Telegram dated May 11–10, 1947: Among all regions nationwide, you rank first economically; in terms of military strength, you have already taken the lead (Shandong holds the top position). At present, you are advancing southward with eight divisions, hoping to resolve the South Manchurian issue during the summer and autumn seasons.
Subsequently, during the winter and spring, you plan to launch operations into Rehe and eastern Hebei, aiming to annihilate units such as the 13th Army and the 91st Army, while simultaneously mobilizing the masses and expanding your forces.
These two regions together house a population of fifteen million, constituting an indispensable prerequisite for future campaigns to seize Changchun, the North Ning Railway, and the four major cities of Changchun, Shenyang, Beiping, and Tianjin.
There are three essential conditions for capturing these railways and cities: You have already established a robust base area in North Manchuria, thereby fulfilling the first requirement.
Now, as you engage in combat in South Manchuria, it is anticipated that you will soon complete the second condition—building a powerful base area there.
The third step involves securing base areas in the Hebei–Rehe–Liaoning region.

Telegram dated October 13, 1947: “Within China proper, aside from Li Zongren’s faction potentially dispatching a small contingent beyond the passes, Chiang Kai-shek’s forces on all other fronts are acutely short of manpower and find it exceedingly difficult to reinforce Northeast China.”
It further notes: “Upon capturing Jilin, you should shift the main thrust of your offensive to the North Ning and Ping-Sui lines—specifically between Shenyang and Jinzhou, between Jinzhou and Shanhaiguan, between Shanhaiguan and Tianjin, between Tianjin and Beiping, and between Beiping and Zhangjiakou—all of which constitute highly favorable operational zones.”

Telegram dated November 7, 1948: In your previous telegram, you stated that no significant engagements were expected in the Jinzhou direction.
What is the actual situation there?
If our forces could gain complete control over Fuxin, Yixian, Xingcheng, Suizhong, Yuguan, Changli, Luan County, and the surrounding areas, would this not be more advantageous in countering any potential retreat by Chiang’s forces?
From the perspective of our strategic interests, it would be most beneficial to encircle and destroy Chiang’s troops in Northeast China piecemeal.
Should we lack sufficient strength to prevent their withdrawal, they would likely consolidate around Jinzhou, Chengde, Beiping, and Tianjin, forming a quadrangle with the intervening regions, and reopen the northern section of the Jinpu Railway.
While their supply lines would undoubtedly become precarious and morale would continue to decline, their overall force concentration would increase.
Such eventualities must be foreseen in advance.
Of course, there remains the possibility that Chiang’s forces might stubbornly cling to Northeast China without retreating; however, unless our own forces are strong enough to render such a move impossible, this scenario is hardly conceivable.

Telegram dated July 11–11, 1948: Operations directed southward offer numerous advantages.
The deeper our forces penetrate into the enemy’s rear, the more isolated and vulnerable enemy strongholds positioned behind us become, often forcing them to weaken or withdraw.
This principle has been amply demonstrated throughout the entire South Manchurian campaign and is likewise evident in your ongoing operations.
As for the planned attack on Changchun, given the uncertainties involved, it is indeed prudent—and necessary—to abandon that plan and instead accelerate the southern advance.
Even while you were preparing to assault Changchun, we had already cautioned you against overstating the difficulties of a southward operation to the point of mentally constraining yourselves and forfeiting your initiative.
Now that you have redirected your focus toward the south, studying the enemy situation, terrain, and logistical conditions there, you have identified a range of favorable factors.
This is both commendable and imperative.
You should thoroughly explain these advantages to all officers and soldiers, particularly the cadre, in order to inspire and solidify their resolve to press forward.
At the same time, it is crucial to openly acknowledge the various challenges you will inevitably encounter—such as food shortages, less enthusiastic local support compared to what you have experienced thus far, tenacious enemy resistance, and occasional setbacks—in order to ensure that everyone is mentally prepared and equipped with strategies to overcome these obstacles.
Among these inevitable difficulties, especially those related to food supplies, your senior leadership must assess the situation with utmost seriousness.
