After rest and consolidation, it is advisable for the troops to move west to capture Tongguan, Yaoxian, and other areas[1]

(October 21, 1948)

Peng and Zhang, and inform He and Xi[2]:

Your telegram of the 18th xu hour[3] received. At present, the enemy’s main force is concentrated in Chengcheng, Heyang, and Pucheng, while the western sector is relatively undefended. It seems advisable for you, after twenty days of rest and consolidation, to shift the entire army westward, seize the opportunity to capture Tongguan[4], Yaoxian, Sanyuan, Jingyang, Chunhua, and the surrounding area, and prepare to fight one or two battles in that region before dispatching a part of your forces to Qianli[5] and Yongshou, which will take approximately one month or so. If you adopt this course of action, the enemy forces in Chengcheng, Heyang, and Pucheng will inevitably be compelled to shift westward in whole or in large part, and when they are moving to the western sector, you may seize the opportunity to annihilate several units. Only then will it be possible for you to recover the Chengcheng, Heyang, Pingmin, and Chaoyi[6] areas and obtain grain to pass the winter. If only

[1] This telegram was drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee and addressed to Peng Dehuai, commander and political commissar of the Northwest Field Army, and Zhang Zongxun, its deputy commander.

[2] He and Xi refer to He Long and Xi Zhongxun, who were then respectively commander and political commissar of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia-Shanxi-Suiyuan Joint Defense Military Area.

[3] This refers to the telegram sent by Peng Dehuai and Zhang Zongxun to the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee at the xu hour on October 18, 1948. The telegram stated: After the Libei Campaign, we plan to rest and consolidate for 20 days to recover from fatigue. We intend to organize another campaign in mid-November to strive to recover Chengcheng, Heyang, Chaoyi, and Pingmin, to solve the problems of food supply and wintering, and to carry out training and consolidation. Judging from the current situation between the enemy and ourselves, we plan to use the 1st and 4th Columns to capture Chunhua, Tongrun, and Koutouzhen, threaten Jingyang and Xianyang, and draw the enemy’s main force to concentrate westward. The 2nd, 3rd, and 6th Columns will seize opportunities to annihilate enemy forces, recover lost territory, and expand new liberated areas.

[4] Tongguan, name of an old county, now Tongchuan, Shaanxi.

[5] Qianli refers to Qianxian and Liquan in Shaanxi.

[6] Pingmin and Chaoyi, both names of old counties, abolished in 1958 and merged into Dali County, Shaanxi.

the 1st and 4th Columns are sent to Chunhua, it is feared that they will not be able to draw many enemy troops westward; with our forces weak on both ends, it is feared that it will be difficult to recover Chengcheng, Heyang, Pingmin, and Chaoyi. If you spend the greater part of November and December committing your full strength to operations in the western sector and obtaining grain there, leaving the grain in southern Shanxi and in Chengcheng, Heyang, Pingmin, and Chaoyi for consumption when the troops shift to the eastern sector for rest and consolidation in the second half of December and in January and February of next year, it seems comparatively more cost-effective. We do not understand what difficulties there may be for a large army to conduct operations in the western sector. We hope you will give this your consideration and handle it as you see fit.

Military Commission
Ma zi