Rapidly Dispatch Troops to Block and Cut Off the Shenyang Enemy’s Retreat via Yingkou[1]

(October 18, 1948)

Lin, Luo, Liu, and inform the Northeast Bureau:

Your telegram of the 18th at 10:00 hours[2] received. What we are most worried about is the Shenyang enemy retreating via Yingkou to reinforce central China. It is reported that Chiang Kai-shek has requisitioned 50,000 tons of shipping in Tianjin, seemingly in preparation for withdrawing troops from Yingkou in November. The resolution of Changchun in a manner consistent with our ideal has made it very difficult for Chiang and Wei[3] to decide to take the overland route to reinforce Jinxi-Huludao[4]. If Chiang and Wei exploit the moment when you are attacking Jinxi-Huludao to rapidly withdraw their entire army to Yingkou, hold it, use sea routes to transport grain for supply, and then gradually move toward Tianjin-Yu[5] or central China, there is a danger that you will be unable to stop them. We do not know whether your forces can exploit the period of Chiang and Wei’s hesitation and indecision to very rapidly capture Jinxi-Huludao, and then swiftly turn the main force back to besiege Shenyang. Even so, attacking Jinxi-Huludao will always require a considerable amount of time, and the Yingkou sector is entirely undefended. Therefore, we propose that within the next few days, after the Changchun

[1] This telegram was drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee and addressed to Lin Biao, commander of the Northeast Field Army; Luo Ronghuan, its political commissar; Liu Yalou, its chief of staff; and the Northeast Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.

[2] Refers to the telegram sent by Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou to the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee at 10:00 hours on October 18, 1948. The telegram stated: After the fall of Jinzhou, Chiang Kai-shek decided that the reinforcing armies from Jinxi and Shenyang should still advance toward Jinzhou according to the original plan, while simultaneously ordering the enemy in Changchun to break out. We had planned to lure the Shenyang enemy southward and then fight a large-scale mobile war, but yesterday the 60th Army revolted, and the New 7th Army was besieged. We estimate that Chiang’s army will no longer dare to advance toward Jinzhou according to the original plan. As for the next move, we believe that attacking Jinxi-Huludao is the best course, and reconnaissance preparations are currently underway.

[3] Wei refers to Wei Lihuang, then Commander-in-Chief of the Kuomintang Army’s Northeast “Bandit Suppression” General Headquarters.

[4] Jinxi-Huludao refers to Jinxi and Huludao in Liaoning Province.

[5] Tianjin-Yu refers to Tianjin and Yuguan (Shanhaiguan) in Hebei Province.

issue is resolved, apart from leaving a few independent divisions to keep watch on Zheng Dongguo[1] and the New 7th Army (assuming that unit switches sides), all the columns that attacked Changchun and several independent divisions should rapidly move south in their entirety, positioning themselves between Shenyang and Yingkou. The timing should be in the first ten days of November; any later and there will be no guarantee. Furthermore, one column must be used to control Yingkou, construct fortified defensive positions, and sever the links between sea and land, so that Chiang and Wei will not dare to take the Yingkou route. Even if they do take the Yingkou route, we can resist them first, holding out until the main force arrives to encircle and annihilate them. What is your opinion? Awaiting your reply.

Military Commission

18th, 21:00–23:00 hours

[1] Zheng Dongguo was then Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Kuomintang Army’s Northeast “Bandit Suppression” General Headquarters and concurrently Commander of the 1st Army Corps.