With less than a month remaining until mid-August, your political mobilization efforts and preparations for logistics must be intensified; otherwise, you risk being unable to launch operations along the North Ning, Ping-Cheng, and Ping-Zhang lines by August.

Telegram dated July 30, 1948: We believe you should prioritize operations against Jinzhou and Tangshan.
Whenever feasible, you should strive to capture these cities, completely or largely annihilating Fan Hanjie’s group, before turning your attention to Chengde and Zhangjiakou to confront Fu Zuoyi.
Should you bypass Fan Hanjie and directly target Fu Zuoyi, Wei Lihuang would likely concentrate his forces heavily along the Jin-Tang line, with Wei and Fan coordinating a westward reinforcement of Fu.
In that event, you could find yourselves in a very precarious position.
Food supplies are extremely scarce in the western sector, whereas the eastern region is a major grain-producing area; you must take this fact into full consideration.
Please inform us of your views on whether it is still possible to strike Fan Hanjie first.

Telegram dated August 9, 1948: The 91st, 94th, and 16th Armies, among others, are Nationalist units placed under Fu Zuoyi’s command, rather than being part of his personal force.
Their primary mission is to defend the Ping-Yu, Ping-Gu, Ping-Zhang, and Ping-Bao lines.
As long as Yang, Luo, and Geng advance toward Ping-Gu and Ping-Zhang, these units—except for the 91st Army—will swiftly fall back.
The 94th and 16th Armies are currently engaged against Yang, Luo, and Geng and are stationed far from the Jin-Yu front; they pose no obstacle to your operations there.
The 94th Army has no direct route to Jinzhou, and the two divisions of Wang Boxun’s 8th Army have moved from Qinhuangdao via Shanghai to Bengbu, with no intention of returning to the North Ning line.
Only the 91st Army maintains a presence near Shen County.
By keeping a portion of your forces tied down there, you can effectively neutralize its threat without impeding your advance toward Jinzhou and Yu County.
Do not be misled by the enemy’s deceptive tactics; act decisively and promptly.
The current situation along the North Ning line is ripe for action.
Your claim that your own operations depend on Yang Chengwu’s movements is entirely incorrect.

Telegram dated August 11, 1948: Regarding the potential mass exodus of enemy forces from Northeast China into Central China, we had already warned you about this possibility even before you concluded your winter campaign, urging you to seize the opportunity to intercept them.
Should a large number of enemy troops relocate en masse to Central China, it would severely disadvantage our operations in that region.
Two months ago, we also instructed you to begin preparing food supplies well in advance for your impending southern advance.
However, your recent telegrams make no mention whatsoever of whether you have followed these directives over the past two months.
Based on the latest reports, it appears that no preparatory work has been carried out during this period, leaving your troops without provisions and unable to proceed.
Moreover, the reasons you have cited for delaying the commencement of your offensive consistently revolve around the evolving enemy situation, which in turn hinges on whether Yang Chengwu can deploy his forces earlier.
For instance, your telegram at 19:00 on the 6th mentioned logistical concerns but concluded: “If Yang Chengwu can move out sooner, then we too can advance earlier.”
In contrast, your telegram at 17:00 on the 8th made no reference to food supplies at all, focusing solely on the dire state of the enemy situation and concluding: “The timing of the main operation in Northeast China depends entirely on when Yang Chengwu begins his advance.”
Despite our repeated reminders that you should not overemphasize the southern enemy threat—especially by using Yang Chengwu’s actions as the sole criterion for your own deployment—and our subsequent confirmation of Yang’s exact schedule, you subsequently declared within less than three days: “We shall never base our decisions on whether Yang Chengwu moves early or late,” reverting once again to the issue of food supplies.
It seems you treat your own logistical and intelligence needs with equal care, yet regard Yang Chengwu’s circumstances as if they posed no real challenge whatsoever.
What benefit could possibly accrue from indefinitely postponing your own deployment while allowing his forces to march ahead independently?
