We Must Concentrate Our Forces
to Completely Destroy Huang
Baitao’s Corps
 (November 14, 1948, 11:00 P.M.)
To Liu [Bocheng], Chen [Yi], and Deng [Xiaoping], and for the information of
Su [Yu], Chen [Shiju], and Zhang [Zhen], Wei [Guoqing] and Ji [Luo], the East
China Bureau, and the Central Plains Bureau:1
	 1.	 We received the telegram sent by Su [Yu] on the 13th between 5:00 and 7:00
P.M.2
	 2.	 During the next several days, we must concentrate our energies on thoroughly wiping out all of Huang [Baitao]’s Army Corps3 and the enemy
forces on the Su [county]-Beng[bu] railway.
	 3.	 We are deeply concerned that if our forces cannot destroy Huang Baitao on
the 14th and 15th, and if the blocking forces are insufficient or ineffective,
then Qiu [Qingquan] and Li [Mi]4 will be able to move close to Bandit Huang.
We expect Comrade Su Yu to follow the plan explained in the telegram sent between 5:00 and 7:00 p.m. on the 13th, first concentrating our forces to finish off Bandit Huang’s Twenty-fifth, Forty-fourth, and 100th armies, leaving
Huang’s Army Corps and the Sixty-fourth Army to draw the forces of Qiu
and Li eastward, and then using the two groups, those of Wei and Ji, and Tan
and Wang, together to surround Qiu and Li from the east and west, taking the
opportunity to attack fiercely and destroy a part [of their forces], and forming
an obstructive front between Xuzhou and Qiu and Li. Meanwhile, [Chen]
Shiju will lead all units to destroy the remaining forces of Bandit Huang. If
this move is successful, the entire situation will be favorable to us.
	 4.	 We ask that Liu, Chen, and Deng move rapidly southward after amassing
their entire force to destroy the enemy at Su county and to wipe out the Sixtyeighth Army of Liu Ruming,5 which has already reached Guzheng and other
areas and the Fifty-fifth Army that may follow after it. If we win this victory,
Huang Wei’s6 army group will be isolated and easier to deal with.
	 5.	 After Huang Wei’s army group arrives at Buyang, given that Huang Baitao
and the enemy forces at Shu county and Guzheng have been wiped out and
Bengbu is threatened, we reckon that Chiang Kaishek will probably command him [Huang Wei] to first amass his forces at Mengcheng or Bengbu
and then gradually try to march north. We will have to decide immediately
to amass the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth columns of the
Central Field Army and the entire force of the local army units in Henan,
Anhui, and Jiangsu, with the Xu[zhou]-Beng[bu] railway as their pivot, to
deal with Huang Wei and the potentially increasing enemy force from the
south. The entire force of the East China Field Army will thus deal with the
enemy on the Longhai line.
	 6.	 It is worth considering whether we should attack Qiu and Li first and then
Xuzhou, or Xuzhou first and then Qiu and Li after annihilation of Huang
Baitao’s forces results in the connection between Qiu and Li and Xuzhou
being completely cut off and allowing the enemy no way to break through. It
is, however, not appropriate to attack two enemies at once. We now assume
that in a situation in which Huang Baitao has been wiped out, and Qiu and
Li have been surrounded, Chiang Kaishek will no doubt be obliged to order
Qiu and Li to break out of the encirclement rapidly and fiercely and to pull
back to Xuzhou. Consequently, we must first concentrate the entire force
of the East China Field Army on completing the encirclement of Qiu and
Li. The primary task is to use the strongest force to cut off the connection
between Xuzhou and Qiu and Li, establishing a sturdy and unbreakable barrier between Xuzhou and Qiu and Li. At the same time, we will launch fierce
attacks against Qiu and Li and destroy about one-third of their forces so
they will be unable to move. Thereafter, we will determine, depending on the situation, whether to continue finishing off Qiu and Li and then attack
Xuzhou, or to attack Xuzhou and then finish off Qiu and Li. For this purpose, it would be better for the Third Column of the East China Field Army
to join Wei and Ji in attacking Qiu and Li, while the Fourth Column of the
Central Plains Field Army should move south to join the battle against Liu
Ruming at present and to attack Huang Wei in the future. As for the action
of the Third Column, please have Liu, Chen, and Deng decide and issue
commands.
	 7.	 This campaign is the greatest campaign so far on our southern front, requiring perhaps about two months’ time and probably more than 100,000 casualties. It will also require an extremely large amount of ammunition and
civilian labor. Please have the East China Bureau and the Central Plains
Bureau do their best to organize the support work.
The Military Commission

---

Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 5, pp. 215–17, where it is
reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission.
Liu Bocheng was commander of the Central Plains Field Army, Chen Yi was first deputy
commander of the Central Plains Field Army, and Deng Xiaoping was political commissar
of the Central Plains Field Army. Su Yu was acting commander and acting political commissar of the East China Field Army, and Chen Siju was chief-of-staff and Zhang Zhen
(张震) was deputy chief-of-staff of the East China Field Army. Wei Guoqing and Ji Luo
(Ji Pengfei) were commander and deputy political commissar, respectively, of the East
China Field Army’s Northern Jiangsu Corps. Tan Zhenlin and Wang Jian’an were political
commissar and deputy commander, respectively, of the East China Field Army’s Shandong
Army Corps.

2.  The telegram from Su Yu stated that they were closing their encirclement of Huang
Baitao’s troops, and the Seventh and Eleventh columns of the Northern Jiangsu Corps were
heading out to block the main force under Qiu Qingquan and Li Mi. They also planned to
amass the Fourth, Sixth, and Sixteenth columns and one unit of the Ninth Column to wipe
out the enemy forces west, southwest, and northwest of Nianzhuang.

3.  Huang Baitao was commander of the Guomindang army’s Seventh Army Group.

4.  Qiu Qingquan and Li Mi were the commanders of the Guomindang army’s Second
and Thirteenth army groups, respectively.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-183

5.  Liu Ruming was commander of the Guomindang army’s Fourth Pacification Zone.

6.  Huang Wei was commander of the Guomindang army’s Twelfth Army Group.