It Is Agreed That the Huai-Hai Campaign
Should Be Carried out According to the
Modified Deployment
(October 22, 1948, 1:00 P.M.)
To Rao [Shushi], Su [Yu], and Tan [Zhenlin], and for the information of Chen
[Yi] and Deng [Xiaoping], and the Central Plains Bureau:1
	 1.	 We fully agree with the deployments laid out in your telegram sent at noon
on the 21st.2 Please promptly execute accordingly.
	 2.	 Our comrades Chen Yi and Deng Xiaoping are at this moment directing
the battle near Zhengzhou by using Chen [Geng] and Xie [Fuzhi]’s3 radio
receiver. You and the Third Column, which has arrived in southwestern Shandong, should remain in close contact with Chen [Yi] and Deng
[Xiaoping] via Chen and Xie’s radio receiver to enable smooth coordination.
	 3.	 By the 30th, the Third Column, the Guang[dong] Column, and the two
brigades from southwestern Shandong must reach the areas north of the
Shang[qiu]-Dang[shan] railway, about 100 li from the enemy forces, and
set up a horizontal front for passage by foot. Do not attack the Shang-Dang
line or the enemy will soon figure out that our forces in this region are only
pretending to attack. Instead, you should initiate diversionary attacks toward
the enemy forces along the Shang-Dang line and in Feng county only when the battle is launched in the east on the 5th (or one day earlier on the 4th).
Otherwise, it will probably not be very effective.
	 4.	 At present, the excellent situation is that Huang [Wei] and Zhang [Gan]’s
units4 of Bai [Chongxi]’s army5 have been drawn toward the area of the
Tongbai Mountains by our Second, Sixth, and Tenth columns, and they are
not likely to return to the Yellow River flood region6 to carry out actions that
will threaten our Northeast Army for quite some time. This will help our
units under Chen and Deng to send some, or most, or even all their forces
eastward after they win the battle in Zhengzhou to coordinate with the Third
and the Guang[dong] columns. This will not only pin down the entire force
of Sun [Yuanliang] and Liu [Ruming]7 but may also tie up part of the forces
of Qiu [Qingquan] and Li [Mi].8 The detailed operations can be determined
after our attack on Zhengzhou. Our tentative plan is that you should leave
part of the forces on the Zhengzhou-Huaiyang line, use your main forces to
launch a battle in Xuzhou and Bengbu while the forces of Qiu and Li are providing reinforcement in the east, and seize the opportunity to take Su county
and Bengbu, resolutely and completely destroy the [Tian]jin-Pu[kou] railway, cut the enemy’s communications, and isolate Liu Zhi’s entire army.9 If
the battle in Zhengzhou, starting on the 23rd, can be completed within a few
days, and if we take a few days to rest and reorganize and then start moving
eastward at the end of this month or the beginning of the next month, reaching the area near Su county and Bengbu within ten days and resting a few
days before the battle in Xuzhou and Bengbu, then that will be the time when
our East China Field Army will be involved in an intense battle, and we must
draw a large proportion of the strength of the forces of Qiu and Li to serve as
reinforcements. This will play an important role in securing a major victory in the Huai-Hai Campaign. We are not sure, however, whether there will be
sufficient time for this plan. Please consider the matter thoroughly after Chen
and Deng’s forces have won the battle at Zhengzhou and reply by telegram.
The Military Commission
---
Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 5, pp. 118–20, where it is
reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission.
Rao Shushi was political commissar of the East China Military Region. Su Yu was acting
commander and acting political commissar of the East China Field Army, and Tan Zhenlin
was deputy political commissar of the East China Field Army. Chen Yi and Deng Xiaoping
were first deputy commander and political commissar, respectively, of the Central Plains
Field Army.

2.  The telegram from Rao Shushi et al. stated that following changes in the enemy’s
situation, they recommended strengthening the forces blocking the enemy reinforcements
on both sides of the Yunhe train station to ensure success of the plan to surround and annihilate the enemy forces under Huang Wei on November 5. They offered specific recommendations on the deployment of units for this purpose.

3.  Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi were commander and political commissar, respectively, of
the Fourth Column of the Central Plains Field Army.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-166

4.  Huang Wei (1904–1989, native of Jiangxi) was commander of the Guomindang
army’s Twelfth Army Group, and Zhang Gan (1897–1959, born in Guilin, Guangxi) was
commander of the Third Army Group.

5.  Bai Chongxi was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang army’s Central China
“Bandit Suppression” Headquarters.

6.  In June 1938, Guomindang troops blew up the embankment of the Yellow River at
Huayuankou, near Zhengzhou in Henan, to block the advance of the invading Japanese
forces. The waters of the Yellow River flooded the Jialu River into the Yi River and the
waters of the western Fei River flooded into the Huai River, covering forty-four counties
and 54,000 square kilometers of land in Henan, Anhui, and Jiangsu. In 1947, the hole in
the dike at Huayuankou was repaired, the Yellow River returned to its original path, and the
formerly flooded regions became a loess wasteland.

7.  Sun Yuanliang was commander of the Guomindang army’s Sixteenth Army Group,
and Liu Ruming was commander of the Guomindang’s Fourth Pacification Zone.

8.  Qiu Qingquan was commander of the Guomindang army’s Second Army Group, and
Li Mi was commander of the Guomindang’s Thirteenth Army Group.

9.  Liu Zhi was commander of the Guomindang army’s Xuzhou “Bandit Suppression”
Headquarters.