Under such circumstances, Fu Zuoyi would face minimal pressure on his eastern flank, enabling him to concentrate substantial reinforcements on the western front to drive Yang Chengwu back east and redirect his attention toward Yang, Luo, and yourself—as occurred last April.
Is this conducive to the overall strategic objective?
Your cavalier attitude toward Yang Chengwu is deeply troubling.
Judging from your recent telegrams, your assessment of the enemy situation along the North Ning line likewise appears overly simplistic.
To encourage greater prudence, we hereby reiterate these points.
Should you disagree with our guidance, please submit a counterargument.

Telegram dated September 5, 1948: The focal point of your autumn campaign should remain the Wei Lihuang–Fan Hanjie axis.
Do not assume that once you have defeated several of Fan Hanjie’s divisions, you may immediately turn your attention to the 13th Army under Fu Zuoyi’s command in Chengde.
According to your deployment outlined in the telegram at 19:00 on the 3rd, after eliminating enemy positions in Yixian, Gaqiao, Xingcheng, and Suizhong, the two divisions stationed west of Jinzhou, the two divisions at Shanhaiguan, the five divisions in Jinzhou, and the five divisions along the Jin-Yu line are all isolated and ripe for annihilation.
During these engagements, Wei Lihuang is highly likely to send reinforcements, which could join the fray en route.
This arrangement allows you to conduct large-scale operations along the North Ning line, where resupply is relatively convenient.
It also represents a classic method of breaking through the enemy’s center, thereby isolating Wei Lihuang’s and Fu Zuoyi’s flanks.
Therefore, your main force should not hastily depart from the North Ning line; instead, you should anticipate continuing to fight for Jinzhou, Shanhaiguan, and Tangshan, ultimately securing control over the entire North Ning Railway—with the exception of the Beiping–Tianjin segment, which remains in our hands to facilitate future maneuvers toward either flank.
Given that my Yang Chengwu unit is advancing into Suiyuan and my Yang, Luo, and Geng units are threatening the Ping-Zhang line, Fu Zuoyi simply does not possess sufficient reserves to reinforce the North Ning front beyond the five divisions already deployed in the Tangshan area.
Consequently, Wei Lihuang continues to represent your primary adversary.
Thus, your current disposition—seven columns and six independent divisions concentrated along the Xinmin–Shenyang–Changchun axis—is entirely appropriate.
Nevertheless, prior to capturing Jinzhou, it remains uncertain whether the enemy forces in Changchun and Shenyang, despite being under considerable pressure from your superior forces, will dare to take any decisive action.
It is likely that they will only commit their troops once you actually commence the assault on Jinzhou.
Telegram dated September 17, 1948: Following the elimination of enemy strongholds in Yixian, Gaqiao, Xingcheng, and Suizhong, if it proves feasible to simultaneously attack Jinzhou and Shanhaiguan, you should do so without delay.
If simultaneous action is not possible, you must carefully weigh whether to prioritize Shanhaiguan or Jinzhou.
Attacking Shanhaiguan first and then redeploying those forces to Jinzhou would be both laborious and time-consuming, granting the Shenyang-based enemy ample opportunity to reinforce its positions.
Conversely, if you strike Jinzhou first, the Shenyang garrison will likely be unable to respond in time, remaining immobilized—indeed, it is already in a state of paralysis.
Telegram dated September 19, 1948: Are you confident that you possess sufficient forces to decisively eliminate the enemy in Yixian, Jinzhou, and the area west of Jinzhou within approximately ten days?
We believe you should concentrate your efforts on capturing these three key objectives, as they hold the key to the entire campaign.
Should the existing columns operating near Jinzhou require roughly ten days to secure all three locations, it would be advisable to reinforce them temporarily with additional units drawn from the columns currently positioned west of Shenyang, ensuring that at least two of the three targets are captured expeditiously.
Of course, Wei Lihuang may still choose to ignore Changchun and rush reinforcements directly toward Jinzhou.
If that occurs, you should strive to swiftly subdue Jinzhou following your success in Yixian; otherwise, as enemy reinforcements converge, your attention will inevitably be divided, making it increasingly difficult to effectively engage both the Jinzhou and the western Jinzhou forces.
