Policy and Arrangements for Fighting
Following the Occupation of Changchun
(October 19, 1948)
To Lin [Biao], Luo [Ronghuan], and Liu [Yalou]:1
We received the telegram sent at 20:00 on the 18th.2
	 1.	 The New First Army was still advancing west from Xinlitun3 on the 17th.
Please investigate whether the armies around Zhangwu and Xinmin are also
still advancing westward. If, following the Changchun Incident,4 Chiang
[Kaishek] and Wei [Lihuang]5 do not modify their policy of seeking battles
with you from the two routes of Jinxi and Huludao to Shenyang, this will
be very beneficial to us. In this situation, it is quite right for you to adopt
the policy of luring the enemy in deep and fighting a battle of large-scale
annihilation.
	 2.	 At the same time, however, you must still allow for the possibility that
Chiang and Wei will change their plan when we completely finish off the
enemy forces in Changchun and when all our columns and the main forces
of the independent division in the North move south. You should still consider deploying a powerful corps in Yingkou and in the areas northwest and northeast of it to avoid being caught unprepared when Chiang and Wei
withdraw from Yingkou. The New First Army and others have now made
considerable westward progress, even getting as far as the region around
Goubangzi.6 This will still greatly facilitate a sudden retreat toward Yingkou
on their part; we hope you will take full note of this. The intelligence suggesting that Chiang Kaishek has assembled 50,000-ton ships in Tianjin in
preparation for withdrawing his troops from Yingkou is quite reliable.
The Military Commission
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Notes

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 3, pp. 103–4, where it is
reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission.
Lin Biao was commander of the Northeast Field Army; Luo Ronghuan was political commissar of the Northeast Field Army; and Liu Yalou was chief-of-staff of the Northeast Field
Army.

2.  The telegram from Lin Biao et al. stated that their Independent Sixth and Eighth
divisions had entered Changchun to take over the base of the Sixtieth Army. They had
occupied Xinlitun on the 17th and were moving on from there with the intention of luring the enemy in deep by withdrawing their Tenth Column to Goubangzi and Heishan and
withdrawing their Fifth Column to Buxin.

3.  Xinlitun is a town in northern Heishan county, Liaoning.

4.  The Guomindang troops defending Changchun became demoralized under siege by
the Communist forces and with the annihilation of the units defending Jinzhou Guomindang commanders Zeng Zesheng and Zheng Dongguo (1903–1991, native of Hunan) led
their armies to revolt, allowing the Communist forces to occupy Changchun.

5.  Wei Lihuang was commander of the Guomindang army’s Northeast “Bandit Suppression” Headquarters.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-164

6.  Goubangzi is a town in southern Beizhen county, Liaoning.