Use All of Your Elite Forces to Fight on the
Jinzhou Front1
(October 10, 1948)
	 1.	 From the day you start attacking Jinzhou, there will be a period when the
tactical situation will be very tense. We hope that every two or three days
you will inform us by radio of the enemy’s situation (the strength of the
resistance by the enemy forces defending Jinzhou, the progress of enemy
reinforcements from Huludao and Jinxi and from Shenyang, and the enemy’s probable course of action in Changchun) and of our own situation (the
progress of our attack on the city and the casualties sustained in attacking the
city and holding off the enemy reinforcements).
	 2.	 It is highly possible that, as you have said, the tactical situation during
this period will develop most favorably, that is, you will be able to wipe
out not only the enemy’s forces defending Jinzhou but also a part of the
enemy’s reinforcements from Huludao and Jinxi and some or most of the
enemy’s forces fleeing from Changchun. If the enemy’s reinforcements from
Shenyang advance to the area north of the Daling River just after you have
taken Jinzhou and when you are thus able to shift your forces to encircle
them, then it will be possible to wipe out these reinforcements as well. The
key to all this lies in striving to capture Jinzhou in about a week.
	 3.	 Decide on the disposition of your troops for checking the enemy reinforcements according to your progress in attacking Jinzhou and its progress in
advancing from both the east and the west. In case the enemy reinforcements
from Shenyang advance rather slowly (as may happen if, during your attack
on Jinzhou, the enemy besieged in Changchun breaks out but is caught and
crushed by our Twelfth Column and other forces, in which case the enemy
reinforcements from Shenyang may be so bewildered as to advance rather
slowly or to halt or turn back to rescue the Changchun forces), while the
enemy reinforcements from Huludao and Jinxi advance rather quickly, you
should be ready to throw in your general reserves to help the Fourth and
Our source for this document is Mao Zedong junshi wenji, Vol. 5, pp. 52–53, where it is
1.  Mao drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission to Lin
Biao, commander of the Northeast Field Army, Luo Ronghuan, political commissar of the
Northeast Field Army, and others.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-157

Eleventh columns wipe out part of the latter reinforcements and, first of all,
to check their advance. If the enemy reinforcements from Huludao and Jinxi
are being tied down and checked by our Fourth and Eleventh columns and
other forces and therefore are advancing rather slowly or halt, if the enemy
forces in Changchun do not break out, if the enemy reinforcements from
Shenyang are advancing rather quickly, and if most of the Jinzhou enemy
forces have been wiped out and the capture of the city is imminent, then
you should let the enemy forces from Shenyang advance deep into the area
north of the Daling River so you can shift your forces in time to encircle and
annihilate them at your convenience.
	 4.	 You must focus your attention on the operations in Jinzhou and strive to
capture this city as quickly as possible. Even if none of the other objectives
is attained and Jinzhou alone is captured, you will have gained the initiative,
which in itself will be a great victory. It is hoped that you will give due attention to all the above points. Especially during the first few days of the battle
of Jinzhou, the enemy reinforcements from both east and west will not make
any major moves and you should concentrate all your energy on operations
on the Jinzhou front.

reproduced in Xuanji (1960), pp. 1339–40.