By swiftly seizing Yixian and Jinzhou, you can maintain the initiative; otherwise, you risk falling into the same passive stance you have endured over the past six months, finding yourself equally incapable of dealing with either the Changchun or the Shenyang enemy.
You must also consider the possibility that some of the Shenyang forces may choose to reinforce Jinzhou while others remain hesitant or even fail to respond.
Accordingly, your ability to seize the tactical initiative—while the strategic initiative has already been firmly in your grasp—depends on your capacity to rapidly capture these three objectives, particularly Jinzhou.
There are only two scenarios under which you could achieve tactical initiative without first taking Jinzhou: either by launching a sweeping counterattack from north of Shenyang to annihilate approximately 100,000 enemy troops, or by delivering a similar decisive blow precisely as the Shenyang forces prepare to reinforce Jinzhou.
However, we have no concrete evidence to suggest that either of these outcomes is realistically achievable.
Our preference remains for a proactive approach to capturing Jinzhou, which not only offers a higher likelihood of success but also serves the broader strategic interests of the campaign.
The foregoing constitutes our considered opinion.
Furthermore, since our forces began their advance on the 9th, eleven full days have already passed, yet you have yet to initiate the attack on Yixian.
This sluggish pace warrants careful review.
Telegram dated October 3, 1948: Acknowledged receipt of the telegrams dated October 1–11.
First, you should capitalize on the current opportune moment—while the Changchun enemy has yet to deploy and the Shenyang forces are reluctant to reinforce Jinzhou alone—by swiftly capturing Jinzhou.
Under no circumstances should you alter this plan again.
With the enemy eliminated in Yixian, Xingcheng, and Suizhong, and Huludao and the western Jinzhou region now reinforced by a new Fifth Army and the 95th Division, which are poised to open up traffic between the two cities, you can simultaneously deploy the necessary forces along both routes: first neutralizing the four divisions reinforcing Jinzhou from the west, and then proceeding to seize Jinzhou itself.
Five months ago, in April or May, the Changchun enemy was readily accessible, yet you hesitated to strike.
Two months later, the situation remained unchanged, and you again refrained from acting.
Now that your deployment for the Jinzhou operation is complete and the Eighth and Ninth Armies have been withdrawn from Jinzhou and Songshan, you are once again reluctant to attack Jinzhou, citing minor changes in the enemy situation—the arrival of the Fifth Army from Shanhaiguan and the 95th Division from Tianjin to Huludao—and expressing a renewed desire to return to Changchun.
We deem this course of action inappropriate.
Second, where is your command post located at present?
You should have arrived in the Jinzhou area as early as early August, well ahead of your troops, to coordinate the attack.
Instead, your forces have already reached their destination, while you have yet to arrive.
We urge you to promptly relocate to the Jinzhou front and assume command of the operation, with the aim of swiftly capturing the city.
Prolonged delays risk leaving you in a passive and vulnerable position.
Telegram dated October 3, 1948: Following today’s telegrams issued at 17:00, we revisit the question of your intended direction of attack and steadfastly maintain that you should absolutely refrain from deviating from your original plan.
Abandoning Jinzhou in favor of Changchun carries significant risks.
Beyond the reasons previously outlined, should you ultimately decide to pursue Changchun, you would inevitably be compelled to return to the Jinzhou campaign shortly thereafter.
Firstly, the combined strength of the two enemy forces would not diminish; in fact, it might even increase, thereby exacerbating the difficulties you face in engaging them.
Secondly, at present, the Shenyang forces are deterred from committing their full resources to reinforcing Jinzhou due to the lingering presence of Changchun.
You can leverage this dynamic by maintaining a firm grip on Changchun for the next ten to twenty days—an interval of critical importance—for at least partially restraining the Shenyang reinforcements.
Should you first capture Changchun and then turn your attention to Jinzhou, not only would the relative strength of the two enemy forces become even more unfavorable than it is today, but the Shenyang forces would likely commit themselves entirely to reinforcing Jinzhou, significantly intensifying the threat they pose to your own operations.
