Next Step: It Is Advisable to Strike Jinxi and Huludao[1]

(October 17, 1948)

Lin, Luo, Liu, Tan, and inform the Northeast Bureau:

(1) Regarding your next move, we believe it is advisable to strike Jinxi and Huludao, and it should not be delayed too long. It is advisable to commence operations after approximately fifteen days of rest and consolidation, striking Jinxi first and Huludao afterward, striving to complete the task of capturing Jinxi and Huludao in November. During your campaign against Jinxi and Huludao, the enemy in Shenyang may be compelled to send reinforcements. Because the garrison forces in Jinxi and Huludao are direct lineage troops of the Kuomintang, unlike the garrison in Jinzhou, which consisted mostly of miscellaneous units. When we captured Jinzhou, Wei Lihuang effectively sat by and did nothing to save it, which must have dissatisfied many. Therefore, when we attack Jinxi and Huludao, the enemy in Shenyang may send reinforcements. And as long as the Shenyang enemy moves far away from Shenyang, advancing via Dahushan[2] and the Daling River to reinforce Jinxi and Huludao, it will be advantageous to the overall situation. This is because within the Kuomintang, there have always been two opinions regarding Shenyang: withdrawal or no withdrawal. According to recent intelligence, Wei Lihuang advocates no withdrawal. However, the Nanjing Ministry of National Defense is still making certain preparations for withdrawal. The methods include overland routes and sea routes. With us occupying Jinzhou, the overland route is very difficult. To withdraw, they would have to use sea transport via Yingkou. Sea transport would have to take place in November. After that, Yingkou freezes over and becomes impassable. If, because of our attack on Jinxi and Huludao, the Shenyang enemy is forced in November to send reinforcements via Dahushan and the Daling River, they will then be unable to utilize the November window to withdraw from Yingkou. As long as the Shenyang enemy does not withdraw in November, after you have captured Jinxi and Huludao, you can then move three to four columns inside the passes to strike the Tianjin-Shanhaiguan line[3], while the main force returns to the vicinity of Shenyang

[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the CPC Central Committee, addressed to Lin Biao, Commander of the Northeast Field Army; Luo Ronghuan, Political Commissar; Liu Yalou, Chief of Staff; Tan Zheng, Director of the Political Department; and informing the Northeast Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.

[2] Dahushan, now named Dahu Shan, a town located in the southern part of Heishan County, Liaoning Province.

[3] The Tianjin-Shanhaiguan line refers to the railway from Tianjin to Shanhaiguan, which is now a section of the Beijing-Harbin line.

to gradually weaken the Shenyang enemy, until Shenyang is finally captured.

(2) Jinxi and Huludao currently have eight divisions, and their combat effectiveness is relatively strong. If we add one division from the 92nd Army and two divisions from the 8th Army in Yantai (one relatively strong, the other composed of local forces and very weak; these two divisions were originally scheduled to be transferred to the Xuzhou-Bengbu[1] area for reorganization, but recently there is intelligence, yet to be confirmed, that they might be sent to Huludao or Tanggu), then there would be a total of eleven divisions. We are not clear about the terrain and the strength of fortifications at Jinxi and Huludao, the disposition of enemy forces at these two locations, the distance between Jinxi and Huludao, and whether it is possible to pin down one location while striking the other first, destroying them one by one. However, we feel that with your current twenty-seven divisions, high morale, ample troop strength, the enemy's low morale, and their reinforcements being far away, coupled with the prestige of our great victory, it is possible to capture Jinxi and Huludao. Even if the terrain at Huludao is unfavorable for attack, capturing Jinxi alone would be very good.

(3) Regarding our army's casualties and captured spoils in the Jinzhou operation, what difficulties you foresee in attacking Jinxi and Huludao, and whether combat is possible after only fifteen days of rest and consolidation—we request your reports on all these points.

(4) Just as this telegram was finished, we received your telegram of the 16th at 12:00 hours. Chiang Kai-shek has gone to Shenyang to arrange the withdrawal from Changchun. Chiang Kai-shek has always underestimated our army's strength. He seems to be judging that after attacking Jinzhou, our army must have suffered heavy casualties and cannot fight again without more than a month of rest and consolidation. Our past practice of always taking a long period of rest and consolidation after a major battle also provides a basis for his judgment. He certainly does not believe that you can now strike the enemy at Xinmin and Zhangwu, nor does he believe that you can attack Jinxi after half a month. His plan is probably to complete the withdrawal from Changchun within this month, use the Changchun forces to return and defend Shenyang, and then use the full strength of Shenyang to reinforce Jinxi and Huludao. If you can persuade the 60th Army to break away from Changchun before the withdrawal, and our 1st Corps can seize the opportunity to attack and enter Changchun to finish off the New 7th Army, then Chiang Kai-shek's plan to concentrate the full force of the Shenyang enemy to reinforce Jinxi and Huludao can be sabotaged. Even if the 60th Army cannot stage an uprising, if our 1st Corps can annihilate part or most of the Changchun enemy after they break out, it can still sabotage part or most of Chiang's plan. To coordinate with the withdrawal of the Changchun enemy, Chiang and Wei will inevitably order the enemy forces now at Zhangwu and Xinmin to advance northward for coordination, which will require about two weeks round trip. If you can complete rest and consolidation and preparations for attacking Jinxi and Huludao within two weeks, and launch the attack on Jinxi and Huludao just when the Changchun and Shenyang forces are converging, it will certainly catch Chiang and Wei off guard. If you can capture Jinxi in about ten days, then reinforcements from Shenyang will certainly be hard-pressed to arrive in time.

(5) One possibility is that after Chiang and Wei extract the Changchun forces, they will abandon Shenyang, and the entire army will withdraw southward by the overland route, pressing against you in an attempt to retake Jinzhou, while placing their main force on the Tianjin-Shanhaiguan line. If this happens, then you should strive even more to attack and occupy Jinzhou, Huludao, Shanhaiguan, Luanxian, Tangshan[1] and other points as rapidly as possible, threatening Beiping and Tianjin, forcing Chiang and Wei to airlift a portion of their forces to reinforce Beiping and Tianjin, thereby facilitating a turnabout to annihilate the enemy's main force. If the enemy uses sea transport via Yingkou to reinforce Shanhaiguan, Tangshan, Beiping, and Tianjin, then you must also first take Jinxi and Huludao, and then discuss operations inside the passes.

Military Commission
Xiaoyin (03:00–05:00, 17th)

[1] Yu, Luan, Tang refer to Yuguan (Shanhaiguan), Luanxian, and Tangshan in Hebei Province.