The Dispositions for the Huai-Hai Campaign
Must Take into Account the Changing
Situation
 (October 27, 1948, 8:00 P.M.)
To Rao [Shushi], Su [Yu], and Tan [Zhenlin], and for the information of Chen
[Yi] and Deng [Xiaoping] (please have Chen [Geng] and Xie [Fuzhi] pass this on
to Chen and Deng):1
We received your telegram sent at 9:00 A.M. on the 27th.2 Please report to
us as soon as you have studied the revised deployments. When you study the
deployments, apart from taking the current circumstances into consideration, you
should also anticipate possible changes in these circumstances. You should imagine several ways in which the enemy’s circumstances might change, including
one relatively serious scenario, and prepare methods to deal with such situations.
At this moment, possible changes in the situation include:
	 1.	 When you approach the eight divisions of Huang [Baitao]’s army corps,3
they may well change their present relatively dispersed position, which will
be easy to divide, surround, and annihilate, into a relatively integrated and
closed-up position, which will be difficult to divide, surround, and annihilate.

	 2.	 When the eight divisions of Huang’s army corps are surrounded and annihilated, some will be wiped out completely, but it is possible that some divisions, because they are able to concentrate their forces, will be difficult to
liquidate completely.
	 3.	 Because the two armies of Li Mi4 are closely linked, this may make it impossible for our forces to control the canal. If our forces are unable to act effectively as they move from Taierzhuang to Suyangshan,5 the Eighth and Ninth
armies will likely amass at Yunhe6 station and east of it, very close to Huang
Baitao, and prevent you from destroying Huang Baitao completely.
	 4.	 If your forces attacking Hanzhuang, Jiawang, and Liuquan7 from Lincheng,8
are unable to act effectively or appropriately, and are unable to draw in an
army of Qiu Qingquan’s forces9 to cope with these areas; or again, if the forces
that you sent out to attack in the direction of Feng county and Dangshan do
not act forcefully and are unable to draw part of Qiu Qingquan’s forces to
stay there, Qiu’s forces may be able to send one army or even more to join
Li Mi at the Daxujia-Bayiji-Nianzhuang line,10 and enable Li Mi to reinforce
Huang’s army group effectively.
	 5.	 Chen and Deng will lead eleven brigades to the areas between the three counties
of Woyang, Yongcheng, and Bozhou on November 4th, and will try to attack
Sun Yuanliang11 and threaten Xu[zhou] and Beng[bu]. This will, of course,
contribute greatly to your battle by possibly drawing off one army from Qiu
Qingquan’s forces and the entire force of Sun Yuanliang to deal with them.
You should, however, base your plan on the East China Field Army directly
and effectively holding down Qiu Qingquan. This is the most reliable strategy,
because the enemy forces are on an internal line, which is easy to transfer,
whereas Chen and Deng cannot place Liu Zhi12 in a fatal position.
	 6.	 After the Ji’nan Campaign, there may be a tendency among our cadres to
underestimate the enemy. If we fail to overcome such a mentality, it may
affect this campaign. Please take note of the above points.
The Military Commission

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Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 5, pp. 134–36, where it is
reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission.
Rao Shushi was political commissar of the East China Military Region. Su Yu was acting
commander and acting political commissar of the East China Field Army, and Tan Zhenlin
was deputy political commissar of the East China Field Army. Chen Yi and Deng Xiaoping
were first deputy commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Central Plains
Field Army. Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Fourth Column of the Central Plains Field Army.

2.  The telegram from Rao Shushi et al. disagreed with Wang Jian’an’s October 22
advice, proposing to amass the First, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth columns and
the south-central Shandong Corps against Huang Baitao’s troops. They offered an alternative plan that would allow them to annihilate Huang’s troops and then proceed to annihilate
the troops under Li Mi and Qiu Qingquan. In the meantime, they were studying changes in
the enemy’s situation and adjusting their deployment accordingly.

3.  Huang Baitao was commander of the Guomindang army’s Seventh Army Group.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-170

4.  Li Mi was commander of the Guomindang army’s Thirteenth Army Group.

5.  Taierzhuang is a town in the southern part of Zaozhuang city, Shandong. Suyangshan is a village located in western Pi county, Jiangsu.

6.  The town of Yunhe is now the county seat of Pi county, Jiangsu.

7.  Hanzhuang is a town located in southeastern Weishan county, Shandong. Jiawang is
a town located in northeastern Xuzhou city, Jiangsu. Liuquan is a village located in northern Tongshan county, Jiangsu.

8.  Lincheng refers to Xuecheng in Zaozhuang city, Shandong.

9.  Qiu Qingquan was commander of the Guomindang army’s Second Army Group.

10.  Daxujia is a town located in eastern Tongshan county, Jiangsu. Bayiji and Nianzhuang are towns located in western Pi county, Jiangsu.

11.  Sun Yuanliang was commander of the Guomindang army’s Sixteenth Army Group.

12.  Liu Zhi was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang army’s “Bandit Suppression”
Headquarters at Xuzhou.