For these reasons, we strongly discourage any further alterations to your plan and urge you to concentrate your efforts on capturing Jinzhou within the next ten days, deploying the requisite forces to simultaneously neutralize four to five divisions reinforcing Jinzhou from the west.
Once Jinzhou is secured, you will have gained a strategic advantage.
In contrast, attempting to capture Changchun would neither confer such an advantage nor alleviate your future challenges.
We earnestly request that you carefully weigh these considerations.
Telegram dated October 4, 1948: Your determination to attack Jinzhou is both commendable and reassuring. (1) You have correctly decided to employ four columns and eleven columns, along with two independent Rehe detachments, to counter the enemy in the western Jinzhou and Huludao sectors; to assault Jinzhou with six columns—numbers one, two, seven, eight, and nine; to confront the Shenyang reinforcements with four columns—five, six, ten, and eleven; and to address the Changchun threat with nine independent divisions.
This approach properly prioritizes the Jinzhou and western Jinzhou fronts, rectifying the longstanding error of evenly dividing your forces between north and south—a mistake compounded by your earlier inclination to revert to targeting Changchun, which, fortunately, never materialized and thus had no practical impact.
Over the past month, we have repeatedly urged you to adopt this focused strategy; it is only now that you have finally embraced the idea of concentrating your main effort on the two Jinzhou fronts rather than distributing your forces equally, despite the fact that this should have been done from the outset.
From the initiation of your campaign to this day, nearly a month has elapsed before you have clarified the issue of operational priorities (even going so far as to add two additional columns to the Jinzhou front). Whether this delay has affected your operations, and to what extent, can only be determined by the outcome of the battle.
Nonetheless, the error of balancing your forces between north and south has now been corrected.
From this episode, you should draw two key lessons: The first lesson is that your command post must arrive in the target area ahead of your troops—an insight we have repeatedly emphasized.
Your failure to do so has unduly constrained your strategic vision for an extended period.
The second lesson is that, under normal circumstances, you should concentrate your main force on a single objective rather than dispersing it evenly across multiple fronts.
Third, the sooner you launch your attack on Jinzhou, the better; however, since your forces have not yet fully assembled and your command post has only recently approached the vicinity of Jinzhou, the preparations for the siege have yet to be completed.
Naturally, some waiting is required until your troops are fully assembled and the preparations are finalized, after which you may commence the assault.
That said, you should strive to minimize this preparatory phase and avoid unnecessary delays—certainly without succumbing to panic.
Fourth, the reasons why you should not attack Changchun are not, as you have claimed, that it would be too time-consuming, nor that “even if we do not attack Changchun, the enemy will inevitably break out on its own; I can recapture Changchun and destroy a portion of it.”
Rather, as we stated in our telegrams at 17:00 and 19:00 yesterday, the true rationale lies in the fact that, should you indeed turn your attention back to Changchun, you would be making a grave mistake.
Taking the breakout factor as an example, the longer the enemy delays its breakout, the more advantageous it becomes; in fact, remaining entrenched is even more beneficial.
Fifth, all previous disagreements between us have now been resolved.
We hope you will boldly implement the deployment outlined in your telegram at 9:00 today, resolutely pressing forward to capture Jinzhou and subsequently advancing into western Jinzhou.
Sixth, Chiang Kai-shek has arrived in Shenyang, ostensibly to boost the morale of his disheartened subordinates.
However, you should pay him no heed whatsoever.
Telegram dated October 5, 1948: (1) We fully concur with your telegram at 15:00 on the 4th regarding the handling of enemy reinforcements.
This approach ensures that your attack on Jinzhou remains protected from any reinforcements arriving from either the east or the west, even if additional enemy forces were to join the fray. (2) Reports indicate that the Kuomintang is transporting Sun Li-jen’s 31st Army from Taiwan to Huludao via sea.
Should the entire division be airlifted northward, it would consist of two brigades, each comprising three regiments, all equipped with American-made weapons and freshly trained but lacking combat experience.
