It seems advisable to postpone the timing of the attack on Zhengzhou by another two or three days[1]

(October 17, 1948)

Liu, Chen, Deng, Deng, and inform Rao, Su, Tan[2]:

Your telegram of the morning of the 17th[3] noted. (1) It seems advisable to postpone the timing of your attack on Zhengzhou by another two or three days. This is because you must consider not only the possibility that Huang Wei[4] may move north to reinforce, but also the possibility that Sun Yuanliang[5] may move west to reinforce. According to Su and Tan’s telegram of the morning of the 16th[6], Qiu and Sun[7] plan to launch a northward offensive on the evening of the 20th. If you choose the evening of the 23rd, the evening of the 24th, or the evening of the 25th

[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, addressed to Liu Bocheng, Commander of the Central Plains Field Army; Chen Yi, First Deputy Commander; Deng Xiaoping, Political Commissar; and Deng Zihui, Deputy Political Commissar.

[2] Rao refers to Rao Shushi, then Political Commissar of the East China Military Region. Su and Tan refer to Su Yu and Tan Zhenlin, then respectively Acting Commander and Acting Political Commissar, and Deputy Political Commissar of the East China Field Army.

[3] Refers to the telegram sent by Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, and Deng Xiaoping to the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China during the morning hours of October 17, 1948. The telegram stated: “Currently, three divisions of Huang Wei’s Corps are covering the transport of military supplies to Nanyang. The 7th Division has been transferred south to Guangshui to deal with our Wang Hongkun’s forces, while the East China Field Army’s operations are still twenty days away. If we postpone the timing of the attack on Zhengzhou, we may lose this relatively favorable opportunity for battle.” “Therefore, we are determined to capture Zhengzhou before Huang Wei’s Corps turns back, and plan to advance from the Yuxiang area on the night of tomorrow (the 18th), launch the attack on the night of the 21st, and strive to capture it within five or seven days. As long as we capture Zhengzhou within six or seven days, we will be in a very active position, and it will also be more advantageous for coordinating with the East China Field Army.”

[4] Huang Wei, then Commander of the 12th Corps of the Kuomintang Army.

[5] Sun Yuanliang, then Commander of the 16th Corps of the Kuomintang Army.

[6] Refers to the telegram sent by Su Yu, Tan Zhenlin, Chen Shiju, and Zhang Zhen to Zhao Jianmin, Xu Shenji, Fu Qiutao, and copied to the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, etc., during the morning hours of October 16, 1948. The telegram stated: “Because Qiu and Sun’s Corps plan to launch an offensive toward southwestern Shandong on the evening of the 20th, they may reoccupy Heze, Jinxiang, and Juye, and even the Yuncheng area, using this action to disrupt our entry into Bian and Zheng, and to make us mistakenly believe the enemy intends to reoccupy Jinan. In order not to hinder our next operational moves, it has been decided that the 9th Column and the Guang Column will enter the southwestern Shandong area.”

[7] Qiu refers to Qiu Qingquan, then Commander of the 2nd Corps of the Kuomintang Army. Sun refers to Sun Yuanliang.

as the time to begin the attack on Zhengzhou, it seems relatively better. This is provided that this timing is also generally suitable with regard to the situation concerning Huang Wei. If you feel that this timing is only suitable with regard to Sun Yuanliang’s side and fundamentally unsuitable with regard to Huang Wei’s side, then act according to your telegram of the morning of the 17th. (2) Regardless of when Liu, Chen, and Deng attack Zhengzhou, the plan of action decided by Su and Tan’s side, as per the telegram sent to the Military Commission on the afternoon of the 15th[1], remains unchanged.

The Military Commission

[1] Refers to the telegram sent by Rao Shushi, Su Yu, and Tan Zhenlin to the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China during the afternoon hours of October 15, 1948. The telegram reported in detail the specific operational deployments, proposing that the entire campaign advance to the assembly and preparation positions along the Lincheng-Linyi line by October 31, and launch a sudden attack on Xin’an Town and its defending enemies to the east and west on November 5.