It Is Best to Launch the Attack on the Three Armies of Huang, Li, and Qiu on the Same Evening[1]

(October 30, 1948)

Rao, Su, and Tan, and inform Liu, Chen, and Deng[2]:

Your telegram of the 28th day, xu hour[3] has been received. The plan and dispositions are very good; please proceed accordingly. There is only one point: launching the operations separately on the evenings of the 7th and the 8th might alert Huang’s army[4] and cause it to rapidly contract and concentrate during the daytime of the 8th before you have approached the enemy. It seems better to initiate actions everywhere simultaneously on either the evening of the 7th or the evening of the 8th, so that the enemy forces at all points are attacked at the same time and each considers itself in a perilous situation,

[1] This telegram was drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee and addressed to Rao Shushi, Political Commissar of the East China Military Region; Su Yu, Acting Commander and Acting Political Commissar of the East China Field Army; and Tan Zhenlin, Deputy Political Commissar of the East China Field Army.

[2] Liu, Chen, and Deng refer to Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, and Deng Xiaoping, who were then respectively Commander, First Deputy Commander, and Political Commissar of the Central Plains Field Army.

[3] This refers to the telegram sent by Rao Shushi, Su Yu, and Tan Zhenlin to the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee on the xu hour of October 28, 1948, concerning the plan and specific operational dispositions for the Huaihai Campaign. The telegram stated: To facilitate operations east of the Grand Canal, all our forces west of the Canal will initiate combat on the evening of November 7, creating a posture of converging from north and south to annihilate Li Mi’s army and attack Xuzhou. Operations east of the Canal will focus on annihilating Huang Baitao’s army, with combat proceeding in two steps. The first step is to open up the battlefield, set up blocking positions for enemy reinforcements, and divide the enemy forces so they cannot concentrate, link up with Li Mi’s army, or flee eastward to Xinpu or Haizhou. The second step is to use six columns to divide and annihilate the enemy at Xin’an Town and Ahu, one column to block the enemy frontally, and one column to encircle the 64th Army. If our forces move south and Huang’s army concentrates near Xin’an Town, we will immediately attack Xin’an Town, but we can still carry out battlefield division and encirclement attacks. We will strive to achieve secrecy and sudden assault, so that the enemy cannot contract and avoid battle. All columns east of the Canal will initiate combat on the evening of the 8th.

[4] Huang’s army refers to the Kuomintang’s 7th Army, commanded by Huang Baitao.

unable to look after one another. Only after two or three days will they be able to ascertain the direction of our main attack, but by then, because our various units are already pressing upon them, they will be unable to reinforce one another. It is extremely important, especially, to deprive the various units of Huang’s army of the time needed to contract and concentrate. Therefore, victory in this battle rests on two conditions, namely: (1) The three armies of Huang, Li, and Qiu[1] and the various corps within these three armies must be unable to reinforce one another. To achieve this, in addition to the entire East China Field Army deploying according to the telegram of the 28th day, xu hour, Chen and Deng’s side is also requested to act simultaneously on the 7th or the 8th. (2) The various corps of Huang’s army must be given no time to contract and concentrate. To achieve this, actions should be launched on the same evening, not on two separate evenings in succession. The above is submitted for your consideration and decision. Furthermore, if there are still matters in your rear areas that have not been fully handled, it is advisable to entrust them to appropriate comrades for processing, so that Su and Tan can concentrate on commanding the operations. If this battle is fought well, it is possible to annihilate eight divisions of Huang’s army, two divisions of Li’s army, and two to three divisions of Feng Zhi’an’s[2] forces, and soon thereafter it may also be possible to annihilate the enemy at Donghai and the Two Huai’s[3], thereby unfolding the war situation north of the Yangtze River. At that time, even if Chiang Kai-shek transfers all the enemy forces from Jinxi, Huludao, Yingkou, and other places southward, they can only be deployed for defense along the Yangtze River, which will be of no help to the overall situation. Therefore, we hope you will meticulously organize this great campaign. Also, our forces can occupy Shenyang today; we inform you as you are concerned.

Military Commission

30th day, yin hour

[1] Huang refers to Huang Baitao. Li and Qiu refer to Li Mi and Qiu Qingquan, who were then respectively Commanders of the Kuomintang’s 13th Army and 2nd Army.

[2] Feng Zhi’an was then Commander of the Kuomintang’s 3rd Pacification Zone.

[3] The Two Huai’s refer to Huaiyin and Huai’an in Jiangsu Province.