Given their limited capabilities, it would take approximately ten days for them to reach the front lines.
You should not allow this news to unsettle your resolve.
Instead, you should endeavor to shorten the preparation period as much as possible and begin the attack without undue delay. (3) The Shenyang reinforcements are woefully inadequate.
The deployment suggests extreme apprehension regarding my anticipated counteroffensive, adopting a cautious, incremental approach.
Therefore, you need not worry about the difficulty of repelling these forces; roughly nine divisions should suffice. (4) The spirit of resistance among the Shenyang and western Jinzhou reinforcements is weak.
With six columns dedicated to blocking their advance, you are more than capable of handling the situation with ease.
Telegram dated October 11, 1948: As long as you are not concerned about severing the enemy’s supply lines, allowing them to occupy Zhangwu is not necessarily detrimental.
For the time being, you can operate free from the threat of Shenyang reinforcements, awaiting the intense fighting in Jinzhou, when the Zhangwu forces will likely come to Jinzhou’s aid, having already lost valuable time. (1) The Kuomintang has deliberately released air about a potential withdrawal from Changchun, seemingly drawing our attention to the city without any genuine intent to evacuate imminently.
Whether this is the case will become clear in the coming days. (2) The Shenyang forces’ occupation of Zhangwu renders them essentially useless, indicating that Wei Lihuang seeks to lure me back into reinforcing Jinzhou through cunning means, thereby circumventing the direct risk of being annihilated while attempting to relieve the besieged city.
The defenders of Jinzhou are a motley crew, and even their destruction would be deeply regrettable.
Should you manage to capture Jinzhou within a matter of days, the Shenyang forces will undoubtedly retreat from Zhangwu to fortify Xinmin.
However, if the operation drags on and Lu Junquan and others urgently call for reinforcements, prompting Chiang Kai-shek to order Wei Lihuang to dispatch substantial reserves, those forces may choose to advance through Xinlitun and Heishan toward Dahu Mountain, or to return directly to Xinmin via the Yaoyang River to engage in combat at Dahu Mountain.
Nevertheless, as long as you can seize Jinzhou within a week or so, the enemy will in no way be able to close in on the city.
Once Jinzhou falls, the enemy will invariably withdraw, rendering it impossible for you to pursue and annihilate them.
This scenario appears quite likely.
Whether the Changchun forces will actually retreat remains uncertain; for now, the probability of non-retreat seems relatively high.
Telegram dated October 18, 1948: Our greatest concern lies in the possibility of Shenyang forces withdrawing from Yingkou to reinforce Central China.
Reports suggest that Chiang Kai-shek is assembling fifty thousand tons of shipping capacity in Tianjin, presumably in preparation for a mass evacuation from Yingkou in November.
A timely resolution of the Changchun issue would greatly complicate Chiang and Wei’s decision-making process, discouraging them from sending their entire army to reinforce Jinzhou and Huludao via land.
Should Chiang and Wei seize upon the opportunity presented by your Jinzhou and Huludao campaigns to withdraw en masse to Yingkou, establish supply lines by sea, and gradually redeploy their forces toward the Jinpu Railway or Central China, there is a serious risk that you would be unable to prevent such a development.
Therefore, we propose that, once Changchun has been pacified, you retain only a few independent divisions to monitor Zheng Dongguo and the New Seventh Army (assuming the latter will eventually side with you), while the remaining columns and independent divisions tasked with attacking Changchun should promptly withdraw southward, positioning themselves between Shenyang and Yingkou.
This relocation should ideally occur in the early part of November; any delay would compromise our ability to mount an effective defense.
Furthermore, a single column must be stationed at Yingkou to fortify the port, severing all maritime and land connections and deterring Chiang and Wei from venturing there.
Even if they do attempt to leave, I will have already launched a preliminary counterattack, buying time for the main force to arrive and deliver the final blow.
Telegram dated October 19, 1948: Should the Changchun enemy voluntarily surrender, my Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Columns may cease their advance toward Changchun.
These three columns would be best served by stationing two of them between Shenyang and Yingkou, while the remaining one establishes defensive positions at Yingkou.
