in Fuping and temporarily refrain from advancing westward. What is your opinion? Awaiting your reply.

Central Military Commission

16th, 5:00 hours

[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Central Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, addressed to Xu Xiangqian, First Deputy Commander of the North China Military Region and Commander and concurrently Political Commissar of the First Corps, and Zhou Shidi, Deputy Commander and concurrently Deputy Political Commissar of the First Corps.

[2] Fu Zuoyi, then Commander-in-Chief of the Kuomintang Army’s North China “Bandit Suppression” General Headquarters.

[3] Beiping, Tianjin, Zhangjiakou, and Tangshan refer to Beiping, Tianjin, Zhangjiakou in Hebei, and Tangshan.

[4] The Yang-Luo-Geng Corps refers to the Second Corps of the North China Military Region, with Corps Commander Yang Dezhi, Political Commissar Luo Ruiqing, and Chief of Staff Geng Biao.