It Is Correct to Focus the Fighting on
Jinzhou and Jinxi
(October 4, 1948, 6:00 A.M.)
To Lin [Biao], Luo [Ronghuan], and Liu [Yalou]; and for the information of the
Northeast Bureau:1
We received the telegram you sent at 9:00 A.M. on the 3rd.2
	 1.	 It is very good that you have decided to attack Jinzhou, and we are very
relieved.
	 2.	 You have decided to use the full forces of the Fourth and Eleventh columns
as well as two independent divisions from Rehe3 to deal with the enemy
forces in Jinxi and Huludao. You are using six columns in all – the First,
Second, Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth – to attack Jinzhou. You are using
a total of four columns – the Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Twelfth – to deal with
the enemy reinforcements sent to Jinzhou from Shenyang. And you are using
nine independent divisions to handle the enemy forces from Changchun.
These plans are completely correct. This can be considered focusing the
fighting on Jinzhou and Jinxi. In this way, you can correct the longstanding
error of dividing forces equally between the north and the south without a
focus (turning around to attack Changchun was absolutely the wrong idea,
but because you abandoned this idea quickly, it had no practical negative
repercussions). We have told you several times by telegram during the past
month to do things this way, but only now have you actually come around
to this important point: You should not divide your forces equally, but rather
you should use your main forces on Jinzhou and Jinxi. Although you should have done things this way from the outset, and it has already been nearly a
month until now from when your units began their movements, when you
have straightened out the problem of your focus of attack and have added
two new columns to your forces around Jinzhou and Jinxi, which may have
some impact on the fighting (whether or not there is an impact, and how
large, can only be determined by the outcome of the fighting), the mistake of
equally dividing your forces can now be considered corrected. You should
learn two lessons from this matter. The first lesson is that you should move
your command post toward where you plan to attack before your troops
advance (we pointed this out to you very early on). Your failure to do this
limited your foresight for a long time. The second lesson is that you should
usually concentrate your main forces to attack one point rather than equally
dividing your forces.
	 3.	 As far as the timing of the attack on Jinzhou is concerned, the sooner the better. However, since your forces have not all arrived, your command post has
only just reached the vicinity of Jinzhou, and the mobilization and preparations for attacking the city have not commenced, you should of course wait
a while. Wait until your forces have reached their places and preparatory
work is completed, and then begin your attack. That said, you should strive
to shorten this preparatory process and not delay too much. Of course, you
should also not do things in a rush.
	 4.	 As to why you should not turn around and attack Changchun, it is not, as you
have said, because “it would take too much time,” or because “if we do not
order an attack on Changchun, those enemy forces still would automatically
break out of the encirclement, enabling us to recover Changchun and wipe
out part of the enemy.” Rather, it is because of those reasons mentioned in
the two telegrams we sent yesterday at 17:00 and 19:00, which is that if you
actually turn around and attack Changchun, you will be making a big mistake. For instance, taking up the point about the enemy breaking out of the
encirclement, the later this enemy breaks out, the better for us, and better yet
if the enemy does not break out at all.
	 5.	 All the prior differences of opinion among us are now gone. We hope you
will make your deployments based on the telegram you sent at 9:00 A.M. on
the 3rd. You should proceed boldly and persist firmly as you strive to first
capture Jinzhou and then attack Jinxi.
	 6.	 Chiang Kaishek has arrived in Shenyang, but he is only there to boost the
morale of his disheartened troops. Pay absolutely no heed to anything he
says or does; just persist with the arrangements in your telegram of 9:00
A.M. on the 3rd.
The Military Commission

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Notes

Our source for this telegram is Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 5, pp. 166–68, where it is reproduced from Mao’s handwritten manuscript preserved in the Central Archives.
3.  See “Do Your Best to Capture Jinzhou within About Ten Days,” October 3, 1948, in
this volume.
DOI:  10.4324/9781315719436-155

--- Notes

1.  Mao Zedong drafted this telegram on behalf of the Central Military Commission.
Lin Biao was commander of the Northeast Field Army, Luo Ronghuan was political commissar of the Northeast Field Army, and Liu Yalou was chief-of-staff of the Northeast Field
Army.

2.  The telegram from Lin Biao et al. stated that they still intended to capture Jinzhou
and they would not attempt to attack Changchun. They would aim to annihilate the enemy
forces in Jinzhou to prevent recapture.