Ideally, these units should reach their designated locations prior to your attacks on Jinzhou and Huludao, effectively blocking any potential retreat by the Shenyang forces toward Yingkou.
Telegram dated October 19, 1948: “It is essential to estimate the moment when the Changchun enemy has been completely neutralized and our main forces in the north—both regular columns and independent divisions—have withdrawn southward, as Chiang and Wei may then change their plans.
You should consider deploying a robust task force to Yingkou and its adjacent northwest and northeast regions to preempt any sudden decision by Chiang and Wei to evacuate from Yingkou.
Currently, the New First Army and other units are positioned quite far to the west, even as far as Goubangzi, which makes them particularly susceptible to a rapid withdrawal to Yingkou.
You must pay close attention to this dynamic.
The information regarding Chiang Kai-shek’s concentration of fifty thousand tons of shipping capacity in Tianjin, ostensibly in preparation for a mass troop deployment from Yingkou, appears quite credible.”
Telegram dated October 19, 1948: The Shenyang forces seem to have resolved to withdraw, and the likelihood of doing so to Yingkou is very high.
Your immediate priority should be to instruct Xiao Jingguang and Xiao Hua to ensure that the majority of Changchun’s independent divisions leave only two or at most three behind in the Changchun area, while the twelve columns press onward from Fushun to Yingkou and its surrounding regions to block any potential escape routes.
In the interim, as an emergency measure, you might consider ordering ten columns to advance directly from Dahu Mountain to establish defensive positions at Yingkou.
With ten columns, eleven columns, and six to seven independent divisions already in place, the situation has stabilized.
Should this effort succeed, the enemy will have nowhere to flee, and you will have achieved a strategic victory.
Telegram dated October 10–10, 1948: Given the constant threat of enemy withdrawal to Yingkou, we urge you to instruct ten columns to prepare for the possibility that the enemy may seek refuge there at any moment, thereby commencing the establishment of defensive positions at Yingkou without delay.
Gao Gang and Wu Xiuquan have proposed deploying twelve columns and three independent divisions under the command of Zhong Wei, with all units rushing northward from Siping to arrive in Qingyuan by the 24th at the latest, then marching swiftly to Anshan and Haicheng to block any potential escape routes toward the coast.
This plan is highly necessary; we urgently request that Gao and Wu expedite its implementation as quickly as possible.
Nevertheless, the ten columns must still prepare to take up defensive positions at Yingkou immediately upon detecting signs of an enemy withdrawal, in order to gain the upper hand.
Gao and Wu have suggested deploying six divisions—namely, the Eleventh Column plus three independent divisions—to the north of Yingkou.
We believe it would be prudent to add one more division, bringing the total to seven, to strengthen the defenses and prevent any further escapes.
Among these, one to three divisions should possess particularly strong combat capabilities.
Telegram dated October 14, 1948: Although the bulk of the Fifty-First Army, Fifty-Third Army, and One Hundred and Seventh Division remain concentrated in Tieling, Shenyang, Fushun, Benxi, and Anshan, and a portion of the Fifty-First Army has already occupied Haicheng and Niuzhuang, it has become abundantly clear that the enemy regards Yingkou as one of its two primary escape routes.
When I rout the enemy forces in Heishan and Beizhen, their remnants may also attempt to flee toward Yingkou.
Therefore, you should continue to assign some of your independent divisions to operate in the south, eliminating enemy strongholds in Anshan, Haicheng, and Niuzhuang while simultaneously securing Yingkou and blocking any attempts by the enemy to escape to sea.
In addition, all available local forces in South Manchuria should be utilized to counter the enemy in the Anshan, Haicheng, and Niuzhuang areas.
Telegram dated October 15, 1948: You had completely failed to anticipate that the enemy might use Yingkou as an escape route.
Even after our repeated warnings and based on inaccurate reports suggesting that the Fifty-First Army was advancing westward, you neglected to secure Yingkou, resulting in the Fifty-Second Army’s occupation of the port on the 24th—an oversight of considerable magnitude.