Agree to the Implementation of the Revised Deployment for the Huaihai Campaign[1]

(October 22, 1948)

Rao, Su, Tan, and inform Chen, Deng[2], and the Central Plains Bureau:

(1) We fully agree with your Ma-Wu telegram[3] deployment; please proceed with its implementation accordingly. (2) Comrades Chen Yi and Deng Xiaoping are currently using the Chen-Xie[4] radio station to direct operations near Zhengzhou. Your units and the 3rd Column, which has entered southwestern Shandong, should all maintain close contact with Chen and Deng via the Chen-Xie station to facilitate coordination. (3) The 3rd Column, the Guang Column, and the two brigades in southwestern Shandong should advance to the area north of the Shangqiu-Dangshan line[1] by the 30th, positioning themselves approximately 100 li from the enemy in a single-line formation, cutting off all movement of personnel. Do not launch attacks on the Shangqiu-Dangshan line, so that the enemy will realize at an early stage that our activities in that sector are merely a feint deployment. Only at the same time as the battle commences on the Wei day in the east (or possibly one day earlier, on the Zhi day) should diversionary attacks be launched against the enemy on the Shangqiu-Dangshan line and in Feng County; otherwise, they may not have a significant effect. (4) The current extremely favorable situation is that the Huang and Zhang corps[3] of Bai’s[2] forces have been drawn into the Tongbai mountain area by our 2nd, 6th, and 10th Columns. For a considerably long period, they will be unable to turn back and enter the Yellow River flood zone[4] to threaten the operations of our forces on the northeastern front. This facilitates our Chen and Deng, after their victory in attacking Zhengzhou, moving eastward with part, the greater part, or the entirety of their forces to coordinate with the 3rd and Guang Columns. This would not only tie down the entirety of Sun and Liu’s[5] forces but could also tie down part of Qiu and Li’s[6] forces. Specific actions can be decided after the attack on Zhengzhou. Our estimate is to leave a portion of our forces along the Zhengzhou-Huaiyang line and, when the Qiu and Li corps move eastward in large numbers to provide reinforcements, to launch the Xuzhou-Bengbu[7] operation with our main force, seizing the opportunity to capture Su County and Bengbu, resolutely, thoroughly, cleanly, and completely destroying the Tianjin-Pukou Railway, cutting off the enemy’s lines of communication, and isolating Liu Zhi’s[8] entire army. If the Zhengzhou operation, which began on the 13th, can achieve its objective within a few days, followed by several days of rest and reorganization, and then advance eastward at the end of this month or the beginning of next month, reaching the vicinity of Su County and Bengbu in about ten days, rest for several days, and then launch the Xuzhou-Bengbu operation—this would coincide with the period when our East China Field Army is engaged in fierce fighting. It would inevitably draw a very large portion of Qiu and Li’s forces back for reinforcement, which would be of immense value in ensuring a great victory in the Huaihai Campaign. However, it is unknown whether time will permit this. Please, Chen and Deng, after the victory in attacking Zhengzhou, give this overall consideration and reply by telegram.

Military Commission

22nd, 13:00 hours

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--- Notes

[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, addressed to Rao Shushi, Political Commissar of the East China Military Region; Su Yu, Acting Commander and Acting Political Commissar of the East China Field Army; and Tan Zhenlin, Deputy Political Commissar.


[1] The Shangqiu-Dangshan line refers to the railway from Shangqiu to Dangshan, a section of the Longhai Railway.


[2] Chen and Deng refer to Chen Yi and Deng Xiaoping, who were then respectively the First Deputy Commander and Political Commissar of the Central Plains Field Army.


[2] Bai refers to Bai Chongxi, then Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army’s Central China “Bandit Suppression” General Headquarters.


[3] Refers to the telegram sent by Rao Shushi, Su Yu, and Tan Zhenlin to the Military Commission of the Central Committee at noon on October 21, 1948. The telegram stated: In light of changes in the enemy situation, apart from first exposing a portion of our forces in southwestern Shandong to feign attack and confuse the enemy, drawing them back to facilitate the rapid encirclement and annihilation of Huang’s Corps, we must strengthen the frontal blocking forces on the northern and southern sides of Yunhe Station to ensure the success of the main assault direction. Based on the current positions and the rest and replenishment status of the various columns, the battle is scheduled to commence on November 5. We propose revising the deployment as follows: The entire Subei Army Group plus seven infantry columns—the 1st, 6th, 9th, and Luzhongnan Columns—totaling 20 brigades, supported by the main force of the Special Technical Column, will undertake the task of dividing, encircling, and annihilating the 8 brigades of Huang Baitao’s Corps in the areas of Ahu, Yinping, Gaoliu, Xin’an, and Wayao. The 4th and 8th Columns will be responsible for raiding and annihilating the enemy’s 9th Army at Paoche and Yunhe Station, controlling both sides of the railway and the banks of the canal, and preparing to block reinforcements. The 10th and 7th Columns will raid and annihilate the enemy at Hanzhuang, after which the main force will encircle and annihilate the enemy at Jiawang, subsequently seizing the opportunity to attack and capture the Liuquan area. The 13th Column will encircle and annihilate the defending enemy at Tai’erzhuang, or use its main force to directly attack the enemy at Suyangshan and Biantang. The 3rd Column and the Guang Column will enter southwestern Shandong to coordinate with the two independent brigades of the Hebei-Shandong-Henan Military Region, organizing diversionary attacks against the enemy in the areas of Yutai, Feng County, Dangshan, and Shangqiu, to detain Sun Yuanliang’s Corps and prevent it from reinforcing eastward or westward. The remaining main forces plan to assemble at their current positions and await opportunities.


[3] The Huang and Zhang corps refer to the Nationalist Army’s 12th Corps and 3rd Corps, whose commanders were Huang Wei and Zhang Gan, respectively.


[4] Chen-Xie refers to Chen Geng and Xie Fuzhi, who were then respectively the Commander and Political Commissar of the 4th Column of the Central Plains Field Army.


[4] In June 1938, when the Japanese invading forces advanced into the Central Plains, the Nationalist army retreated without fighting and breached the Yellow River dike at Huayuankou near Zhengzhou, Henan. The Yellow River waters flowed along the Jialu River into the Ying River and the West Fei River, emptying into the Huai River, inundating 54,000 square kilometers of land across 44 counties in Henan, Anhui, and Jiangsu provinces. The flooded area was called the Yellow River flood zone. After the Huayuankou breach was closed in 1947 and the Yellow River returned to its old course, the flood zone became a sandy wasteland.


[5] Sun and Liu refer to Sun Yuanliang and Liu Ruming, then respectively Commander of the Nationalist Army’s 16th Corps and Commander of the 4th Pacification Zone.


[6] Qiu and Li refer to Qiu Qingquan and Li Mi, then respectively Commander of the Nationalist Army’s 2nd Corps and 13th Corps.


[7] Xuzhou-Bengbu refers to Xuzhou in Jiangsu and Bengbu in Anhui.


[8] Liu Zhi was then Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Army’s Xuzhou “Bandit Suppression” General Headquarters.