Agree to the Disposition for Dealing with Reinforcing Enemy Forces[1]

(October 5, 1948)

Lin, Luo, Liu:

(1) We fully agree with your telegram of the 5th [4th] at 1500 hours[2] concerning the disposition for dealing with the reinforcing enemy forces. This disposition can guarantee that the attack on Jinzhou will not be threatened by any existing reinforcing enemy forces from either the east or the west, and even if additional reinforcing enemy forces are added, they can also be blocked. (2) According to information, the Kuomintang is currently shipping by sea Sun Liren’s[3] 31st Army from Taiwan to land at Huludao. If this entire army is transported north, it consists of two divisions, each division having three brigades, all newly recruited troops with American equipment. Although they have undergone training for a long period, they lack combat experience and their fighting strength is not strong. It is estimated that they will find it difficult to arrive within ten days. You should not let this information disturb you or shake your resolve. However, you must shorten the preparation time as much as possible and begin the attack at an early date. (3) The deployment for reinforcing Jinzhou from Shenyang, as learned from Dalian, is very timid. This deployment shows extreme fear of our tactic of attacking Jinzhou and striking the reinforcements, adopting a cautious policy of advancing step by step and acting according to the situation. Therefore, you need not worry that this enemy force will be difficult to block; approximately nine divisions or so will be sufficient to block this enemy force. From the twelve divisions you have on that front, you may position nine to ten divisions on the first and second lines, and station three or two divisions at a location not too far from Jinzhou, so that they can be transferred to the Jinxi front when necessary. (4) The offensive spirit of the reinforcing enemy forces from both Shenyang and Jinxi will certainly not be strong. Using six columns to block the reinforcements, you will certainly be fully competent and able to accomplish the task with ease. At the same time, it may not be necessary to use as many as six columns for attacking the city; it is estimated that five columns will suffice, and one column can still be kept as a general reserve force to guarantee the victory of the entire campaign. (5) How many more days are needed to complete preparations, and on what date can the attack begin? Awaiting your report.

Military Commission

0500 hours, 5th

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2. It is planned to use the 10th Column and one division of the 1st Column to resist the reinforcing enemy coming from Shenyang, and to use two divisions of our 6th Column and the entire 5th and 12th Columns to support the operations of the 10th Column, adopting mobile warfare to annihilate the enemy from their flank and rear and to gain time. 3. After the battle for Jinzhou concludes, the reinforcing enemy from Jinxi may shrink back to their original positions at Jinxi. The reinforcing enemy from Shenyang will then be caught in a dilemma, neither able to advance nor retreat. Our army will then turn back the main force that attacked Jinzhou to annihilate the reinforcing enemy from Shenyang, secure Jinzhou, and then attack Jinxi in the next step. However, if by that time the reinforcing enemy from Jinxi has been cut off by us and has not had time to retreat south, our army will first annihilate this enemy force in front of our positions.

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[1] This is a telegram drafted by Mao Zedong for the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to Lin Biao, Commander of the Northeast Field Army, Luo Ronghuan, Political Commissar, and Liu Yalou, Chief of Staff.


[2] Refers to the telegram sent by Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou at 1500 hours on October 4, 1948, to the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China concerning the disposition for dealing with the reinforcing enemy forces. The telegram stated: 1. The distance between the enemy positions at Jinxi and Jinzhou is only over 30 li. Our army is determined to use the 4th Column and the 11th Column in the gap area between the two Jin’s, adopting offensive defense to stubbornly resist and wear down the enemy. In addition, two independent divisions will attack the enemy’s flank and rear at Jinxi and Huludao to tie down the enemy.

[3] Sun Liren, then Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Kuomintang Army and concurrently Commander of the Army Training Command, was responsible in Taiwan for the organization and training of troops including the 31st Army.