The Strategy for the Huai-Hai Campaign
Should Not Be Changed
 (October 15, 1948, 5:00 P.M. to 7:00 P.M.)
To Rao [Shushi], Su [Yu], and Tan [Zhenlin], and for the information of Liu
[Bocheng], Chen [Yi], and Deng [Xiaoping]:1
	 1.	 Intelligence gained from the two telegrams sent on the 14th and 15th by the
East China Military Command has confirmed that the army corps of Qiu
[Qingquan] and Sun [Yuanliang]2 plan to attack southwestern Shandong. We
estimate that they will launch the attack around October 20, and by the end of
the month they may occupy Jing[xiang], Yu[tai], Cheng[wu], Shan [county],
Cao [county], Ding[tao], He[ze], and even the region of Yun[cheng] and
Ju[ye]. Their objective is to block your way out of the [Kaifeng]-Xu[zhou]
line and to mislead you into believing that they will recapture Ji’nan so that
you will hastily deploy to confront the enemy, will be unable to rest and
reorganize, and will not dare to move out of northern Jiangsu.
	 2.	 Under these circumstances, your plans for the Huai-Hai Campaign should
not change, and you will even gain a great advantage.
	 3.	 We expect you to send the Ninth and the Guang[dong] columns to the regions
of Yan[zhou] and Ji[ning] to control the canal with their main forces, take up
a defensive position, and send one portion to coordinate with the local army
units of southwestern Shandong in confronting the enemy forces in the areas
of Jin[xiang], Yu[tai], and Cheng[wu].
	 4.	 All the remaining forces will rapidly prepare, according to our suggestions,
and begin by gathering along the Linyi and Zou county line, waiting until
Qiu and Sun move into a certain position and then advance simultaneously southward and launch the Huai-Hai Campaign. The Wei [Guoqing]–Ji [Luo]
units3 will take cover at the same location and act simultaneously with the
main forces. They must not act in advance so as to avoid alerting the enemy.
	 5.	 The time for Liu, Chen, and Deng to attack Zhengzhou should not be too
early; it should be decided only after Qiu and Sun have moved some distance northward. When you attack Zhengzhou, you should have strong units
move around to the areas between Zhengzhou and Zhongmou and attack
Zhengzhou from the east. Since the enemy is ready to give up Zhengzhou on
the slightest pretext, it may well flee as soon as you arrive.
	 6.	 Our army in the Northeast has already taken Jinzhou, wiping out seven divisions (brigades) of enemy forces. Peng [Dehuai], Zhang [Zongxun], and Zhao
[Shoushan]4 have destroyed two reorganized divisions of Hu [Zongnan]’s
forces.5 Report attached.

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Notes

Our source for this text is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 5, pp. 90–91, where it is
reproduced from Mao Zedong’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.

--- Notes

1.  Rao Shushi was political commissar of the East China Military Region. Su Yu was
acting commander and acting political commissar of the East China Field Army, and Tan
Zhenlin was deputy political commissar of the East China Field Army. Liu Bocheng was
commander of the Central Plains Field Army. Chen Yi was first deputy commander and
Deng Xiaoping was political commissar of the Central Plains Field Army.

2.  Qiu Qingquan was commander of the Guomindang army’s Second Army Group, and
Sun Yuanliang was commander of the Guomindang’s Sixteenth Army Group.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-161

3.  Wei Guoqing was commander of the East China Field Army’s Northern Jiangsu
Army Corps, and Ji Luo (Ji Pengfei) was its deputy political commissar.

4.  Peng Dehuai was commander and political commissar of the Northwest Field Army.
Zhang Zongxun and Zhao Shoushan were deputy commanders of the Northwest Field
Army.

5.  Hu Zongnan was director of the Guomindang army’s Xi’an Pacification Office.