Liu, Chen, and Deng [1], with copies to Su, Chen, and Zhang; Wei and Ji; Tan and Wang [2]; as well as the East China Bureau and the Central Plains Bureau:  (1) We have received Su’s telegram of the yyou day [3].
(2) Over the next few days, all efforts must be concentrated on completely annihilating Huang’s corps [4] in its entirety, together with the enemy forces along the Suzhou–Bengbu section.
(3) We are very concerned that if Huang Baitao cannot be dealt with within the hanyin and shuari days [5], and if our blocking forces prove insufficient or ineffective, Qiu and Li [6] may link up with Huang’s forces.
It is hoped that Comrade Su Yu will, in accordance with the yyou plan, concentrate his main strength first on eliminating Huang’s 25th, 44th, and 100th Armies, leaving behind Huang’s corps headquarters and the 64th Army to draw Qiu and Li eastward.
Subsequently, the Wei–Ji and Tan–Wang task forces should execute a pincer movement from east and west against Qiu and Li, launching a vigorous offensive to destroy a portion of their forces and establish a solid blocking position between Xuzhou and Qiu–Li.
Meanwhile, Shi Ju [7] is to command the various units in wiping out the remnants of Huang’s forces.
Should this maneuver succeed, the overall situation will turn decisively in our favor.
(4) Liu, Chen, and Deng are requested to devote their full attention to annihilating the enemy at Suxian County, after which they should swiftly advance southward to destroy Liu Ruming’s [8] 68th Army, now advanced to Guzhen and other areas, together with the 55th Army that may follow.
If this operation is victorious, Huang Wei’s corps [9] will be isolated and much easier to handle.
(5) Upon Huang Wei’s corps reaching Fuyang, given that Huang Baitao has been destroyed, the enemy at Suxian and Guzhen has been eliminated, and Bengbu is under threat, it is anticipated that Chiang Kai-shek will order it to concentrate first at Mengcheng or Bengbu, then gradually push northward.
We should immediately decide to commit the full strength of the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Columns of the Central Plains Field Army, along with the local military units of Henan, Anhui, and Jiangsu, using the Xuzhou–Bengbu railway as a strategic pivot, to engage Huang Wei and any additional enemy forces approaching from the south.
The East China Field Army, for its part, will continue to deal with the enemy along the Longhai Railway line.
(6) Now that Huang Baitao’s entire force has been wiped out, the link between Qiu and Li and Xuzhou has been definitively severed, and the enemy is unable to reopen that connection, it remains to be considered whether we should first attack Qiu and Li, then Xuzhou, or vice versa.
However, simultaneously confronting both enemies would be inappropriate.
At present, we envisage that, with Huang Baitao destroyed and Qiu and Li encircled, Chiang Kai-shek will undoubtedly order them to break out rapidly and forcefully back to Xuzhou.
Therefore, the East China Field Army must concentrate all its available forces to complete the encirclement of Qiu and Li as a priority—primarily by cutting off the communications between Xuzhou and Qiu–Li with our most powerful formations, thereby establishing an impregnable, unbreachable barrier between the two—and simultaneously launch a fierce assault on Qiu and Li, destroying roughly one-third of their troops and rendering them immobile.
Only then should we reassess the situation: either proceed to finish off Qiu and Li before taking Xuzhou, or capture Xuzhou first and subsequently eliminate Qiu and Li.
To this end, the Third Column of the East China Field Army should be attached to the Wei–Ji task force to participate in the operation against Qiu and Li, while the Fourth Column of the Central Plains Field Army should move south to join the ongoing effort against Liu Ruming and, later, against Huang Wei.
How exactly the Third Column ought to act is to be decided by Liu, Chen, and Deng, who will issue the appropriate orders.
(7) This campaign represents an unprecedented large-scale battle on our southern front.
It may last approximately two months, resulting in over 100,000 casualties, and will require enormous quantities of ammunition and civilian laborers.
The East China Bureau and the Central Plains Bureau are urged to mobilize all available resources to organize support operations.
Printed by the Military Commission at 11:00 PM on the fourteenth day, based on Mao Zedong’s handwritten draft.
Notes  [1] Liu, Chen, and Deng refer to Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, and Deng Xiaoping, who at the time served respectively as Commander, First Deputy Commander, and Political Commissar of the Central Plains Field Army.  [2] Su, Chen, and Zhang refer to Su Yu, Chen Shiju, and Zhang Zhen, who at the time served respectively as Acting Commander and Acting Political Commissar, Chief of Staff, and Deputy Chief of Staff of the East China Field Army.
Wei and Ji refer to Wei Guoqing and Ji Luo (also known as Ji Pengfei), who at the time served respectively as Commander and Deputy Political Commissar of the Northern Jiangsu Corps of the East China Field Army.
Tan and Wang refer to Tan Zhenlin and Wang Jian’an, who at the time served respectively as Political Commissar and Deputy Commander of the Shandong Corps of the East China Field Army.  [3] Refers to a telegram sent by Su Yu on November 13, 1948, at the you hour, to Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Geng, with copy to the CPC Central Military Commission and others.
The telegram set forth a detailed operational plan to encircle the Kuomintang’s Seventh Corps under General Huang Baitao, while simultaneously blocking and annihilating the Second and Thirteenth Corps commanded by Generals Qiu Qingquan and Li Mi.  [4] Huang’s Corps refers to the Kuomintang’s Seventh Corps, under the command of General Huang Baitao.  [5] The hanyin and shuari days correspond to the fourteenth and fifteenth days, respectively.  [6] Refers to the Kuomintang’s Second and Thirteenth Corps, commanded by Generals Qiu Qingquan and Li Mi, respectively.  [7] Shi Ju refers to Chen Shiju.  [8] Liu Ruming was at the time Commander of the Kuomintang’s Fourth Pacification Zone.  [9] Huang Wei’s Corps refers to the Kuomintang’s Twelfth Corps, under the command of General Huang Wei.