Regarding the Operational Deployment of the 3rd and 7th Columns in North China

(October 29, 1948)

Zhou:

Please inform Nie[2] that if the enemy advances to Wangdu and areas south of it today (the 29th) and moves north of Dingxian tomorrow, our 3rd Column should attack the line from Fangshunqiao[3] to Wangdu on the 30th. One brigade under the command of Xiao Ke[4] should be added, enabling the 7th Column to concentrate and counterattack northward. The 3rd and 7th Columns should establish contact tonight and operate under the unified command of Zheng Weishan[5]; a victory may be possible. If the enemy does not move today, or only advances to Wangdu today and remains there without moving tomorrow, then the 3rd Column may rest for one day south of Mancheng, establish good contact with the 7th Column, and engage the day after tomorrow.

Mao Zedong

Morning of the 29th

[1] This is a letter from Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai. On October 24, 1948, the North China "Bandit Suppression" General Headquarters of the Nationalist Army secretly dispatched the 94th Army, the 4th Cavalry Division, and other units to form a "Shanxi Relief Corps," ostensibly to rescue Taiyuan but actually attempting to launch a surprise attack on Shijiazhuang and Xibaipo, where the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was located. The Central Committee and Mao Zedong promptly detected and exposed the Nationalist plot and made advance preparations for defense. In early November, the Nationalist raiding forces withdrew from the Tanghe River area north of Dingxian back to Baoding.

[2] Nie refers to Nie Rongzhen, then commander of the North China Military Region.

[3] Fangshunqiao, a village located southwest of Mancheng County, Hebei Province.

[4] Xiao Ke, then third deputy commander of the North China Military Region.

[5] Zheng Weishan, then commander of the 3rd Column, 2nd Corps, North China Military Region.