Strive with Utmost Effort to Annihilate the Enemy’s Main Force in the Vicinity of Xuzhou[1]

(November 9, 1948)

Su and Zhang, and inform the East China Bureau, Chen and Deng[2], and the Central Plains Bureau:

Your telegram of the morning of the 8th[3] received. You should strive with utmost effort to annihilate the enemy’s main force in the vicinity of Xuzhou and prevent it from fleeing south. The three fronts of East China, North China, and the Central Plains should use their full strength to guarantee the supply of our army.

The Military Commission

21–23 hours, 9th

[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee to Su Yu, acting commander and acting political commissar of the East China Field Army, and Zhang Zhen, its deputy chief of staff.
[2] Chen and Deng refer to Chen Yi and Deng Xiaoping, who were then respectively first deputy commander and political commissar of the Central Plains Field Army.
[3] This refers to the telegram sent by Su Yu and Zhang Zhen to the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee and others at 7–9 a.m. on November 8, 1948. The telegram stated: Chiang Kai-shek may adopt either of two policies—continuing to maneuver against us north of the Yangtze River, or immediately abandoning Xuzhou, Bengbu, and other places and withdrawing his troops north of the river to defend along the river. If the old liberated areas can still provide relatively large support, it would be more advantageous to compel the enemy to adopt the first policy. If so, then in this campaign, after annihilating Huang Baitao’s corps, we need not use our main force to attack toward Lianghuai but should instead advance with our main force toward the Xuzhou–Guzhen line, pin down the enemy in Xuzhou and its surrounding areas, and subsequently reduce and gradually annihilate them (either annihilating Sun Yuanliang’s corps or annihilating Huang Wei’s corps). At the same time, we should send part of our main force into Huainan to cut off the Tianjin–Pukou Railway, disrupt the enemy’s dispositions, and isolate the enemy forces at Xuzhou, Bengbu, and other points. Thus, during the first stage of the campaign, we should immediately use part of our forces to destroy the Xuzhou–Bengbu section of the railway in order to delay the enemy’s southward transport.