Immediately Set about to Arrange to
Completely Annihilate Liao Yaoxiang’s Army
(October 20, 1948, 4:00 A.M.)
To Lin [Biao], Luo [Ronghuan], and Liu [Yalou]:1
We received the telegram sent at 21:00 on the 19th.2
	 1.	 We have been informed of your plan of action by telegram, i.e., that you will
not attack Jinxi and Huludao but instead will attack Liao Yaoxiang’s forces.3
On the one hand, we completely agree with your suggestion that if Liao’s
corps continues to advance, you should wait for the enemy to advance a bit
farther and then attack it. On the other hand, if you discover that the enemy
will not advance farther, or if there are signs that it will retreat to Shenyang
or Yingkou, you should immediately encircle the enemy forces at Zhangwu
and Xinlitun.4 Your method will be to destroy the enemy forces one by one,
and your goal will be the complete annihilation of Liao’s corps. We hope that
you will immediately set about to make arrangements in accordance with
this plan and that you will encourage all your forces to accomplish this task.
	 2.	 Because it is possible that the enemy will retreat to Yingkou at any time,
we hope you will order the Tenth Column to prepare to travel at double speed to defend Yingkou as soon as there are signs of the enemy retreating
to Yingkou.
	 3.	 Gao [Gang] and Wu [Xiuquan]5 suggested placing the Twelfth Column
and three independent divisions under the command of Zhong Wei6 on
trains north of Siping, and rushing them all to Qingyuan before October 24.
They would then make a rapid march for Anshan and Haicheng to block
the enemy’s retreat to Yingkou. This plan is essential; please quickly send
a telegram to Gao and Wu telling them to immediately act along these
lines—the sooner the better. Only the Tenth Column still needs to prepare
to advance from Dahushan7 to Yingkou to preempt the enemy. Of course,
the Tenth Column can remain at Dahushan for the time being and wait for
indications that the enemy is retreating to Yingkou before rapidly advancing to Yingkou.
	 4.	 Gao and Wu also suggested that the other independent divisions and the
second-line corps should advance rapidly to Faku, Zhangwu, and Xinmin
under the command of Xiao [Jinguang] and Xiao [Hua]8 to coordinate with
the Jinzhou main forces to wipe out the enemy. We think that all this is
also essential. But, first, is it sufficient to have the Twelfth Column and
three independent divisions—six divisions in total—advance to Anshan and
Haicheng? We are afraid that if the enemy withdraws all of its forces to
Yingkou, our six divisions will have a difficult time resisting them. Second,
the moment at which we go to Zhangwu and Xinmin to encounter the enemy
should be neither too late nor too early. It seems proper for you to advance
covertly to the area north of Faku, and once your main forces have launched
an attack and seized Liao Yaoxiang, it would be best for you to suddenly cut
off the enemy’s retreat to Shenyang. Please consider the two above points
and respond to Gao and Wu.
	 5.	 When Chiang Kaishek arrived in Shenyang on the 15th, he brought Du
Yuming9 with him to help Wei Lihuang10 direct the retreat. According to the
foreign news agency’s dispatch on the 18th, Chiang Kaishek has returned to
Shenyang. These few days are when the enemy is deciding on its strategy.
The decision to retreat was made on the 15th, and the decision on how to retreat was either made in the last two days or has yet to be made. Further
changes are also possible after a decision is reached. We hope you will
closely watch the changing situation over these next few days. Do not lose
your opportunity and strive for a great victory.
The Military Commission

---

Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission.
Lin Biao was commander of the Northeast Field Army; Luo Ronghuan was political commissar of the Northeast Field Army and Liu Yalou was chief-of-staff of the Northeast Field
Army.

2.  The telegram from Lin Biao et al. stated that the enemy troops might stay in Zhangwu
and Xinlitun until the Eighth Army arrived in Jinxi, and then advance to Jinzhou while the
enemy units in Shenyang retreated to Yingkou, but the enemy units in Zhangwu and Xinlitun might also retreat to Xinmin and Shenyang before they all retreat to Yingkou. These
possibilities introduced a number of challenges to the Communist forces. Lin Biao et al.
proposed allowing the enemy forces to march from Shenyang toward Jinzhou, but if they
stopped advancing or looked prepared to retreat to Yingkou instead, the Communist forces
would encircle them at Zhangwu and Xinlitun and wipe out the units one by one.

3.  Liao Yaoxiang (1906–1968, born in Shaoyang) was commander of the Guomindang
army’s Ninth Army Group.

4.  Xinlitun is a town in northern Heishan county, Liaoning.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-165

5.  Gao Gang and Wu Xiuquan were first deputy commander and deputy chief-of-staff,
respectively, of the Northeast Military Region.

6.  Zhong Wei (1911–1984, native of Hunan) was commander of the Twelfth Column
of the Northeast Field Army.

7.  Dahushan is a town in southern Heishan county, Liaoning.

8.  Xiao Jinguang and Xiao Hua were commander and political commissar, respectively, of the First Corps of the Northeast Field Army.

9.  Du Yuming was deputy commander-in-chief of the Guomindang army’s Xuzhou
“Bandit Suppression” Headquarters.

10.  Wei Lihuang was commander-in-chief of the Guomindang army’s Northeast “Bandit Suppression” Headquarters.